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Abstract 
This doctoral dissertation explores the relationship between the European Union (EU) and 
the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD). While both are important pillars of the international 
aid architecture, their interactions have thus far been overlooked in the fields of (i) EU 
development cooperation, (ii) EU-IOs studies, (iii) development studies and (iv) IR. This is 
problematic as it hampers our understanding of the politics underlying international 
development cooperation as well as the interplay between the multilateral and European 
level in the field of development cooperation. The central objective of this doctoral 
dissertation is to address the above shortcomings in literature by acquiring an in-depth 
understanding of the relationship between the EU and the DAC. Methodologically, this study 
adopts an inductive research design, inspired by grounded theory. This allows to capture 
the full complexity of the EU-DAC relationship, stemming from its flexible nature and the 
fact that the risk of being preconceived by existing literature is reduced to a minimum. Data 
are gathered through a combination of document and archive analysis, semi-structured 
interviewing and participant observations. In doing so, particular attention is paid to (i) the 
way in which the EU organizes itself in the DAC, (ii) the role of the DAC in the changing 
international development landscape, (iii) the EU’s full membership status of the DAC, (iv) 
the DAC’s impact on the EU, (v) the EU’s impact on the DAC and (vi) the rise of PCD on the 
Western donors’ aid agenda. The thesis argues that the relationship between the EU and the 
DAC evolved from an interdependent to a dependent relationship from 2005 onwards. 
While traditionally relations were stable, stemming from the fact that they were mutually 
beneficial, they have become increasingly unstable in more recent years. Applying the 
Aristotelian  four causes, this eroding relationship can be understood by looking at the role 
of the EU, the DAC Secretariat and the EU Member States (efficient and final causes), the 
inherent complex nature of the relationship (material cause) and the EU’s changing nature 
as a development actor as well as the shift in power and ideology between the EU and the 
DAC (formal causes).   
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Introduction 
Development is often said to be the movement towards a better, more just society. In 
the words of Amartya Sen, the winner of the 1998 Noble Prize for Economic Science, 
development equals freedom as it “consists of the removal of various types of unfreedoms 
that leave people with little choice and little opportunity of exercising their reasoned agency” 
(Sen, 1999, p. xii). Hence, development cooperation is an inherently political process as 
promoting the development of a country, region or society involves the distribution of 
social, political and economic benefits and costs (Gänzle, Grimm, & Makhan, 2012; Sen, 
1999). This is also the view taken in this doctoral dissertation, as such distinguishing myself 
from those studies and scholars which see development cooperation predominantly as a 
(technical) transfer of resources from donor to partner countries.  
At the heart of international development cooperation lays the objective of reducing 
poverty. For several decades now, the international community has sought ways to reduce 
the number of poor people in the world. While considerable progress has been made – in 
recent years most notably through the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) – still one 
out of five people face in today’s world a life of extreme poverty, living on less than 1,25 
dollar a day (UN, 2014). Therefore, the fight against poverty will unfortunately remain a 
primary concern for the international community in the following decades (OECD, 2013b; 
UN, 2015). 
This doctoral dissertation aims to make a small, yet valuable contribution to the 
eradication of poverty by seeking to achieve a better understanding of the politics 
underlying international development cooperation. This is done by studying the 
relationship between the European Union (EU) and the Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC1) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Both 
institutions are important pillars of the international aid architecture, yet their interactions 
thus far did not attract any scholarly attention. Furthermore, the DAC itself has been 
massively overlooked in academic literature. This is remarkable, to say the least, given that 
                                                     
1 In the remainder of this doctoral dissertation, the words ‘DAC’ and ‘the Committee’ are used 
interchangebly.  
  
 
the DAC has been extremely influential in defining what we today see as development 
cooperation (Boas & McNeill, 2004; Heiner, Klingebiel, & Mahn, 2014; Manning, 2008). 
Grouping the world’s largest donors, it has served for more than fifty years as a forum for 
defining and monitoring global development standards. For example, the concepts of ODA, 
policy coherence for development (PCD) or untied aid all find their origins within the DAC 
(Führer, 1996; Kim & Lightfoot, 2011). Furthermore the Committee helped forging major 
international development commitments, including the MDGs and the Paris Declaration on 
Aid Effectiveness (Eyben, 2013; Masujima, 2004; Ruckert, 2008). 
One of the DAC’s most important members is the EU. This comes as no surprise given 
that the EU is arguably one of the world’s main development actors, combining the 
characteristics of a bilateral donor – i.e. providing aid through the Union’s budget – and a 
multilateral donor – i.e. embodying the collective efforts of all 28 EU member states 
(Carbone, 2007; Farrell, 2008). The sum of both makes the EU an impressive actor in 
international development, having a global presence in over 140 countries and holding the 
world’s largest budget of official development assistance (ODA)2. Furthermore, the EU has 
shown on numerous occasions its determination to shape international development 
cooperation (Gänzle et al., 2012; Holland & Doidge, 2012; OECD/DAC, 2012c). However, 
whether and how the EU’s development power and ambitions influence the DAC’s work is 
at present unclear. Indeed, neither the study of EU development cooperation (e.g. Arts & 
Dickson, 2004; Carbone, 2007; Holland & Doidge, 2012), nor the literature on the 
interaction between the EU and IOs paid thus far attention to the relations between the EU 
and the DAC (e.g. Jørgensen & Costa, 2012; Jørgensen & Laatikainen, 2013; Kissack, 2010). 
Furthermore, and as outlined in the previous paragraph, the fields of IR and development 
studies hardly paid any attention to the DAC, let alone its relationship with the EU (most 
notable excpetions are: Eyben, 2013; Kim & Lightfoot, 2011; Masujima, 2004; Ruckert, 
2008).  
The main objective of this doctoral dissertation is thus to acquire an in-depth 
understanding of the EU-DAC relationship. By doing so, this study not only addresses the 
                                                     
2 Collectively, the EU provides more than half of the world’s ODA, while bilaterally the EU ranks as 
the third largest provider of development aid (OECD, 2014b). 
  
 
above gap in literature, but more importantly seeks to achieve a better understanding of the 
politics underlying international development cooperation. To achieve this, this study opts 
for an inductive research approach, inspired by grounded theory. The starting point of this 
doctoral research is the collection and analysis of data from which theoretical insights and 
research questions inductively emerge. In turn, these are tested and further refined during 
the research process. This approach is favored over traditional/deductive ones given that it 
offers the flexibility that is necessary for the explorative nature of this doctoral study. 
Furthermore, by allowing theoretical insights and research questions to emerge from the 
data (i.e. its open-ended nature), it is complexity sensitive given that it does not favors a 
certain set of explanations a priori. It also avoids the potential restraints imposed by 
existing literature.  
The remainder of this doctoral dissertation is structured as follows. The first part, 
constituted by three chapters, provides a general introduction to this study. More 
specifically, the first chapter elaborates on the larger context in which the EU and the DAC 
interact with one another. In doing so, particular attention is paid to the policy evolutions 
and dynamics at the level of the EU, the OECD and the international level. Chapter two 
positions this doctoral dissertation within the literature on (i) EU development cooperation, 
(ii) EU-IOs interactions and (iii) IOs/development cooperation, arguing that each study 
systematically overlooked the EU-DAC relationship. The third chapter of this dissertation 
elaborates on the research design of this study. More specifically, particular attention is 
paid to grounded theory, outlining the main underpinnings of this study and showing how 
these relate to my personal ontological and epistemological positions. Furthermore, chapter 
three also discusses the processes of data generation and analysis. The second part of this 
doctoral dissertation presents the empirical findings of this study and is constituted by 
chapters four to nine. More specifically, I broke down the EU-DAC relationship into six 
papers (i.e. five journal articles and one book chapter), each focusing on a particular 
element of the relationship. Each paper is discussed separately in a corresponding chapter 
(see table 1 below). The third and final part of this doctoral dissertation is constituted by 
chapter ten. In this chapter, I integrate the findings of the previous chapters into a 
  
 
theoretical framework. Furthermore, I elaborate on the main contributions of this doctoral 
dissertation and put forward an agenda for future research.  
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Part one 
 
 
 Part one is dedicated to the introduction of this doctoral dissertation, providing a 
general overview of the research topic (chapter 1), the academic literature (chapter 2) and 
the research design of this study (chapter 3).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Chapter 1:  Mapping the research field 
As is the case with studying all social phenomena, it is important to first grasp the 
larger context in which certain interactions or events take place before taking a closer look 
at the phenomenon itself. Therefore, this first chapter provides an overview of the larger 
context in which the EU and DAC interact with one another. This is particularly relevant for 
this doctoral dissertation given that it is a combination of articles, as such not always 
providing sufficient space to elaborate in depth upon the larger context of this study. This 
context can be visualized as follows: 
Figure 1: 
 
 
As reflects from the above figure 1, and as already outlined in the introduction to this 
doctoral dissertation, the central aim of this study is to gain an in-depth understanding of 
the interactions between the EU and the DAC, represented by the thick black arrow in the 
lower left corner. However, in order to fully grasp the EU-DAC relationship one needs to 
take into account the policy dynamics at the level of the (i) EU, (ii) the OECD and (iii) the 
international level. Therefore, this first chapter discusses each of these policy levels 
separately, focusing on those elements that are relevant for interpreting the empirical 
findings in the second part of this dissertation. Before doing so, however, it is important to 
  
 
outline that the following sections predominantly build upon secondary literature. This is 
different for the section on the DAC, stemming from the fact that the Committee has rarely 
been the subject of scholarly attention. Therefore, it includes a first set of empirical results 
on its history, functioning and role in international development cooperation.  
1. The European Union 
The first central actor in this doctoral dissertation is the EU. Therefore, this section 
provides a general introduction to EU development integration, followed by an overview of 
the dynamic interplay between the EU institutions and Member States in this policy area. 
Other aspects of the EU’s development policies (e.g. involvement of the European 
Parliament, the trade-development nexus) are not addressed given that they are not 
relevant for understanding the EU-DAC relationship.  
1.1. EU development integration 
The history of EU development cooperation goes back to the inception of the 
European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957. Similar to Carbone (2007), I distinguish 
between three phases in EU development policy. The first phase started with the signing of 
the Treaty of Rome (1957) and lasted until the Treaty of Maastricht (1993). During this 
period, the EU could be considered a weak development actor, especially seen in the light of 
its current impressive development portfolio. Indeed, the EU essentially lacked real 
development competences and as such had to pursue its development objectives through 
its trade relations with the global South (Carbone, 2007; Holland & Doidge, 2012; Orbie, 
2012).  
The rationale behind this situation was that most EU Member States were at the time 
of the signing of the Treaty of Rome unwilling to transfer much power to the European level 
when it came to development cooperation (Cosgrove-Twitchett, 1978; Drieghe, 2011). 
While the fourth section of the Treaty - titled ‘L’association des pays et territoires d’outre-
mer’ – foresaw in the creation of a development partnership between the EEC and the 
former European colonies with as main objective ‘la promotion du développement 
économique et social des pays et territoires, et l’établissement de relations économiques 
étroites entre eux et la Communauté dans son ensemble’ (1957, art. 131), it did not envisage 
  
 
the creation of a full-blown development policy at the European level. Rather, EU Member 
States foresaw in the creation of three policy instruments which have characterized EU 
development policy ever since. These are, respectively, (i) the preferential trade 
relationship between the EU and the group of African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) 
countries, (ii) the European Development Fund (EDF) and (iii) the European Investment 
Bank (EIB).  Indeed, putting the EU’s trade competences aside, the European Commission 
was only granted a (small) role in managing the intergovernmental EDF and EIB (Arts & 
Dickson, 2004; Cosgrove-Twitchett, 1978; Grilli, 1993). As a result, the EU had to 
extensively rely on its trade instruments during most of the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s to 
pursue its development objectives (Frisch, 2008; Orbie, 2012). Indeed, despite the EU’s 
clear development aspirations – most notably during the seventies as reflects from several 
Commission’s communications at that time (European Commission, 1972, 1974) – a 
majority of EU Member States continued to be reluctant to grant the European Commission 
legal competences in the field of development cooperation (Cosgrove-Twitchett, 1978; 
Dimier, 2014; Grilli, 1993; Holland & Doidge, 2012). 
The Treaty of Maastricht (1993) fundamentally altered the above situation, 
heralding the second phase in EU development integration. More specifically, with the 
signing of the Treaty, development cooperation was added to the EU’s portfolio, allowing 
the European Commission to set up its own bilateral development programs alongside 
those of the EU Member States. In doing so, it had to take into account the so-called triple Cs 
as laid down in Article 130 of the Treaty, referring to the principles of complementarity, 
coordination and coherence (Carbone, 2007; Hoebink, 2005).  
Initially, though, the EU’s development programs faced severe teething problems. 
Due to inexperience, a lack of staff and a scattered division of development responsibilities 
across different Directorate Generals (DGs) within the European Commission, the EU 
struggled during most of the nineties to implement its large and ambitious development 
programs in an effective way (Holland, 2002; Orbie, 2012). Most notable was the strong 
delay in the disbursement of development funds, but there were also other problems 
related to, for example, the lack of effective monitoring and evaluation of the European 
development programs (Holland & Doidge, 2012; Van Reisen, 1999). For understandable 
  
 
reasons, this sparked much criticism about the EU’s new gained role as a development 
donor. In 1998, for example, the DAC issued a highly critical peer review of the Union’s 
development policies, scrutinizing the fact that the Commission lacked an overall vision on 
development and failed to successfully implement and follow up on its development 
programs (OECD/DAC, 1998). Most outspoken, however, was the then UK Secretary of State 
for Claire Short who publicly accused the Commission in June 2000 for being ‘the worst 
development agency in the world’, providing ‘aid that doesn’t help’ (Short, 2000).  
 Obviously, the above situation was unsustainable. Therefore, by the time the new 
Prodi Commission took office in September 1999, the reform of EU development policy had 
become a key priority. More specifically, under the craftsmanship of Poul Nielson, the then 
European Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid, a series of reforms were 
initiated, aiming to turn the EU into a full-blown development donor (Harding, 2000; 
Holland & Doidge, 2012; Nielson, 2012; Orbie & Versluys, 2008). Most notable was (i) the 
establishment of EuropeAid, (ii) the strengthening of the role of the Commission’s 
delegations in the management of the EU’s development funds and (iii) the adoption of the 
2000 Development Policy Statement which for the first time ever laid out an overarching 
EU strategy on development (Bossuyt, Lehtinen, Anne, Laporte, & Gwénäelle, 2000; Orbie, 
2012; Stocchetti, 2013). As a result, the EU had become a full-blown donor by the turn of 
the Millennium. Or as stated by Poul Nielson, the EU had become mainstream, referring to 
the fact that it had turned itself into a traditional donor – in the DAC sense of the word 
(Nielson, 2012).  
The third and final phase in EU development policy – or new season as coined by 
Carbone (2008a) – started from the turn of the millennium onwards. This period is 
characterized by a growing emphasis on enhancing the EU’s coordinating role over the 
different Member States’ development policies (Carbone, 2007, 2008a; Orbie & Versluys, 
2007). Indeed, while EU Member States are still reluctant to integrate in the field of 
development cooperation, the 2000s have witnessed a move towards soft integration and 
the development of a common European vision on development. This is reflected most 
clearly in the European Consensus on Development (2005), a document jointly agreed upon 
by the EU Member States, the European Commission and the European Parliament, 
  
 
outlining a common focus on poverty reduction and achieving the MDGs (Delputte & 
Verschaeve, 2015; Stocchetti, 2013). Also on other topics such as aid effectiveness, policy 
coherence for development (PCD), the untying of aid and most notably the scaling up of 
ODA, joint European pledges and/or commitments have been made during the 2000s (e.g. 
Carbone, 2007; Gänzle et al., 2012; Hoebink, 2010; Holland & Doidge, 2012; Stocchetti, 
2013; Stroß, 2014). 
In sum, it can thus be concluded that the EU has developed itself as a multilateral 
development actor in the new millennium. However, this does not mean it put aside its role 
as a bilateral development donor. Taking a closer look at the EU’s bilateral ODA budget, the 
Union continues to be one of the largest providers of official aid in the world. In 2014, for 
example, it ranked in absolute terms as the third largest ODA donor, outnumbering all other 
EU Member States, including Germany, France and the UK (OECD, 2014b). Also in terms of 
objectives, the EU continues to be an ambitious donor – at least when focusing on its 
discourse. More specifically, over the past decade and a half, the overarching objective of 
the EU’s development policies has been the eradication of poverty. In doing so, particular 
attention has been given to achieving the MDG and implementing the Paris Declaration on 
Aid Effectiveness (Carbone, 2013a; Delputte & Orbie, 2014; OECD/DAC, 2007, 2012c). In 
recent years, however, the EU’s development discourse seem to be changing slowly, mainly 
in response to the changing international development landscape. More specifically, and as 
reflects from the Agenda for Change (2011), the eradication of poverty and achieving the 
MDGs continue to be EU’s primary objectives, though in order to achieve these the 
Commission has come to put more emphasis put on the promotion of human rights and 
democracy and aims to gradually shift its ODA budgets away from the middle-income 
countries (MICs) to the least-developed countries (LICs) in order to maximize its impacts. 
Furthermore, the EU has become one of the key advocates of policy coherence for 
(sustainable) development – especially in the context to the post-2015 framework, as such 
explicitly moving beyond the traditional development paradigms (see chapters 8 and 9). 
Finally, the Commission also increasingly explores ways to strengthen the involvement of 
the private sector in development cooperation, for example, by setting-up so-called 
blending instruments (Delputte & Verschaeve, 2015; ETTG, 2011; European Commission, 
  
 
2011). In sum, it can thus be concluded that the EU has become in recent years a more 
strategic development actor (see e.g. CONCORD, 2012b; Delputte & Verschaeve, 2015; 
Holden, 2014; Mah, 2014).   
1.2. EU Member States and EU institutions  
 
 As outlined in the previous sector, the EU turned itself over the past two and a half 
decades into a full-blown international development actor. In doing so, it combines the 
characteristics of a bilateral and multilateral donor (Carbone, 2011b). This section explores 
in greater detail the interaction between the EU Member States and the EU institutions (i.e. 
the European Commission) within both roles. This is essential for understanding the EU-
DAC relationship given that (i) the EU’s involvement in the Committee is not limited to one 
of both roles and (ii) both the EU institutions and EU Member States take part in the work 
of the DAC (see also chapter four).   
Multilateral role 
 As a multilateral actor, the EU embodies the collective efforts of all 28 Member States 
including its own development programs. For obvious reasons, this multilateral side of EU 
development cooperation is shaped by the interaction between the EU institutions and the 
EU Member States. In doing so, both group of actors see the European level as a venue for 
potential influence (Carbone, 2011b; Frisch, 2008). Indeed, by striving for a common 
position on a particular issue, the European Commission and/or EU Member States 
typically aim to put their stamp on the general direction of the Union’s development 
policies. Furthermore, by setting certain priorities they can also strengthen their own 
position within the European construction, or use the Union as a whole as a vehicle for 
international leverage (Carbone, 2013a; Farrell, 2012; Holland & Doidge, 2012). A text-book 
example are the joint European commitments that have been agreed upon at the Barcelona 
Council Meeting (2002) to scale up European ODA towards 0,7% by 2015. By doing so, the 
EU first of all strengthened its leverage at the UN’s Financing for Development Conference 
in Monterey (2002). Furthermore, these joint commitments also played into the hand of the 
European Commission which was granted a role in monitoring progress among its 
Members (Carbone, 2007; Delputte, Verschaeve, Lannoo, & Orbie, 2015).  
  
 
Applied the EU-DAC relationship, it is thus important to pay particular attention to 
the dynamics that underlie certain common European development positions. This is 
particularly relevant since the EU Member States and EU delegation in Paris are politically 
bound by what they have previously agreed upon in Brussels. As such, there is always the 
question of what collective actions take place – or have taken place – in Brussels when 
studying the DAC’s work on a particular issue. For obvious reasons, this might lead to 
certain frictions between the EU and the DAC given that the Brussels level may serve as an 
(alternative) venue to bypass the work that has been carried out in Paris (see chapter 8).  
Bilateral role 
 As a bilateral donor, the EU should be looked upon as a donor in its own right, 
alongside the other EU Member States. This being said, one cannot simply disregard the EU 
Member States when studying the Union’s bilateral development policies. Obviously, the 
central actor one needs to take into account is the European Commission3, channeling 
European ODA to its partner countries through various EU funds. However, EU Member 
States play an important role in providing resources to these funds. More specifically, the 
EU’s bilateral development programs are financed from two main sources, respectively, (i) 
voluntary contributions of the Member States through the EDF – governed by its own rules 
(see supra) and (ii) own resources from the Union’s budget (e.g. share of Member States 
VAT, custum duties...). Schematically, this looks as follows4: 
                                                     
3 Other EU institutions such as the European Parliament are also involved in the EU’s development 
policies, though, only play a secondary role (e.g. Delputte & Verschaeve, 2015), explaining why these 
are not taken into account in this section as well as the remainder of this doctoral dissertation.   
4 Figure 2 has been derived from a study of the World Bank from 2010, explaining why it only makes 
reference to 27 EU member States instead of 28 EU Member States (Kitt, 2012). 
  
 
 
Moreover, if one further brake down the financing of the EU’s bilateral development 
programs, it becomes clear that not all EU Member States contribute equally to the Union’s 
development budget. The extent to which each Member State does is visualized in figure 3 
below5.   
                                                     
5 Note that figure 3 is slightly outdated as it does not lists the Czech Republic, Poland, the Slovak 
Republic and Slovenia as DAC EU Members. This stems from the fact that figure 3 is derived from 
the most recent DAC multilateral aid review of 2012, whereas the above countries only joined the 
DAC in 2013.  
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As reflects from the above figure6, there exists a great deal of variance across the 
different EU Member States when it comes to channeling ODA through the EU institutions. 
While some of Member States rely quite extensively on the EU – most notably Greece, Italy 
and to a lesser extent also Austria and Portugal, others channel only a small portion of their 
ODA budget through the EU – this is particularly true for those EU Members States that are 
part of the Nordic (plus) and/or the so-called g077 grouping (OECD/DAC, 2012d). Applied 
to the EU-DAC relationship, it is thus important to take into account the above context given 
that the degree to which certain EU Member States are involved in the Union’s bilateral 
development programs may potentially impact the position of some of them when 
discussing certain (EU) related issues in the DAC (see chapter 8). 
                                                     
6 Note that the data in figure 3 should not be seen as a proxy for the ‘EU mindedness’ of the Member 
States, or only to a small extent. This stems from the fact that so-called country specific contribution 
keys are used to determine the amount of ODA channeled through the EDF by the different Member 
States. These keys are only to a certain degree open for negotiations in the sense that Member States 
can only discuss about the weight given to certain parameters. As such, Member States which give 
little ODA in general channel  in relative terms a lot of their aid through the EU.  
7 Referring to those countries that have successfully reached the 0,7% ODA target.  
Figure 3 
Source: OECD/DAC (2012) 
  
 
2. The OECD family  
  
 The second actor that takes in a central role in this doctoral dissertation is the DAC. 
However, in order to fully capture its history, role and functioning, one first needs to look at 
the large context in which it operates, namely, the OECD family. Indeed, rather than seeing 
the OECD as a monolithic bloc which includes the DAC, it is better to see it as a family (or 
system) which is composed by the OECD itself, but also a number of other bodies/IOs – 
most notably the DAC and the International Energy Agency (IEA) – which are closely linked 
to it (see also Lesage & Van de Graaf, 2013) . Schematically, this as follows: 
Figure 4: 
 
 
  
 
 In what follows, I will first discuss the OECD’s history, functioning and role in 
international relations, followed by an overview of the DAC. In this second section, I will 
also briefly touch upon the so-called Development Cluster. Other bodies/IOs such as the 
IEA, Paris 21 will not be addresses given that they fall beyond the scope of this doctoral 
dissertation. This is different for the WP-EFF and the Development Centre, though, both will 
not be addressed in this section, but in the different chapters of this study – stemming from 
the fact that they are only relevant with regard certain specific research questions. Finally, 
it should be pointed out that the section on the DAC largely builds upon my own empirical 
findings, stemming from the fact that the Committee has been massively overlooked in the 
literature (see supra).    
2.1. The OECD  
 
2.1.1. History 
 The OECD is an intergovernmental IO whose primary objective is ‘to promote policies 
that will improve the economic and social well-being of people around the world’ 
(www.oecd.org). It was established in 1961, though, its roots go back to 1948. At that time, 
European countries established the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation 
(OEEC). The OEEC was set-up to administer the Marshall plan for the reconstruction of 
Europe. As such, it served as one of the first successful exponents of European integration 
(Griffiths, 1997; Woodward, 2009). However, by the end of the 1950s, the OEEC had lost 
most of initial glance. This was the case for two reasons. First, the Organisation had outlived 
most of its purpose once the Marshall plan evaporated in 1952. While the OEEC continued 
to be operational – focusing on topics such as trade liberalization – it essentially had 
become an institution without a clear purpose (Carroll & Kellow, 2011; Griffiths, 1997).  
Second, the OEEC was challenged by two new organizations, respectively, the EEC and the 
European Free Trade Association (EFTA). Both had become in no time the new drivers of 
European integration, further adding to the OEEC’s irrelevance. As a result, the OEEC went 
through an existential crisis in the late fifties, and ideas arose to “kill the Organisation all 
together” as suggested by France (Griffiths, 1997; Woodward, 2009). 
  
 
This gradually changed by the end of the fifties. At that time, Western countries 
raised the idea to reform the OEEC and turn it into a forum for transatlantic cooperation8, 
which happened by the end of 1961. This effort should be seen in the light of the political 
situation at that time. First, transatlantic relations were at a historic low. Especially the 
relationship between Washington and Paris was increasingly tense, most notably over the 
nuclear aspirations of French president Charles de Gaulle, better known as ‘force de frappe’ 
(Carroll & Kellow, 2011; Wolfe, 2007). Furthermore, within European countries were 
divided on what path to follow towards integration, giving ground to a more 
supranationalist camp (i.e. EEC countries) and an intergovernmentalist camp (i.e. EFTA 
countries). Second, several countries – most notably the US, UK and Canada – were 
frightened by the creation of the EEC’s common market. More specifically, and as stipulated 
in Article 1 of the Treaty of Rome (1957), the EEC countries engaged in an economic 
liberalization that went far beyond the traditional free trade liberalizations as that time. As 
such, most non-EEC countries were afraid of the potential discriminatory impact of the 
creation of this European Common market (Griffiths, 1997; Wolfe, 2007; Woodward, 2009). 
By reforming the OEEC, the US aimed to kill both challenges with one stone. More 
specifically, and as envisaged by the Eisenhower administration, the new OECD first of all 
needed to serve as a forum for permanent dialogue between the different Western 
countries. This would smoothen political relations across the Atlantic and give a strong 
signal to the rest of the world that Western countries were still a united bloc. Furthermore, 
by focusing on socio-economic issues – including trade (!) – the idea was that the OECD 
could serves as a default structure for influencing the EEC’s common market if necessary 
(Griffiths, 1997; Wolfe, 2007; Woodward, 2009).  
 
 
 
                                                     
8 Note that the initial plan was to expand the mandate of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 
However, in the end the choice fell on reforming the OEEC, amongst other reasons, because of the 
French position vis-à-vis the NATO (Carroll & Kellow, 2011; Griffiths, 1997).  
  
 
2.1.2. Membership 
 In terms of membership, the OECD is currently composed out of 34 countries9, 
including most of the world’s so-called advanced or industrialized countries. These span all 
continents, with the exception of the Africa. However, due to the OECD’s establishment 
history – i.e. originating from the OEEC and being established during the Cold War – most of 
its members are traditional European/Western powers. This explains why the OECD carries 
the image of being a ‘rich man’s club’ or ‘club of western countries’ (Carroll & Kellow, 2011; 
Mahon & McBride, 2008). In recent years, however, the Organization is trying to abandon 
this image10. It does so by trying to expand its membership, reaching out to the so-called 
emerging countries – most notably the BRICs and Indonesia (Clifton & Díaz-Fuentes, 2011; 
Lesage & Van de Graaf, 2015; Woodward, 2011). These efforts paid off, at least to some 
extent. While close collaborations and partnerships – or in OECD terms ‘enhanced 
engagements’ – have been set up with all BRIC countries, only Russia has shown a real 
interest in joining the Organization. However, the latter’s accession has been put on hold 
because of the ongoing conflict (or war) in Ukraine (www.oecd.org).  
 Furthermore, the OECD also tries to involve other actors – i.e. third countries, IOs 
and civil society organizations (CSOs) – to the greatest extent possible. However, it should 
be noted that the involvement of third countries and CSOs varies greatly across the 
different bodies of the OECD. While most IOs easily find their way to Paris– to list a few: the 
United Nations (UN), Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), International Labour 
Organization (ILO), International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Trade Organization (WTO) 
or World Bank all take part in the OECD’s work on an almost permanent basis (OECD, 2007, 
2013c, 2014c) – third countries and CSOs often show less enthusiasm to take part in its 
work (Carroll & Kellow, 2011).  
                                                     
9 At present, the OECD is composed out of  34 countries. These are respectively: Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, The Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Turkey, 
The United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US).  
10 This also clearly reflects from the appointment of the Mexican Angel Gurria in 2006 as new 
Secretary-General of the OECD, whose election programme predominantely revolved around 
expanding the Organization’s membership in order to secure its future.  
  
 
2.1.3. Functioning   
 In terms of functioning, the OECD’s decision-making process is shaped by three 
actors (cf. figure 4). These are, respectively, (i) the OECD Council, (ii) the OECD Secretariat 
and (iii) the different OECD Committees. Starting with the OECD Council, this body 
constitutes the highest political level within the Organization. It meets regularly – on 
average once a month – at the level of the permanent representatives to the OECD to 
oversee the work of the Organization. Furthermore, once a year, the Council meets at the 
ministerial level to discuss the key priorities and issues for the OECD, as such given 
strategic direction to the Organization. For example, the outreach of the OECD towards the 
BRICs (see supra) has been initiated by the OECD Council (Carroll & Kellow, 2011; Clifton & 
Díaz-Fuentes, 2011; OECD, 2007; Woodward, 2009). In both constellations, the OECD 
Council is chaired by the Secretary-General and decisions are taken by consensus (Carroll & 
Kellow, 2011; Woodward, 2009).  
A second actor in the OECD’s decision-making is the Secretariat. Essentially, its role 
is twofold, namely, (i) supporting the work of the different OECD committees with analysis 
and input and (ii) carrying out the priorities that have been set by the Council (e.g. 
implementing institutional reforms). At the head of the OECD Secretariat, one can find the 
OECD Secretary-General, assisted by several Deputy Secretary-Generals11. At a lower level, 
the Secretariat is made up by different Directorates, each responsible for a specific policy 
area and/or more horizontal issues such as the promotion of policy coherence. In total, the 
OECD Secretariat is made up of around 2500 officials, of which a majority are highly-
qualified experts – often with a background in economics, international law or political 
science (Carroll & Kellow, 2011; www.oecd.org).  
A third and final actor are the different OECD committees. At present, the OECD is 
composed out of over 250 committees, working groups and expert groups. It is here that 
the center of gravity of the decision-making lies given that these specialized committees 
                                                     
11 In the period between 2011 and 2014 former Belgian prime minister Yves Leterme was one of the 
OECD’s Deputy Secretary-Generals, being in charge of Social Affairs, Education, Governance and 
Entrepreneurship.  
  
 
and bodies serve as the meeting place for the representatives of the different OECD Member 
States and officials from the OECD Secretariat. Typically, most of these Committees hold a 
great deal of autonomy in terms of determining their agenda, working pace or level of 
involvement of non-OECD members (see supra). This is particularly true for the so-called 
first-level committees, which are the most important committees (de jure the DAC is also 
one of them). These committees are allowed to establish subcommittees, working parties 
and expert groups to address certain aspects of their work. This makes the OECD a very 
decentralized IO, given that it is an amalgam of committees, bodies, subsidiary bodies and 
working groups which all function in the same way (i.e. soft law mechanisms), though work 
at different paces and meet in different constellations (Carroll & Kellow, 2011; Woodward, 
2009).  
2.1.4. Role in global governance 
 Finally, and perhaps most important, is the role of the OECD in global governance. As 
already outlined in one of the previous sections, the OECD’s overarching objective is to 
‘promote policies that will improve the economic and social well-being of people around the 
world’ (www.oecd.org). This ambition builds upon the first article of the OECD convention, 
which stipulates that the Organization shall design and promote policies to: 
  
 (a) achieve the highest sustainable economic growth and employment and a rising 
 standard of living in Member countries, while maintaining financial stability, and thus 
 to contribute to the development of the world economy; 
 (b) contribute to sound economic expansion in Member as well as non-Member 
 countries in the process of economic development; and 
 (c) contribute to the expansion of world trade on a multilateral, non-discriminatory 
 basis in accordance with international obligations (OECD, 1960, Art. 1).  
  
 As reflects from the above article, the OECD holds a broad and extremely flexible 
mandate. This explains why the Organization has been active on a wide range of issues, 
covering almost the entire socio-economic policy spectrum ranging from agriculture, 
corruption or environment to energy, employment, taxation, trade or science 
  
 
(www.oecd.org). Only in a small number of policy areas – i.e. defense, culture and sports – 
the OECD lacks competences or has shown no ambition thus far (Carroll & Kellow, 2011). 
Because of its broad and flexible mandate, the OECD holds a distinctive role in global 
governance. Indeed, at a meta-level, its functioning is not constrained by a narrow/well-
defined mandate as is the case for most other IOs. This makes the OECD a very flexible IO, 
which is able to quickly address gaps in global governance. During the 1970s, for example, it 
was one of the first IOs to address the emerging issues of environment12 and energy13 in its 
work (Carroll & Kellow, 2011; Lesage & Van de Graaf, 2013; van Lennep, 1998; Woodward, 
2009). 
 Finally, taking a closer look at the actual work of the OECD, its current role in global 
governance is twofold. First and most important, the Organization serves for its Members 
as a forum for information sharing, policy learning and standard setting in a wide range of 
policy areas. More specifically, the OECD committees serve as meeting places for national 
servants – typically specialists in a certain policy area – to jointly reflect upon (common) 
problems and try to come up with solutions based on analysis and deliberation (Carroll & 
Kellow, 2011; Marcussen, 2003; Porter, 2007; Woodward, 2009). Furthermore, in most 
policy areas, the OECD developed some kind of system of peer reviewing, allowing its 
Members to scrutinize as well as learn from each other’s policy performances (Ben-Artzi, 
2013; Carroll & Kellow, 2011; Woodward, 2009). In sum, the OECD thus serves first of all as 
hub of global knowledge in a wide range of policy areas (Marcussen, 2003; Nay, 2014; 
Slaughter, 2004). Second, in recent years, the OECD has increasingly come to function as the 
de facto secretariat of the G20. Indeed, since the Pittsburgh summit (September 2009), the 
OECD has been actively taking part in the work of the G20. More specifically, and following 
an official request from the G20, the Organization provides policy expertise and analysis to 
the G20 meetings. Furthermore, it also carries out tasks mandated by the Group. On 
taxation, for example, the OECD has established in recent years several reports and 
standards, following discussions at the level of the G20 to tackle tax evasion (Carroll & 
Kellow, 2011; OECD, 2013d; Wouters & Kerckhoven, 2011).  
                                                     
12 In 1970, for example, the OECD set-up its Environment Committee.  
13 In 1973, for example, the OECD established the International Energy Agency (IEA). 
  
 
2.2.  The DAC 
Having provided a general overview on the OECD, this section takes a closer look at 
the DAC. As previously outlined in this chapter (and also reflects from figure 4), it is 
important to make a distinction between the OECD and the DAC given that the latter holds a 
largely autonomous position within the OECD family. Or as coined by a former DAC 
delegate, the Committee should be seen as an “OECD within the OECD”, referring to the fact 
that while it operates in a similar fashion as the OECD, it holds a much more autonomous 
position.  
2.2.1. History 
The origins of the DAC lay in the late fifties/early sixties. At first sight this might 
seem obvious given that the DAC is de jure a committee of the OECD which was established 
at that time. However, what few people know is that the DAC is actually older than the 
OECD, initially being an independent IO called the Development Assistance Group (DAG). 
More specifically, the origins of the DAG go back to 13 January 1960, whereas the OECD 
became only operational on 30 September 1961 (Führer, 1996). Similar to the creation of 
the OECD (see supra), the establishment of the DAG came at the initiative of the US. It was 
established in response to the changing international context in the late fifties, referring 
first of all to a new wave of decolonization. Furthermore, the Soviet Union (USSR) was 
economically increasingly involved in the global South and communist forces were uprising 
in a number of countries, most notable Angola, Cuba and Vietnam (McWilliams & 
Piotrowski, 2009; Rostow, 1985). Against this background, a significant expansion of 
Western aid budgets was seen as self-evident, both for humanitarian and geopolitical 
reasons (Esman & Cheever, 1967). However, the US itself was unable to further expand its 
aid budget, stemming from the fact that the country faced its first balance of payment 
deficits since the end of the Second World War. On the other hand, countries such as 
Germany or Japan were economically thriving14 and had up until then provided – in relative 
terms – little development aid (Esman & Cheever, 1967; Gable, 1959; Rostow, 1985; 
Schmidt, 2003).  
                                                     
14 Germany was typically referred to as being a wirtschaftswunder (German for economic miracle) 
referring to its rapid economic reconstruction and recovery after the Second World War.  
  
 
In response to the above situation, the Eisenhower administration raised in 1958 the 
idea of creating a partnership of Western countries on development cooperation. This 
proposal – later come to known as the Common Aid Effort – envisaged extensive burden-
sharing and coordination among Western donors in order to increase the overall volume 
and effectiveness of Western development aid (Bracho, 2011; Esman & Cheever, 1967). 
Most Western countries quickly responded positively to the US proposal – regardless of 
some minor differences of opinions on how much aid was already provided by countries 
such as France or Italy. As such, by the end of 1958 diplomats started to discuss the 
implementation of the Common Aid Effort (Esman & Cheever, 1967; US, 1958a, 1958b). One 
of the important issues that needed to be tackled was the level of institutionalization of this 
partnership. While all negotiating parties insisted on the creation of a strong and 
permanent partnership, a majority of them rejected the idea of establishing yet another IO, 
stemming from the proliferation of IOs in the aftermath of the Second World War. 
Therefore, the idea was raised to implement the Common Aid Effort within the framework 
of an already existing IO. The choice ultimately fell on the OECD – which at that point still 
needed to be established (Carroll & Kellow, 2011; Esman & Cheever, 1967; US, 1958a, 
1958b, 1959c). However, given the strategic importance of aid at that time, the US – as well 
as others – worked out an interim solution, namely the immediate establishment of the DAG 
which upon the inception of the OECD would serve as an IO in its own right (Esman & 
Cheever, 1967; Führer, 1996; US, 1959a, 1959b, 1959c, 1959d).  
The actual merger of the DAG and OECD took place on 5 October 1961. By that time, 
the DAG had already held 5 meetings15, respectively, in Washington (2x), Bonn, London and 
Tokyo (Führer, 1996). In doing so, it proved to be a well-functioning and effective 
organization. For this reason, the US ultimately decided that they wanted to maintain the 
integrity of the DAG within the OECD’s framework. In addition, the Eisenhower 
administration had become rather skeptical about the potential effectiveness of the OECD 
given that the tensions on the European Common market continued to prevail and could 
                                                     
15 Note that the OEEC Secretariat also supported the DAG. Furthermore, a number of meetings of the 
so-called Working Party of the DAG which focused on the monitoring of development had also taken 
place in Paris in 1960.  
  
 
easily paralyze the entire Organization. Therefore the line was taken that the DAC would 
replace the DAG on the condition that it would acquire the same functions, characteristics 
and membership possessed by the DAG (Esman & Cheever, 1967; Rostow, 1985; US, 1959c, 
1959d, 1960). As such, the DAC was ultimately a continuation of the DAG, now operating 
from within the OECD’s institutional framework (Esman & Cheever, 1967).  
This unique/quasi-autonomous status of the DAC within the OECD has remained 
unaltered ever since. Today, for example, it is still reflected in the fact that the DAC is the 
only OECD Committee that is headed by a permanent chair, representing the Committee 
within the rest of the Organization as well as the larger international community. The DAC 
also upholds its own membership criteria16 and has a partly independent budget 
(Masujima, 2004; Ruckert, 2008). Also geographically, the DAC Secretariat (hereafter 
Development Co-operation Directorate or DCD) is based in Boulogne-Billancourt – a suburb 
of Paris – whereas the OECD itself is housed in (or near) the Chateau de la Muette, located in 
the 16th arrondissement of Paris. However, meetings of the DAC do take place in the OECD’s 
buildings. Finally, it should be noted that over time, the DAC has engaged in a slow but 
gradual process of strengthening its relations with the rest of the OECD. In 2002, for 
example, the DAC and OECD jointly established the so-called Development Cluster, grouping 
all bodies within the OECD family that touch upon issues of development cooperation in 
their work (Führer, 1996; Manning, 2008; OECD/DAC, 2010). This being said, strengthening 
the collaboration between the DAC and the rest of the OECD continues to be a delicate 
balancing act as it typically divides the DAC delegates and DCD officials in a group of people 
who want to safeguard the autonomy/integrity/budget of the DAC and another group of 
people who seek to mainstream development concerns into the work of the rest of the 
Organisation.  
 
                                                     
16 Members of the OECD are not automatically members of the DAC and vice versa. For example, the 
EU is a full member of the DAC, while only being a full participant in the OECD (see chapter 3). 
Furthermore, Australia and Japan joined the DAC prior to their accession to the OECD, whereas 
other countries such as Denmark or Switzerland did the opposite move (Carroll & Kellow, 2011)). It 
should be noted, however, that in recent years, the DAC is gradually bringing its membership in line 
with that of rest of the Organization (OECD/DAC, 2012b).  
  
 
2.2.2. Membership 
The DAC is currently composed out of 29 Member States. These are, respectively, 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, the EU, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
the US and the UK. As such, the DAC represents virtually all traditional donors as well as a 
number of so-called re-emerging donors from Central and Eastern Europe and Asia (i.e. 
Korea). In addition, also the World Bank, IMF and United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP) take part in the work of the DAC as permanent observers. This is also the case for a 
number of non-DAC OECD Members such as Chile, Estonia, Hungary, Israel or Turkey. In 
2014 also the United Arab Emirates (UAE) became a participant to the DAC (Führer, 1996; 
Hynes & Carroll, 2013; OECD/DAC, 2012b, 2014). Furthermore, depending on the topic 
and/or subgroup/working party of the DAC (see infra), also a number of other stakeholders 
take part in the Committee’s work. These include representatives from the BRICs, 
developing countries, IOs and CSOs (Manning, 2008; OECD/DAC, 2010, 2012a).  
2.2.3. Functioning 
In order to understand the functioning of the DAC, one needs to pay particular 
attention to the two main actors that take part in its work. These are, respectively, the DAC 
Secretariat (DCD) and the different Member States’ delegations. De jure one should also see 
the DAC Chair as a separate actor as he or she17 is not affiliated to either the DCD or the DAC 
Member States, though, in practice the chair usually sides along the DCD.  
Starting with the DCD, the role of the DAC Secretariat is to support the work of the 
Committee, i.e. its Members. It does so by providing analytical input to the meetings, follow-
up on previous decisions and help building a consensus if needed. However, and as is the 
case with most agencies/bureaucracies, the DCD is not a passive player in the decision-
making process. Due to its central position in the decision-making process, it is often able to 
actively steer the work of the Committee, especially if it feels that the integrity of the DAC’s 
                                                     
17 Although, there has never been a female DAC chair thus far. 
  
 
work is at stake. The second group of actors which take part in the work of the DAC are the 
different Member States’ delegations. More specifically, each Member State is represented 
by a so-called DAC delegate – and in most cases also some additional staff members who 
follow up on the work of the Committee’s subsidiary bodies (see infra). Importantly, DAC 
officials are typically residential in Paris, stemming from the high work pace of the 
Committee, which would make it too costly and/or time consuming to fly in for each 
meeting18. DAC delegates traditionally are senior level officials with a background in 
development. The sum of both makes that they constitute a kind of epistemic community, 
referring to the fact that they have a similar background and are – to some extent – isolated 
from their respective capitals19. It should be noted, however, that in more recent years, the 
DAC has witnessed a slow but gradual ‘diplomatization’ of its delegates. More specifically, a 
growing number of them no longer have a background in development cooperation, but 
originate from within the traditional diplomatic corps of their respective country.  
Finally, taking a closer look at the actual interactions between the DAC Members and 
the DCD, it is important to keep in mind that the Committee operates at different levels. 
More specifically, the DAC meets at (i) the level of the Committee and (ii) the level of the 
subsidiary bodies. The meetings at the Committee level are the most important ones given 
that this is the place where all major political decisions are taken. These so-called DAC 
meetings are chaired by the DAC chair, supported by a number of senior DCD officials (most 
notably the Director). The Member States are represented in these meeting by their 
respective DAC delegate. Importantly, the DAC also convenes once a year a so-called High-
Level Meeting (HLM) – typically in December – as well as a preparatory Senior-Level 
Meeting (SLM) – typically in May. As reflects from their name, the different DAC Members 
fly in high-level officials – including ministers – for the HLM. Consequently, the HLM 
typically gives strategic direction to the DAC, setting out the political agenda for the year(s) 
to come and/or tackling highly sensitive issues (e.g. reforming the ODA definition). At a 
lower political level, the DAC meets at the level of its subsidiary bodies. These subsidiary 
bodies focus on a particular aspect of the DAC’s work, dealing with all the technicalities. 
                                                     
18 This is the case for most other OECD committees given that they gather once or twice a year, 
whereas the DAC holds meetings at least once a month. 
19 This also reflects from the fact that DAC delegates often meet besides work.  
  
 
Without doubt, the most well-known subsidiary body of the DAC is – or better was – the 
Working Party on Aid Effectiveness (WP-EFF), which operated between 2008 and 2012 and 
organized the High Level Forums (HLFs) on Aid Effectiveness in Accra (2008) and Busan 
(2012). Other important subsidiary bodies are, for example, the Working Party on Statistics, 
responsible for upholding the credibility and integrity of the ODA definition, or the Network 
on Development Evaluation, which undertakes studies to see what aid works (not) and why 
(not) (www.oecd.org; participant observations).  
In this doctoral dissertation, the main focus lays on the DAC’s meetings at the 
Committee level, stemming from the fact that the cases that are central to this study were 
predominantly addressed at this level. However, I also focused on the work of some of the 
DAC’s subsidiary bodies (e.g. chapter 5) in order to fully grasp the complexity of certain 
issues as well as the work leading up to the decisions at the level of the DAC.  
2.2.4. Role in global governance 
Finally, it is important to elaborate on the DAC’s role in international development 
cooperation. As already outlined in one of the previous paragraphs, the DAC was initially 
established to increase the volume and effectiveness of development aid (OECD/DAC, 
1960). This objective has remained unaltered ever since (e.g. OECD/DAC, 2011). To pursue 
these goals, the DAC operates in a similar fashion as the rest of the OECD, that is to say that 
it relies on a unique mixture of soft-law mechanisms. First, the DAC serves as a forum for 
development standard setting and monitoring. In 1969, for example, it introduced the ODA 
definition, allowing the DCD to systematically monitor and compare the aid efforts of the 
different DAC Members (Hynes & Scott, 2013). In a similar vein, the DAC also established 
several other development principles, including the concepts of untied aid, PCD or donor 
alignment (Forster & Stokke, 1999b; Manning, 2008; Masujima, 2004; Ruckert, 2008).  
Second, the DAC serves as a forum for policy learning and development evaluation. 
More specifically, its peer reviews – but also other instruments – offer its Members a means 
for (i) scrutinizing the development policies of the donor under review, (ii) identifying best 
practices and (iii) mutual learning. Off course, these peer reviews are a legally non-binding 
  
 
instrument. Nonetheless, they have proven to be very effective in a number of cases, 
creating a momentum for policy reform (Ashoff, 2013; Ben-Artzi, 2013; Paulo & Reisen, 
2010).  
Third and final, the DAC serves as a forum for policy dialogue and international 
consensus building. In recent years, for example, it played a leading role in forging 
international development commitments such as the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness 
(2005) or the MDGs (2000). More specifically, the Paris Declaration was the direct outcome 
of the HLF in Paris that was organized by the DAC. The role of the DAC in the establishment 
of the MDGs is less well-known. Basically, its 1996 report ‘Shaping the 21st century’ set in to 
a large degree the tone of the debate in the late nineties given that it put forward seven 
International Development Goals, which in a first stage were endorsed by the Bretton 
Woods institutions, and afterwards evolved into the MDGs (Eyben, 2013; Eyben & Savage, 
2012; Kim & Lightfoot, 2011; Manning, 2008; Masujima, 2004).  
In sum, the DAC can thus be seen as an important pillar of the international aid 
architecture given that it has been extremely influential in defining what we today see as 
development cooperation (Boas & McNeill, 2004; Heiner et al., 2014; Kim & Lightfoot, 2011; 
Nay, 2014).  
3. The changing international context 
Finally, it is important to elaborate on the international context in which the EU and 
the DAC operate and interact with one another. Therefore, this third section pays particular 
attention to the changing international development landscape given that it has been in a 
constant state of flux from the mid-2000s onwards. Indeed, over the past decade, the 
traditional aid model has increasingly become under pressure to change and adapt to the 
emergence of (i) new actor (ii) new ideas and (iii) other context variables (Janus, Klingebiel, 
& Paulo, 2014; UN, 2015). This has been particularly challenging for the DAC, stemming 
from the fact that it is arguably the most visible exponent of the traditional (Western) 
development model – think, for example, at the ODA regime (Eyben, 2013; Kim & Lightfoot, 
2011; Paulo & Reisen, 2010). However, also the EU – both as a bilateral and multilateral 
development actor – is confronted with this changing international context and has to adapt 
  
 
to it (DIIS, 2013; ETTG, 2014; ODI, DIE, & ECDPM, 2013). Therefore, the remainder of this 
section will elaborate in more detail on each of these three evolutions. Note, however, that 
while I discuss them separately for the sake of clarity, they cannot be disentangled from one 
another.  
3.1. New actors 
 
 Without doubt the most visible evolution in international development cooperation 
has been the proliferation of new/(re) emerging development actors in the past decades(s) 
(Smith, Fordelone, & Zimmermann, 2010; Walz & Rachmandran, 2011; Zimmermann & 
Smith, 2011). Indeed, in recent years, a growing number of players have (re)entered the 
development stage, be it as a provider of development assistance (e.g. Korea, the Central 
and Eastern European Countries, philanthropic foundations, NGOs) or some kind of hybrid 
form between a receiver and provider of aid (e.g. most BRICs, Turkey). Furthermore, also 
private sector actors have become increasingly involved in development cooperation 
(Kragelund, 2011; Manning, 2006). Consequently, development cooperation is no longer 
the exclusive prerogative of the traditional DAC donors, but has become much more 
diversified at all policy levels (Brown & Morton, 2008; Smith et al., 2010; Zimmermann & 
Smith, 2011). Obviously, this evolution has (and still is) put(ting) significant pressure on the 
international aid architecture. For example, IOs such as the DAC, but also the World Bank, 
IMF are forced to adapt to this new (power) constellation (Besada & Kindornay, 2013; 
Birdsall, 2006). Furthermore, the proliferation of development actors has add to a further 
fragmentation of the donor landscape, making coordination more important than ever 
before. It also leads to a growing competition between donors in a number of cases in the 
sense that development countries have more options to choose from. In turn, this might 
inspire donors to act more strategically – think, for example, about the EU’s agenda for 
change which puts forward the principle of differentiation. On the other hand, the increased 
number of development actors is not by definition a negative evolution. On the contrary, it 
might also improve the quality and/or quantity of aid (Janus et al., 2014).  
  
 
3.2. New ideas 
 In parallel with – and as a result of/in response to – the proliferation of new 
development actors, the world has witnessed in recent years the emergence of new 
development ideas. Indeed, after more than five decades of dominant ‘traditional/Western’ 
development thinking, there is a growing range of ideas on how to tackle poverty. Perhaps 
most important or fundamental is the growing ‘beyond aid’ thinking in recent years, both 
within policy and academic circles (Barder, Clark, Lépissier, Reynolds, & Roodman, 2013; 
Janus et al., 2014; Janus, Klingebiel, & Paulo, 2015; Kharas & Rogerson, 2012; Mawdsley, 
Savage, & Kim, 2014; Severino & Ray, 2009; Andrew Sumner & Mallet, 2013; UK, 2015). 
While there exist various – often complex – interpretations of what this ‘beyond aid’ 
paradigm actually entails, the basic idea is that aid on its own is not enough to promote 
development (Janus et al., 2014). More specifically, in today’s globalized world, 
development cooperation is increasingly seen as only one part of the larger system of 
international cooperation system that is needed to tackle global challenges (e.g. poverty, 
climate changes) and as such promote (sustainable) development (Barder et al., 2013; 
ETTG, 2014; Janus et al., 2014).  
 Perhaps the first strong exponent of this ‘beyond aid’ thinking was the Busan 
Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (2011), referring to the outcome 
document of the fourth and final HLF on Aid Effectiveness (Eyben & Savage, 2012; 
Mawdsley et al., 2014). More specifically, in Busan the development community 
acknowledged for the first time “the need to broaden our focus and attention from aid 
effectiveness to the challenges of effective development” (art. 28). In the same period, we also 
witness a growing importance attached to the principle of PCD (see chapter 9). While the 
concept of PCD had been around for quite some time (cf. Forster & Stokke, 1999a), its 
interpretation shifted in the late 2000s from being a negative concept (i.e. a tool to avoid 
policy incoherence between development policies and other policies) to a more 
positive/holistic concept (i.e. PCD being a tool to build positive synergies across different 
policy areas)(Droeze, 2010; ECDPM, 2014; OECD, 2013a, 2014a; Prontera, 2014; Stroß, 
2014). However, by far the most visible exponent of the ‘beyond aid’ thinking is the post-
2015 process given that the ultimate object is to move beyond the traditional development 
  
 
paradigm, aiming to link the promotion of (i) inclusive social development, (ii) inclusive 
economic development, (iii) environmental sustainability and (iv) peace and security (UN, 
2012, 2013, 2015). Confronted with this context, the field of development cooperation 
todays thus stands at crossroads as it will have to seek links with other policy areas (or 
even integrate) in order to maintain its relevance (cf. Janus et al., 2014).  
 Also within the field of development cooperation, recent years have witnessed a 
proliferation of new ideas. First, traditional development concepts as defined by the DAC 
and the Bretton Woods Institutions have become increasingly challenged and/or 
complemented by development thinking and practices of non-traditional donors such as the 
BRICs. For example, the latter actors put a lot of emphasis on the principle of South-South 
cooperation, but also stress the importance of non-interference and mutually beneficial 
types of cooperation (Bräutigam, 2011; Janus et al., 2014; Kragelund, 2011). Obviously, the 
latter challenge traditional Western concepts such as the ODA definition, aid conditionality 
or the principle of untied aid (Bräutigam, 2011; Chandy & Kharas, 2011; Kim & Lightfoot, 
2011; Zimmermann & Smith, 2011). Second, recent years have also witnessed the rise of 
new ideas on how to achieve the MDGs. Most notably is the growing emphasis that is being 
put on economic growth and private sector engagement, a shift that can be clearly 
witnessed in, for example, the G20’s Seoul Consensus (2010) or the EU’s Agenda for 
Changes (2011).  
3.3. Other context variables  
 
 Finally, in addition to the proliferation of new actors and ideas, there are also a 
number of other context variable that are worth elaborating on given that they have 
strongly influenced the context in which development policies have come to exist in recent 
years.  More specifically, while there are countless variables that have an impact on the 
creation of development policies, two are worth pointing out. The first one is the global 
financial and economic crisis, which emerged in 2008 and fundamentally altered the 
financial situation in which countries had to operate. More specifically, and contradictory to 
what was initially expected, the financial crisis affected above all the traditional Western 
donors, in particular the EU countries. The emerging economies and developing countries 
  
 
were affected to a (much) lesser extent (DIIS, 2013). In this context, European ODA budgets 
suffered hard, leading to ‘impressive’ cutbacks in countries such as Greece, Spain, Italy 
(CONCORD, 2012a; OECD, 2014b). Furthermore, due to the fact that Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) growth fell across the EU, European trade with developing countries fell 
back (or stagnated), especially in het period between 2008 and 2010 (DIIS, 2013; EU, 
2014). As a result, in Africa20, China overtook Europe as the largest trading partner. In sum, 
one could thus conclude that the global financial and economic crisis affected the position of 
traditional donor countries. While it first of all negatively influenced their aid budgets, it 
also played into the hand of the already ongoing process of developing countries 
increasingly turning towards the (re)emerging development actors (DIIS, 2013; Grimm, 
Humprey, Lundsgaarde, & John de Souza, 2009; Humprey, 2010).  
 The second context variable that changed profoundly over the last decades (and will 
continue to do so) is the geography of poverty. More specifically, since 1990 a substantial 
number of countries have graduated from being a low-income countries (LICs) to middle-
income countries (MICs) (DIIS, 2013). However, underlying these macroeconomic success 
stories lays in most cases a growth path that has not been inclusive, to say the least. As such, 
the global distribution of poor has shifted from LICs to MICs, meaning that a large majority 
of today’s poorest people live in MICs, most notably India and China (Sumner, 2010; 
Sumner & Mallet, 2013). While several studies point out that this will only be a temporary 
phase, predicting that by 2030 the majority of poor people will live in fragile and low-
income African states (DIIS, 2013; Kharas & Rogerson, 2012), it does raise the question on 
where to distribute aid. Indeed, while traditionally donors have always focused on countries 
– think about the list of ODA-eligible countries – on could wonder to what extent the focus 
should not lay on people.  Again, these types of questions put pressure on the existing aid 
regimes to reform and adapt to the changing international context. To what extent, for 
example, does the DAC needs to reform its ODA definition to this new geography of 
poverty? And how does the EU’s agenda for change and its growing emphasis put on LDCs 
correspond to the above reality? 
                                                     
20 Note that it is by no means my intention to reduce developing cooperation to helping African 
countries.  
  
 
Chapter 2. Literature overview 
 In this second chapter of this doctoral dissertation, I situate my research within the 
broader realm of literature on (i) EU development cooperation, (ii) EU-IOs relations and 
(iii) international relations (IR) and international development studies. While this has 
already been done to some extent in the previous chapter – in the sense that it clearly 
revealed the lack of literature on the EU-DAC relationship as well as provide a general 
overview of the main actors and dynamics – this chapter looks at the literature from a more 
general perspective, focusing on the main evolutions within each of these field.  
2.1. The study of EU development cooperation 
The scholarship on EU development cooperation has gained momentum in the 
2000s. Indeed, in parallel with the EU’s transformation towards a full-blown bilateral and 
multilateral development actor (see supra), a growing number of scholars have started to 
study the EU’s development policies (e.g. Arts & Dickson, 2004; Carbone, 2007, 2009, 
2013b; Delputte, 2013; Gänzle et al., 2012; Hoebink, 2010; Holland, 2002; Holland & 
Doidge, 2012; Orbie, 2012). This stands in sharp contrast with the previous decades during 
which only a selected number of scholars took an interest in the EU’s development policies 
– notable exceptions were Cosgrove-Twitchett (1978, 1981), Faber (1982), Frey-Wouters 
(1982) or Grilli (1993). However, despite this increasing scholarly attention, EU 
development cooperation remains understudied – especially in comparison to other donors 
(e.g. France, Germany, the UK or UK) and other fields of EU external action (e.g. climate, 
trade, security).  
Generally speaking, the aforementioned studies (i) provided an overview of the main 
evolutions in EU development cooperation (e.g. Arts & Dickson, 2004; Carbone, 2007; 
Hoebink, 2005; Holland & Doidge, 2012; Orbie, 2012) or paid particular attention to (ii) a 
specific country or region (e.g. Carbone, 2013b; Holland, 2002; Söderbaum & Stålgren, 
2010) and/or issues such as (iii) donor coordination (e.g. Carbone, 2013a; Delputte & Orbie, 
2014; Delputte & Söderbaum, 2012), (iv) the coherence between the EU’s aid and non-aid 
policies (e.g. Carbone, 2011a; Carbone, 2009; Hoebink, 1999; Stroß, 2014; Van der Hoeven, 
2010), (v) the involvement of CSOs (e.g. Carbone, 2008b; Huybrechts & Peels, 2008) or (vi) 
  
 
the role of the so-called ‘new’ Member States in EU development cooperation (e.g. Horký & 
Lightfoot, 2012; Lightfoot & Szent-Iványi, 2014; Paragi, 2010).  
Off particular relevance for this doctoral dissertation, however, is the limited – or 
better almost complete lack of – attention for the multilateral level in the study of EU 
development cooperation. Indeed, despite a dramatic increase of interactions between the 
EU and IOs in recent years (Jørgensen & Costa, 2012; Kissack, 2010; Laatikainen & Smith, 
2006) and the fact that a number of scholars have convincingly argued (or implicitly 
shown) that EU development cooperation is the product of the complex interaction 
between the EU institutions, EU Member States, developing countries but also (!) IOs 
(Carbone, 2013a; Farrell, 2008; Holland, 2008; Olsen, 2005), virtually no studies explicitly 
address the link between the EU and the multilateral level with regard to development 
cooperation. Most notable – and to our knowledge only – exceptions are Baroncelli (2011, 
2012), Carbone (2013a) and Farrell (2008, 2012). These studies have in common that they 
study the EU’s role in a particular IO21, focusing on how the Union is institutionally 
represented and/or what its impact is on the decision-making of the respective 
Organization. However, while these studies are extremely useful – after all they are the first 
to provide a descriptive overview of the EU’s engagement in a number of important 
development IOs – they do not move beyond offering a ‘traditional’ institutional/legal 
account of the EU’s relations with IOs (see infra). To a certain degree, only the 2008 study of 
Mary Farrell is an exception to this rule in the sense that she not only looks at both the 
institutional and ideational dimension of the relations between the EU and the Bretton 
Woods institutions. Basically, the argument she makes is that the EU (i) came too late to the 
party (i.e. the Washington consensus was already hegemonic) and (ii) subscribes to the 
neoliberal development agenda (Farrell, 2008). However, also this study faces a number of 
shortcomings, most notably a lack of depth in the sense our comparative perspective does 
not allow to study the IMF, UN, World Bank and WTO in much detail.  
Finally, paying particular attention to the topic of this doctoral dissertation, there are 
at present no studies devoted to the EU-DAC relationship. More specifically, the only 
                                                     
21 More specifically, Baroncelli focuses in her work on the World Bank, Carbone on the different 
HLFs on aid effectiveness and Farrell on the UN, World Bank and IMF.  
  
 
insights that can be gained from the literature on EU development cooperation are those 
from a small number of studies which indirectly – and thus also rather briefly – touch upon 
the topic. Maurizio Carbone (2011a), for example, makes reference to bureaucratic 
tensions/competition between the DAC and the EU on the issue of PCD, and a joint study of 
Jan Orbie and Heleen Versluys (2008) launched the idea of a kind of ‘OECD-isation’ of EU 
development policy, referring to the similarities between the EU and DAC when it comes to 
soft-law integration in the field of development. Apart from both studies, however, 
literature on EU development cooperation leaves us wondering about the relationship 
between both institutions, illustrating the added-value of this doctoral dissertation. 
2.2. The study of EU-IOs relations 
 Similar to the study of EU development cooperation, research on EU-IOs relations gained 
momentum in the 2000s. While for several decades now, there has been a growing 
intensification of relations between the EU and IOs, it was not until the European Security 
Strategy (2003), outlining the ‘effective multilateralism’ doctrine, that the scholarly community 
took a real interest in the studying the interplay between Brussels and the multilateral level. 
This clearly reflects from the numerous journal articles, special issues and (edited) volumes on 
this topic, which emerged from the second half of the 2000s onwards (e.g. Blavoukos & 
Bourantonis, 2011; Debaere, 2014; Dewaele & Kuipers, 2013; Jørgensen & Costa, 2012; 
Jørgensen & Laatikainen, 2013; Kissack, 2010; Laatikainen & Smith, 2006; Niemann & 
Bretherton, 2013; Orsini, 2014; Van Schaik, 2013; Wouters, Basu, & Schunz, 2008; Wouters, 
Bruyninckx, Sudeshna, Basu, & Schunz, 2012). 
 Taking a closer look at this ever-increasing number of studies, one can identify two 
stages in the research. Initially, most of the research involved the mapping of the field. Basically, 
what scholars did was providing detailed accounts of how the EU organized itself across the 
spectrum of IOs (cf. Orbie, Saenen, Verschaeve, & De Ville, 2015). During the second stage, 
however, a growing number of researchers began to build upon these descriptive accounts, 
seeking ways to integrate the different studies that had been carried out thus far (cf. Saenen, 
2014). These efforts gave ground to a number of theoretical debates. Most notable is the so-
  
 
called ‘one voice debate’, referring to the discussion on whether or not there is a causal link 
between EU coherence and effectiveness in IOs (e.g. Kissack, 2009; Saenen, 2014; K. E. Smith, 
2010; Van Schaik, 2013; Wouters, Hoffmeister, & Ruys, 2006). In parallel, and to some degree 
overlapping with the single voice debate, a growing number of EU-IOs scholars have also been 
struggling with how to incorporate the international context in their work (Jørgensen & Costa, 
2012; Orbie et al., 2015). Indeed, most studies thus far offered a very Eurocentric perspective, 
paying particular attention to intra-EU variables such as actorness or coherence, explaining why 
more recently a number of scholars have started to wonder how these link with ‘external 
variables’ (e.g. the opportunity structure on the receiving end of the relationship, the (mis)fit 
between the EU norms and the international norms…) (e.g. Groen & Oberthür, 2013; Jørgensen, 
Oberthür, & Shahin, 2012; Thomas, 2012). However, despite these impressive efforts, the field 
of EU-IOs studies still faces a number of severe teething problems. Stemming from the fact that 
the study of EU-IOs is still relatively young and that only recently its scholars have taken an 
interest in moving beyond the descriptive studies, it bears little surprise that this field still lacks 
theoretical strength. Or as stated by Joachim Koops, the study of EU-IOs offers: “[…] a wide 
range of pre- or a-theoretical case studies and largely unconnected attempts of tentative 
theorizing” (Koops, 2012). Furthermore, and of particular relevance for this doctoral 
dissertation, the focus predominantly lays on traditional foreign policy domains and trade, 
paying little attention to development policy.  
 Paying particular attention to the OECD and DAC, the study of EU-IOs almost completely 
ignores both institutions. First, it fails to map out how the EU organizes itself within the OECD, 
and more specifically within the DAC. Indeed, to my knowledge there is only one other study – 
besides the one I published in co-authorship with Tamara Takacs (chapter four) – which focuses 
on the EU-OECD relations (Carroll & Kellow, 2012). Apart from that, this relationship is also 
briefly touched upon in the work of Sieglinde Gstöhl (Gstöhl, 2009) and a working paper of the 
Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) (Comelli & Matarazzo, 2011). Both studies, however, provide a 
snap shot overview of how the EU delegations are organized across the spectrum of IOs, 
devoting not more than one paragraph to the OECD. Furthermore, what all the aforementioned 
studies have in common is that while they (superficially) touch upon the EU-OECD relations, 
  
 
they almost completely overlook the Union’s relations with the DAC. At first sight, this comes as 
no surprise given that development cooperation in general hardly seems to be a policy of 
interest for EU-IOs scholars as it are typically EU development scholars which reach out to this 
community (e.g. Baroncelli, 2012). On the other hand, the DAC is – to our knowledge – the first 
IO in which the EU obtained full membership (cf. chapter six), which makes it an extremely 
interesting case and even more remarkable that over the past five decades nobody has taken a 
real interest in studying this relationship.  
Second, the literature on EU-IOs offers little theoretical insights that are relevant for this 
doctoral dissertation22. Indeed, most of the studies have been focusing on more ‘traditional’ 
IOs, referring to those institutions in which the decision-making is determined by coalition 
building, voting cohesion and/or extensive coordination – think, for example, about the UN 
general assembly or the IMF. However, and as already outlined in the previous chapter, the 
OECD and DAC are very different IOs given that they operate in a much more deliberative way 
and rely on a unique mix of soft-law policy instruments to pursue their objectives. As such, 
existing accounts on EU influence/effectiveness are not fine-grained enough to fully capture the 
EU-DAC relationship. Furthermore, and as touched upon in one of the previous paragraphs, they 
have only recently started to pay more attention to so-called ‘external variables’, whereas the 
external context is crucial for understanding the EU-DAC relationship (cf. chapter 1).  
2.3. The studies of IR and international development 
 Finally, a  third and fourth strand of literature that is worth mentioning is, respectively, 
the study of IR and international development. While both fileds are very distinctive from one 
another, I have chosen to lump both together given that they have similar characteristics. More 
specifically, both fields have paid some attention to, respectively, the OECD and the DAC, 
though, failed to make the link with the EU.  
 Starting with the study of IR, there has been ample attention from different 
schools/traditions for the role, functioning and relevance of IOs in global governance (e.g. 
                                                     
22 As a grounded theorist, it should be emphasized that this was discovered at a later stage of this 
study (see infra).  
  
 
Barnett & Finnemore, 1999; Putnam, 1988; Risse, 2000). Consequently, most IOs have received 
considerable scholarly attention, ranging from the UN (e.g. Weiss, Thakur, & Ruggie, 2010; 
White, 2002) to the G7/8/20 (e.g. Cooper & Thakur, 2013; Hajnal & Meikle, 1999), IMF or World 
Bank (e.g. Boughton & Lateef, 1995; Peet, 2003; Wade, 2011). Importantly, also the OECD has 
been the subject of scholarly attetion, be it still to a much lesser extent than most other IOs and 
only from the mid-2000s onwards. More specifically, while several studies looked at the 
functioning of the OECD at large (e.g. Carroll & Kellow, 2011; Mahon & McBride, 2008; 
Marcussen, 2003; Woodward, 2009), other paid attention to one particular aspect of its work 
such as taxation or energy (e.g. Eccleston & Woodward, 2013; Kudrle, 2013; Lesage & Van de 
Graaf, 2013) or studied the OECD from a specific perspective such as mulitpolarity or policy 
transfer (e.g. Clifton & Díaz-Fuentes, 2011; Pal, 2014; Woodward, 2011). However, with regard 
to this doctoral dissertation, the above studies have their limitation in the sense that they (i) pay 
little to no attention to the EU-OECD relationship (see supra) and (ii) almost completely 
overlook the DAC, typically considering it to be one of the many committees of the 
Organization;  
 In a similar vein, also the study of international development does not touch upon the 
EU-DAC relationship. Indeed, development scholars have systematically overlooked the DAC, 
with the exception of its work on aid effectiveness or the norms its produces such as the ODA 
concept. To some extent, this limited attention for the DAC comes as no surprise given that at a 
more general level development scholars have only recently took an interest in the role of IOs. 
One of the first studies that explicitly argued for incorporating the multilateral level into the 
field of development studies was the edited volume of Bøäs and McNeill (2004). Indeed, both 
editors convincly illustrated the ever-more important role of IOs in today’s aid architecture, 
ranging from agenda-setting to providing development assistance. One particular chapter in this 
edited volume touches upon the DAC, tough, only offering a basic overview of its functioning 
and role in development cooperation, while elaborating much more extensively on the DAC’s 
role in the emergence of the good governance concept (Masujima, 2004). Importantly, the 
above edited volume of Bøäs and McNeill set – at least to some extent – the wheel into motion, 
given that an increasing number of development scholars have started to pay attention to the 
  
 
role of IOs (e.g. Birdsall, 2006; Hibben, 2013; Scholte, 2012). However, with regard to the DAC 
little is moving thus far. A rare exception is the book chapter of Arne Ruckert in 2008, though, 
this study analysises the Committee at a meta level, wondering about its role in the creation of 
a neoliberal development agenda, while not elaborating in much depth on the functioning of 
the DAC.  As such, the study of international development continues to lack a basic work on the 
DAC which outlines its hisotry, functioning or specific role in development. To some extent, the 
work of Richard Manning (2008) and Helmut Führer (Führer, 1996) provide such an overview, 
however, both authors previously held key positions within the DAC, respectively, as DAC Chair 
and director of the DCD. Consequently, there continues to be an urgent need for more 
independent/academic accounts of the DAC.  
 This being said, some aspects of the DAC’s work did receive sufficient scholarly 
attention. This is first of all the case for its work on aid effectiveness. More specifically, several 
scholars and think tanks have studied the way in which the Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness (2005), the Accra Agenda for Action (2008) or the Busan Partnership for Effecitve 
Development Co-operation (2011) came to exist. In doing, so particular attention was paid to 
the legitimacy of the DAC’s WP-EFF, stemming from the fact that it only from 2005 onwards 
significantly expanded its membership (Brown & Morton, 2008; Dijkstra & Komives, 2011; 
Eyben, 2013; Eyben & Savage, 2012; Hammad & Morton, 2009; Owa, 2011; Steinle & Correll, 
2008). A second – and partly overlapping – strand of literature focuses on the changing 
international development landscape (i.e. the proliferation of new actors), wondering how this 
affects the DAC’s role. In doing so, particular attention is paid on whether and how the so-called 
DAC regime – referring to, for example, the ODA concept or the Paris agenda  – will be able to 
survive in the light of the (re)emergence of the BRICs and other actors given that these actors 
often provide foreign assistance on their own terms (Bräutigam, 2011; Chandy & Kharas, 2011; 
Kim & Lightfoot, 2011; Zimmermann & Smith, 2011). However, with regard to this dissertation, 
the above studies have their limitations in the sense that (i) they hardly pay any attention to the 
DAC’s day-to-day functioning, (ii) the DAC’s work on aid effectiveness is very distinctive from the 
rest of its work and (iii) almost completely overlook the EU.  
  
 
Chapter 3: Research design 
 
As previously outlined in the introduction to this doctoral dissertation, the central 
aim of this study is to acquire an in-depth understanding of the relationship between the EU 
and the DAC. To achieve this goal, this study opts for an inductive research approach, 
inspired by grounded theory (GT). This research method is particularly well-suited for 
explorative and in-depth research, providing a general strategy to develop theoretical 
insights based on empirical observations. The data for this study were obtained through a 
combination of (i) archive study and document analysis, (ii) semi-structured interviews and 
(iii) participant observations. In this chapter, I will first provide a detailed overview of GT in 
which I lay out the foundations of this research method and elaborate the way in which I 
applied this framework. Furthermore, I also elaborate on my personal ontological and 
epistemological motivations to engage with this approach. In the subsequent section, I 
discuss the process of data collection. More specifically, I focus on the qualitative research 
methodologies that have been applied during the process of data generation, respectively, 
(i) document analysis, (ii) interviewing and (iii) participant observation. In the third 
section, I discuss the process of data analysis, paying particular attention to the different 
coding strategies that have been applied throughout this study. Finally, this chapter 
concludes with a critical reflection on the research design of this study.  
3.1. Grounded Theory 
 
Grounded theory is a general research method – one could also call it an approach or 
strategy – which involves a fundamentally different way of thinking about the collection 
and analysis of data then traditional (positivist) research does. More specifically, it 
explicitly unites both processes, as such challenging the dominant practice of collecting data 
prior to the analysis. While being largely unknown in the fields of EU studies, development 
studies or IR, it is actually one of the most popular research methods in social sciences, 
being widely applied in various disciplines ranging from anthropology and sociology to 
political science, psychology and nursing studies (e.g. Becker, 2012; Bryant & Charmaz, 
2007; Charmaz, 2004, 2006; Glaser, 1998; Klotz & Prakash, 2008; Locke, 1996; Maxwell, 
2005; McNabb, 2010; Strauss & Corbin, 1998).  
  
 
The main premise of GT is the discovery of new theory – or the rediscovery of 
existing ones – through the systematic and simultaneous collection and analysis of data 
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967). This approach was first developed by two sociologists, 
respectively, Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss in 1967 in their influential book ‘The 
Discovery of Grounded Theory’. Essentially, both railed against the dominant deductive way 
of doing research that prevailed at that time. More specifically, Glaser and Strauss criticized 
the fact that most scholars spent a disproportionate amount of time testing existing 
theories, relying on a set of clear-cut hypotheses that had been adopted prior to the data 
collection. This was considered to be problematic given that the scientific community at 
that time was – in their views – dominated by a small group of leading scholars, the so-
called “theoretical capitalists” (p. 11). These scholars had monopolized to a large degree the 
theoretical thoughts, downgrading the rest of the scientific community to what they called a 
“proletariat of testers” of the former’s intellectual efforts (p. 11). As such, the primary 
concern of most research was to adhere to the dominant theoretical paradigms, offering no 
guarantee that the phenomena under research where tackled from an appropriate 
theoretical angle, let alone that relevant research was carried out in the first place (1967, 
pp. 7-11). Apart from that, Glaser and Strauss were also frustrated by the fact that, back in 
the sixties, qualitative research methods were still considered to be inferior to quantitative 
approaches (Becker, 2012; Glaser & Strauss, 1967).  
As a reaction to the above situation, Glaser and Strauss developed GT as a 
fundamentally different approach to research. Essentially, and not surprisingly, they 
provided researchers a set of inductive and qualitative strategies, allowing to discover 
(new) theory. By doing so, both scholars aimed to liberate the social sciences from its 
hypotetico-dedcutive as well as quantitative straightjacket (Charmaz, 2004; Glaser, 1992; 
Strauss & Corbin, 1998). The most basic and fundamental idea of GT is that of explicitly 
uniting the processes of data collection and analysis. In contrast to virtually all other 
research methods, GT does not start with a careful review of the existing literature. Rather, 
the starting point of a study is the actual collection and analysis of data. As such, the 
researcher avoids – or better reduces – the risk of being preconceived by existing 
theoretical frameworks and concepts (Becker, 2012; Böhm, 2004; Glaser & Strauss, 1967). 
  
 
Initially, data are gathered based on the idea of theoretical sampling, referring to analyzing 
“as many different people, situations and documents as possible […] to obtain data covering 
the entire spectrum of the research question” (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p. 35). Afterwards, 
when the researcher has successfully analyzed his/her first set of data, additional data are 
collected in function of the emerging theoretical concepts and ideas. This process continues 
until the point of ‘theoretical saturation’ is reached, referring to the point at which new data 
stop providing novel theoretical insights (Charmaz, 2006). Schematically, a stereotypical GT 
study looks as follows: 
  Figure 5: 
 
As reflects from the above figure, GT thus aims to develop new theoretical insights – 
or verify/refine existing ones. However, it should be outlined that these theoretical insights 
should not be seen as final truth statements about social reality – assuming this is even 
possible (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Indeed, similar to other inductive approaches, GT is by its 
very nature an open-ended and explorative research method. In contrast to deductive 
research, whose conclusions are ‘certain’, inductive research offers conclusions that are 
most ‘probable’, based on the evidence given (Bryant & Charmaz, 2007). This also links with 
the primary aim of GT, namely eliciting potentially fresh theoretical insights of a specific 
  
 
social relationship or phenomenon, which then afterwards can be further tested and refined 
through more traditional (deductive) research23 (Becker, 2012; Glaser, 1998; Suddaby, 
2006).  
As outlined in the previous paragraphs, perhaps the key feature of GT is its unique 
stance vis-à-vis the traditional literature review. Indeed, GT explicitly advises to start 
research with the collection and analysis of data, raising the question what place existing 
literature holds within this research tradition. To be honest, there is no straightforward 
answer to this question. On the contrary, over the past decades, it has been the subject of 
much debate among GT scholars as well as misconceptions from other scholars. To a large 
extent this can be explained by the fact that Glaser and Strauss initially remained rather 
vague on the issue. Indeed, while both advocated in favor of starting research without a 
prior knowledge of the literature (see supra), it remained unclear if, when and how to 
engage with the literature once entered the field, not to mention questions about whether it 
is possible or desirable to enter the field without prior knowledge (Dunne, 2011; Suddaby, 
2006). This gave ground to various methodological positions, ranging from extremist 
approaches (i.e. staying away from the literature during the entire research process), to 
more moderate and mainstream approaches (cf. Cutcliffe, 2000; Suddaby, 2006).  
This dissertation positions can be situated within this second tradition. In essence, 
the guiding principle of my approach was to avoid preconception to the greatest extent 
possible. In doing so, I did not take the extreme position that a researcher should enter the 
field with a blank mind (i.e. no prior knowledge), or with a blank research agenda (i.e. no 
predefined research topic). The underlying rationale is twofold. First, it is simply impossible 
to have no prior knowledge. After all, every researcher has its own personal history, 
background and knowledge which he or she cannot simply put aside24. Second, it is not 
                                                     
23 This was also the case for this particular Ph.D. project. More specifically, by studying the EU-DAC 
relationship, it appeared that the Union’s membership status was sticky (cf. chapter 6). This 
inspired a number of colleagues and myself to test whether also in other IOs the initial decision on 
the EU’s membership status installs a path dependence (cf. annex 1).  
24 In my personal case, for example, I engaged with the existing literature during my undergraduate 
studies. Or when applying for funding for this doctoral dissertation, I had to provide an overview of 
the literature that was relevant for this study.  In fact, simply by being a part of the scholarly 
  
 
desirable that a scholar has no prior knowledge of the topic he or she is about the study. At 
the very least, every scholar at some point needs to know whether his or her research has 
been carried out before. After all, there is no point in reinventing the wheel again, especially 
not when research is financed by public money as was the case for this Ph.D. project 
(Cutcliffe, 2000; Suddaby, 2006). As such, the question which I had address – or better 
struggle with – was when and how to engage with the existing literature. Essentially, I 
followed a two-track approach which involved engaging with literature that provides 
factual information during the entire research stay (e.g. studies on the origins of the DAC), 
whereas only looking at the theoretical literature at a later stage of the research, i.e. only 
after I had gained my own theoretical insights on the EU-DAC relationship. At this stage, the 
existing theoretical literature was used both as a means to test my theoretical concepts and 
potentially integrate new concepts into the coding process (see also Glaser, 1998; Suddaby, 
2006). Importantly, it is worth pointing out that the risk of being preconceived was rather 
limited in this particular study. This has everything to do with the fact that there exists 
virtually no literature on the DAC, let alone the relationship between the EU and the DAC. 
Furthermore, also most of the literature on EU development cooperation is descriptive in 
nature The biggest challenge came from the study of EU-IOs relations and the field of IR 
(e.g. regime complexity) given that both strands of literature are more theory oriented – in 
particular the field of IR – which could potentially result in preconception on my behalf. 
Therefore, I only delved into this literature at a later stage of my Ph.D. research, more 
specifically from the third year onwards. By that time, I had already formed my opinion on 
the EU-DAC relationship, making alternative (theoretical) insights usefull to further 
challenge, test and refine my insights. Linking back to figure 5, the way in which this 
research unfolded itself can be schematically visualized as follows: 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
community one automatically comes into contact with existing literature and theory, for example, 
while chatting with colleagues in the office or attending panels at conferences.   
  
 
Figure 6: 
 
Finally, it is important to provide a brief outline of the main ontological and 
epistemological underpinnings of this study. Indeed, while the previous paragraphs might 
have given the impression that, regardless of methodological discussions, there is a single 
and universal interpretation of GT, the opposite is actually true. Ever since the 
establishment of GT in 1967 (Glaser & Strauss, 1967), the scientific community has 
witnessed the emergence of various schools of GT, coinciding with the different ontological 
and epistemological positions out there. These range from, on the one hand, positivist and 
post-positivist accounts (e.g. Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Glaser, 1998; Locke, 1996) to, on the 
other hand, more pragmatist (e.g. Bryant, 2009), constructivist (e.g. Charmaz, 2006; Mills, 
Bonner, & Francis, 2006) and feminist accounts (e.g. Keddy, Sims, & Stern, 1996; Wuest, 
1995). My research approach situates itself within this second tradition.  
  
 
At the ontological level, I assume that reality is socially constructed, that is to say 
that I believe that each and every one of us constructs his or her own subjective 
interpretation of reality (Dessler, 2005). At an epistemological level, I position myself as a 
pragmatist. In line with the founding fathers of pragmatism John Dewey and Charles 
Sanders Peirce (Hookway, 2015; McDermott, 1989), but also with several GT scholars 
(Bryant, 2009; Bryant & Charmaz, 2007), I believe that research should be problem-driven 
rather than theory-driven. More specifically, in my personal view, the purpose of research is 
not to offer transcendental/philosophical accounts of truth given that this is impossible and 
has few practical consequences. Rather, the purpose of research is to acquire an in-depth 
understanding of relevant social phenomena and processes. What is relevant here, 
however, is the way in which such knowledge can (or should) be obtained. In line with 
pragmatism, I believe that social inquiry is the best way to such acquire knowledge. More 
specifically, given that reality is a social construct, one ideally studies social phenomena 
from within, actively taking part in the social world (Bryant, 2009; Hookway, 2015). In 
order to achieve this, research requires an open-ended and flexible method, explaining my 
choice for GT. As already outlined previously in this chapter, GT has the advantage that it 
offers a set of strategies which liberate a researcher from the potential straightjacket of 
existing theoretical concepts and theory, as such enabling him or her to fully grasp the 
complexity of the phenomena under research (Charmaz, 2004, 2006; Mills et al., 2006; 
Suddaby, 2006).  
Finally, it is important to elaborate on the finalities of this doctoral dissertation. As 
reflects from the previous sections, the objective of GT studies – including this doctoral 
dissertation – is to develop new (or refine) existing theoretical insights. However, and in 
line with my ontological and epistemological positions, this doctoral dissertation has not 
the ambition to develop a theoretical framework in the positivist sense of the word. Indeed, 
stemming from the fact that social reality is too complex to be captured by laws (in the 
natural science sense of the word), I consider such an endeavor impossible, nor desirable as 
it hampers us to see grasp the full complexity of a certain social phenomenon. Therefore, 
the objective of this doctoral dissertation is to move beyond a purely descriptive analysis of 
social reality, offering a so-called thick description of the EU-DAC relationship (cf. Geertz, 
  
 
1973). More specifically, the aim of this GT study is to look at the complexity of this case 
and by doing so unravel the different layers of understanding that structure the EU-DAC 
relationship. Furthermore, and similar to all research, also this doctoral dissertations 
strives for a higher level of generalization (cf. chapter 10).  
3.2. Data collection 
As outlined in the previous section, one of the main features of GT is that it explicitly 
unites the processes of data collection and analysis. This being said, the remainder of this 
chapter will discuss both processes separately for the sake of clarity. However, as a reader 
it is important to keep in mind that both took place simultaneously and that new data was 
collected in function of the theoretical insights that emerged during the analysis (cf. Glaser, 
1998; Martin & Gynnild, 2011).  
In line with all GT studies, the starting point of this doctoral research was the actual 
collection of a first set of data. Based upon the strategy of initial sampling (Glaser, 1998; 
Maxwell, 2005), this first set of data was explicitly intended to be as broad and diverse as 
possible in order to cover the entire research topic. To achieve this, I collected data from a 
wide range of different actors and situations, guided by a set of broad and explorative 
questions such as: “What is the DAC’s role in international development?” ; “Why and how 
did the DAC come to exist?” ; “Why is the EU a full member of the DAC?”, “What is the EU’s 
role in the DAC?”. Gradually, this process of data collection became more targeted, building 
upon the emerging theoretical insights. New/more refined research questions that 
structured the data collection were, for example,  “Why was the EU’s full membership of the 
DAC not altered when the latter became adopted by the OECD in 1961?”; “What reforms did 
the DAC implement to accommodate to the changing aid landscape and what was their 
impact on its relation with the EU?”; “What was the role of the EU in the DAC’s work on 
policy coherence for development or the concessionality of ODA loans?”… 
To address the above research questions, data was generated through a mixture of 
qualitative research methodologies. In what follows, I will discuss in greater detail the three 
different methodologies that have been applied for data gathering. These are, respectively, 
  
 
(i) document analysis, (ii) interviewing and (iii) participant observation. By combining 
these different research methodologies, this dissertation meets the criteria for 
‘methodological triangulation’, referring to the technique of validating research findings by 
cross-checking them with two or more other sources (Denzin, 2006; McNabb, 2010; Olsen, 
2003).  
3.2.1. Document analysis 
The first data gathering technique that has been applied in this doctoral dissertation 
is that of analyzing primary documentation. The majority of these documents have been 
obtained from the OECD library and archives25. Its collection dates from 1947 and includes 
records from the OECD as well as its predecessors, respectively, the Committee for 
European Economic Co-operation (CEEC) and the Organisation for European Economic Co-
operation (OEEC). The collection contains a rich repository of items that document the 
Organisation’s work, including agendas and minutes of meetings, background documents, 
technical papers, speeches, publications and internal communications between the OECD’s 
bodies and the different Member States’ delegations. This dissertation made use of all these 
types of document, though, relied most extensively on (i) agendas and minutes of the DAC’s 
meetings, (ii) speeches of the DAC chair and other DAC officials and (iii) communications 
between the different DAC delegations and the DAC Secretariat. This is motivated by the 
fact that these documents provide the richest account of the views of the different actors 
that are central in this study, i.e. DAC officials, EU officials and DAC delegates.  
Concerning the accessibility of these documents, I never encountered real problems. 
This was particularly true with regard to the Organisation’s work from the period before 
1990 given that all documents from this period have been declassified. Unfortunately, 
however, most of these documents are still is the process of being digitalized for online 
availability. Therefore they needed to be consulted on microfilms and microfilms at the 
OECD’s archives in Paris. Hence, I spent countless hours on going through these 
                                                     
25 I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Mr. Jan-Anno Schuur, Ms. Marie Khalil and the 
other colleagues for their enormous help and hospitality during my countless hours at the OECD’s 
archives.  
  
 
documents26 on ‘ancient’ and noisy microfilm and microfiche readers, allowing me to make 
copies of all relevant data27. This was done during the course of several research stays in 
Paris, respectively, in January 2012, June 2012, June 2013 and October and November 
201328. Regarding the Organisation’s work from 1990 onwards, I first of all relied on the 
online database of Official Unclassified OECD documents 
(http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments). This database contains all policy documents that 
have explicitly been declassified. In total, it includes more than 2000 declassified 
documents on the DAC and especially for more recent years it provides an accurate 
overview of the Committee’s work29. This dataset has been consulted almost continuously 
over the past four years. Off course, not all documents from the period between 1990 and 
2015 are declassified. This is particularly true for confidential documents such as minutes 
of important meetings (e.g. HLM or SLM meetings) or correspondence between the 
different DAC delegations. Therefore, I acquired (temporary) access to several of these 
documents, in close collaboration with the people from the OECD archives, the DAC 
Secretariat. Furthermore, I also obtained documents from a number of Member States’ 
delegations – most notably the Belgian and EU delegations. Off course, it was impossible to 
consult all sensitive documents, hence, I relied on interviews and participant observations 
to fill in the remaining gaps (see infra).  
In addition to the OECD library and archives, I also retrieved primary documentation 
from the US Department of State’s archives. More specifically, I consulted its online 
database  ‘Office of the Historian’ (http://history.state.gov/about). Its collection covers the 
                                                     
26 While it is impossible to tell the exact amount of documents that I have consulted, the total sum 
will lay somewhere between 1000 and 2000 documents. Note that not all documents have been 
thoroughly analyzed – depending on their usefulness – and that a lot of them were only one or two 
pages (e.g. agendas of meetings).  
27 Relevant data was interpreteted very broadly, i.e. all documents that were potentially linked to 
the EU and/or relevant cases. This allowed me to consult these documents afterwards, as such 
ensuring the continuous interplay between data collection and analysis during the entire period of 
this dissertation.  
28 During this last research stay, I was also a visiting scholar at the Centre d’études européennes  of 
Sciences Po.   
29 From 2013 onwards, the DAC has undertook a series of efforts to increase the transparency of its 
work. An important element of this strategy was to significantly increase the declassification of its 
work, of course with the exception of the more sensitive documents.  
  
 
US foreign policy up until the Carter administration and contains a rich dataset of reports of 
meetings, telegrams, letters and a wide range of other primary documentation. For this 
dissertation, I consulted all documents covering (i) European integration and (ii) foreign 
aid assistance from the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations. This can be explained by 
the fact that the OECD crosscuts both topics given that it initially was a European 
integration project (cf. chapter one) and off course deals with development cooperation 
through the DAC.  The data obtained from the US Department of State’s archive have been 
particularly useful for acquiring a better understanding of the DAC’s establishment – and 
more specifically the EU’s full membership of the Committee. Furthermore, they also 
provide relevant information on the establishment of the OECD and the integration of the 
DAC in its work in 1961. This can be explained by the fact that the US played a key role in 
the creation of the DAC and the OECD, stemming from its hegemonic role in international 
relations at that time (cf. chapter 1). As such, the US administration upheld close bilateral 
contacts with all important players on these issues, resulting in rich primary documentation 
for empirical analysis. The actual consultation of these documents took place during the 
first stage of this Ph.D. research, more specifically in the course of the first six months. The 
stems from the fact that above all, I first wanted to become more familiar with the DAC’s 
history as well as understanding the reason why the EU has always been a full member of 
the Committee. However, also at a later stage of my research, I have consulted the US 
department of state’s archives to collect additional data – for example on the establishment 
of the OECD’s Development Centre –, allowing me to test and refine emerging theoretical 
insights.  
Finally, I retrieved a – limited and miscellaneous – set of data from (i) the ‘Archives 
nationales’ of France and (ii) autobiographies and other personal writings of important 
persons in the OECD and/or DAC’s history. Starting with the former source of data, I 
consulted the French national archives in October 2013 in order to obtain detailed 
information about the French position on the EU’s accession to DAC in 1960. This 
information was retrieved from a set of memos and telegrams from this period. These 
documents were consulted at the Archives Nationales, based in Pierfitte-sur-Seine, during 
the course of my final research stay in Paris. The latter set of data contains personal 
  
 
writings of key persons in the DAC’s history. These are, respectively, Walt Whitman Rostow 
– advisor to President Eisenhower on foreign aid – ; Emile Van Lennep – former OECD 
Secretary General – ; Helmut Führer – former director of the DAC’s Development Co-
operation Directorate – ; Richard Manning – former chair of the DAC – and Brian Atwood – 
former chair of the DAC. While these writings cannot be considered primary sources in the 
strict sense of the word, they did provide useful (factual) information on certain topics as 
well as personal insights on the general functioning of the OECD and DAC. As such, they also 
cover – at least to some extent – for the lack of interviews for the period before 1970.  
3.2.2. Interviewing 
The second data gathering technique that has been applied in this doctoral 
dissertation is that of semi-structured export interviewing. This methodology was 
particularly useful for gathering views, attitudes and perceptions of different actors on the 
EU-DAC relationship. In doing so, I have focused on ‘experts’, here referring to persons that 
are familiar with the functioning of the OECD,DAC and/or the EU-(OECD)/DAC relationship. 
Most of them were (or had previously been) affiliated with the OECD and DAC, the EU or the 
different Member States30 delegations in Paris. In addition, I also selected a number of 
interviewees from developing countries, NGOs and IOs, allowing me to validate the data 
retrieved from the so-called ‘insiders’ – here referring to DAC officials and delegates. This 
was particularly useful with regard to questions related to the Committee’s role and 
relevance in the changing international aid landscape (cf. chapter 5).  
Typically, interviewees were selected through the snowball sampling method (Klotz 
& Prakash, 2008; McNabb, 2010). To contact them, I used a standard invitation mail, 
accompanied with a personal resume and a reference letter from Prof. dr. Jan Orbie. In 
general, the response rate was high and positive, allowing me to interview virtually all 
experts I intended too. Three factors have contributed to this success. First, the DAC does 
not attract much scholarly attention (see chapter 1). As such, experts are not overburdened 
with requests for interviews as, for example, is the case in other IOs. Consequently, most 
were positively surprised by my request and therefore showed a strong eagerness to share 
                                                     
30 Here referring to OECD and DAC Member States instead of EU Member States.  
  
 
their thoughts on the DAC and its relations with the EU. Second, a large number of DAC and 
OECD officials have a background in academia, explaining why they are in most cases very 
accommodating to help researchers. Third, by staying a substantial period of time in Paris – 
nine weeks in total, spread over several research stays (see supra) – I was very flexible to 
make appointments with the selected interviewees at those moments that were most 
convenient from them. This greatly improved the quality of the interviews as most experts 
had scheduled at least one hour to discuss the EU-DAC relationship.  
In total, 49 semi-structured interviews have been carried out in the period between 
16 January 2012 and 24 February 2015. As already outlined in the previous paragraph, 
these have been conducted primarily in Paris. Furthermore, interviews have also been 
conducted in Brussels, London31 and over Skype32. The reason why I carried out 49 
interviews – and not, for example, 35 or 54 – is that the point of theoretical saturation was 
reached from around the 40th interview. From then onwards, new interviews stopped 
providing new information and insights (cf. Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Mason, 2010). However, 
to be completely sure that I did not missed out on important information, I scheduled 
another 9 interviews, all confirming the fact that I had reached the point of theoretical 
saturation. As such, it can be confidently stated that the insights presented in this 
dissertation do not build upon an unbalanced and incomplete set of data (cf. Saumura & 
Given, 2008). 
Finally, and closely linked to the next section, this dissertation also builds upon a 
large number of so-called informal and spontaneous interviews (cf. Mack, Woodsong, 
MacQueen, Guest, & Namey, 2005). These are unplanned interviews that have been 
conducted during the course of my participant observations. Interviewees included, 
amongst others, DAC delegates and officials which I accidentally encountered in the OECD’s 
corridors/cafeteria or restaurant before and after the meetings of the DAC. Typically, these 
interviews were short – in most cases less than 5 minutes – and almost completely 
                                                     
31 In 2012 the DAC High Level Meeting took place in London.  
32 While I prefer interviewing in person, I always offered respondents the option to have an 
interview over Skype from the first remainder email onwards. By doing so, I essentially tried to 
further reduce the possible ‘escape strategies’ on their behalf. Ina small number of cases, Skype was 
also the best option for more practical reasons (e.g. when the interviewees were based in the US). 
  
 
unstructured. Nonetheless, they did provide useful insights, especially in relation to the 
topics that were addressed in the DAC’s meeting at those particular days.  
3.2.3. Participant observation 
A third and final data gathering technique that has been applied in this doctoral 
dissertation is that of participant observation. During the course of the past four years, I 
participated as an observer in six meetings of the DAC. These took place, respectively, in in 
January 2012, June 2012, October 2013 (2x) and November 2013 (2x) at the OECD’s 
headquarters – located in the Château de La Muette – and typically lasted for an afternoon 
or a full day. They addressed a wide range of topics, including  (i) the DAC’s role in 
international development, (ii) the reform of the ODA definition, (iii) the OECD’s Strategy on 
Development, (iv) the promotion of PCD, (v) the DAC’s working budget, (vi) the 
enlargement of the Committee, (vii) the global partnership on effective development-
cooperation, (viii) the data revolution in development cooperation, and (ix) financing for 
development. Beside these topics, each meeting also addressed a number of practicalities 
such as making arrangements on future meetings.  
Access to the DAC’s meetings was obtained through the Belgian permanent 
delegation to the OECD33. This was necessary given that the Committee’s work takes place 
behind closed doors. More specifically, I signed an internship agreement from January 2012 
to December 2013, allowing me to accompany the Belgian DAC delegate to the meetings of 
the Committee. It has to be noted, however, that this internship did not involve any 
practical commitments vis-à-vis the Belgian delegation to the OECD. As such this study can 
be qualified as a passive participant observation study given that my role as a researcher 
did not involve actively taking part in the Committee’s work (DeWalt, Dewalt, & Wayland, 
1998; Emerson, Fretz, & Shaw, 2001). In line with my personal research ethics, I never hide 
the fact that I was a researcher when talking with people. However, it should be noted that 
my presence went in most cases unnoticed due to the large number of people in the room. 
On several occasions, persons even assumed that I was an assistant to the Belgian DAC 
                                                     
33 I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Dr. Martinus Desmet, Mr. Lieven De la Marche and 
Mr. Yves Haesendonck.   
  
 
delegate, stemming from the color of my badge34. As such, I am confident that my presence 
did not influence the course of the DAC’s meetings, strengthening the validity of my findings 
(cf. Jorgensen, 1989). 
The actual data obtained through these participant observations consists of field 
notes. These are mainly textual, but also contain a limited number of drawings and 
schedules, for example, on the seating arrangements during the meetings. Field notes were 
typically taken during the observations, though, in a number of occasions notes were made 
afterwards as this was the only feasible option (e.g. during lunch breaks/receptions and 
discussions in the corridors before and after the meetings). The insights retrieved from 
these field notes were useful for this dissertation in two important ways. First, they allowed 
me to acquire a much better understanding of the functioning of the DAC. Indeed, while 
interviews and document analysis already offered important insights on the working of the 
Committee, additional – and sometimes more nuanced – insights were obtained through 
taking part in the DAC’s work. Furthermore, the participant observation also strengthened 
my understanding of how DAC delegations – in this case the Belgian one – prepare for 
meetings of the Committee35. This was particularly useful in the first stage of this Ph.D. 
research in order to get a much better grip on my research topic. Second, at a later stage of 
my research, participant observation allowed me to (i) validate the findings of my semi-
structured interviews and document analysis, (ii) gather new data and (iii) test and refine 
theoretical insights. Especially the latter was important, and from June 2012 onwards 
meetings were solely selected in function of their topic – off course to the extent possible36. 
More specifically, I paid particular attention to those meetings that focused on the ODA 
reforms and PCD – off course to the extent possible – given that it had become clear by that 
time that both cases were particularly relevant for gaining a better understanding of the 
EU-DAC relationship.  
                                                     
34 While visitors to the OECD buildings obtain a white colored visitors badge, I had a blue badge, 
corresponding with the color of the different delegations to the DAC.  
35 During my first research stay in January 2012, I spent a lot of time at the Belgian delegation to the 
OECD. Furthermore, I stayed at the place of the then Belgian DAC delegate, allowing me to gain a 
better understanding of the work that is carried out by the different DAC delegates.   
36 It was, for example, impossible to gain access to the DAC’s annual High-Level Meetings.  
  
 
3.3. Data analysis 
The process of data analysis followed the three stages as advocated by Glaser and 
Strauss. These are, respectively, the stages of (i) open, (ii) axial and (iii) selective coding  
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1998). The first stage of open coding involved 
identifying, naming, categorizing and describing the EU-DAC relationship. Basically, this 
first stage of coding takes place in the beginning of the data collection. At that time, data are 
still selected in a rather chaotic way – I like to use the term problematizing stage –, 
stemming from the type of questions that are raised (e.g. how does the DAC function, how 
does the EU organizes itself in Paris, how about the interplay between the DAC and the 
OECD…). This is also reflected in the open codes, given that these basically address each 
time the question: “What is this about?”, “What is being referred to?” (Strauss & Corbin, 
1998). During this stage, I applied various codes such as ‘beyond aid’, ‘bureaucratic 
competition’, ‘DCF’, ‘DAC enlargement’, ‘EU coordination’, ‘EU enlargement’, ‘European 
consensus’, ‘full membership’, ‘inclusiveness’, ‘new donors’, ‘post-Busan’, ‘policy learning’ 
and so on. This process of open coding was done document-by-document for most primary 
documents and paragraph-by-paragraph for the interviews, field notes and some key 
primary documents. This was considered to be the best choice as line-by-line coding would 
have resulted in too many codes, something which was not necessary for the purpose of this 
research, whereas only document-by-document coding would have created too few coding 
terms.  
The second stage of the data analysis involved axial coding, referring to the process 
of linking codes to one another (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1998). During 
this second stage of coding, the focus increasingly came to lay on integrating/linking the 
open codes. To facilitate this process, I applied, albeit not rigorously37, the coding 
framework that was developed by Glaser and Strauss (1967) (see table 1) and ever since 
has been widely applied in GT studies (Charmaz, 2004; Locke, 1996). By doing so, I defined 
a number of key concepts/core categories. Examples are ‘EU structure’, ‘mutually beneficial 
relationship’, and ‘power shift’, ‘legitimacy DAC’.  
                                                     
37 Stemming from the fact that it has a positivist undertone.  
  
 
Table 1 
Elements to focus on Description 
Phenomenon The concept that holds the bits together.  
Causal conditions Events or variables that lead to occurrence of the 
phenomenon 
Context Background variables 
Action strategies Purposeful, goal-oriented activities in response to the 
phenomenon 
Consequences Consequences of action strategies, intended and 
unintended 
 
However, what is particularly important to point out is that this stage of axial coding 
determined the case selection of this doctoral dissertation. Indeed, as will become clear in 
the following chapters, particular attention will be given to the (i) the EU’s membership 
status in the DAC (chapter six), (ii) the impact of the DAC on the EU (chapter seven) , (iii) 
the issue of concessional ODA loans (chapter eight) and (iv) the promotion of PCD (chapters 
eight and nine). While at first sight these different topics seem not – or vaguely – related to 
one another, I selected them in function of the (emerging) axial codes. Put differently, while 
the first stage of open coding (and corresponding data collection) allowed me to become 
fully acquainted with the general contours and evolution of the EU-DAC relationship, the 
stage of axial coding focused explicitly on those cases and topics that stood out from a 
theoretical point of view in order to acquire a more in-depth understanding of my research 
topic.   
The final stage of the data analysis was that of the selective coding, referring to the 
process of choosing one core concept around which all the others could be draped. The 
basic idea essentially is that there always exists one dominant storyline for each and every 
GT study. This is not different for this dissertation. Indeed, the core concept of this study is 
‘erosion’, referring to the fact that the EU-DAC relationship has evolved from an 
interdependent to a dependent relationship (cf. chapter ten). However, as already outlined 
previously in this chapter, I do not put forward one single theoretical framework that 
explains this evolution. Rather, I search for explanations – or as coined in the conclusions 
‘causes’ – at different levels of social reality, focusing both on agency and structure.  
  
 
3.4. Critical reflection 
Having outlined the general research design of this doctoral dissertation, it is finally 
important to take a critical stand vis-à-vis towards my own research. More specifically, and 
in line with my ontological position, it should be emphasized that research can never be 
neutral and value-free given that reality is socially constructed by each and every one of us 
(Dessler, 2005). While I do not consider this to be a problem – after all there is no 
alternative – one should keep in mind that the results of this dissertation are inevitably 
shaped by my own biases as well as those of the interviewees and observed persons.  
Off course, this is not an excuse to not be reflective on how these biases might have 
potentially shaped the processes of data collection and analysis. Starting with the potential 
impact of my personal normative and political beliefs, I have tried to be aware of my own 
biases at all stages of the research. During the interviews, for example, I explicitly aimed for 
open questions in order to stay as close to the personal accounts of the interviewees as 
possible (cf. Klotz & Prakash, 2008). Furthemore, during the enitre research process, I 
explicilty tried to position myself in the different paradigms on the DAC and its relations 
with the EU, as such challening my own beliefs and the findings of this study.  
Accounting for the biases of the interviewees and the observed persons is much 
harder, if not impossible. Nonetheless, I tried to do so, starting from the basic assumption 
that their views are shaped by their personal backgrounds as well as the contemporary 
context in which they operate. As such, it is possible to account – at least to some degree – 
for the broader context in which the data for this study were obtained. More specifically, 
during virtually the entire period of data collection, relations between the EU and DAC were 
quite tense on several issues. While this dissertation shows that this is not incidental, one 
should keep in mind that this might – and almost certainly – has influenced the accounts of 
the respondents. Indeed, in a number of instances, interviewees clearly vented their 
personal frustrations about, for example, certain persons and/or practices. This has been 
taking into account to the largest extent possible while analyzing the data.  Nonetheless, 
also as a reader one should be aware of this context and the potential biases it may have 
caused.  
  
 
Finally, it also worth pointing out that the fact that the DAC thus far has been largely 
overlooked in academic literature might have influenced the behavior of some 
interviewees. More specifically, while it clearly improved their willingness to collaborate 
(see supra), several interviewees also clearly – and not necessarily implicitly – liked to use 
the opportunity of being interviewed for highlighting the – in their view – added value of 
the DAC in international development. Again, this has been taking into account to the 
largest extent possible while analyzing the data, each time wondering what might be the 
underlying ‘agenda’ of certain statements.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
  
 
Part two 
 
 
 Part two is reserved for the six papers – and corresponding chapters – of this 
doctoral dissertation. As became clear in the introduction to this study, each of these papers 
addresses a particular aspect of the EU-DAC relationship. For the sake of clarity, each 
chapter starts with a brief introduction, elaborating on how the respective paper fits into 
the larger research project.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Chapter 4: The EU’s International Identity: the Curious Case of 
the OECD 
 
 
Status: Published in co-authorship with Prof. Dr. Tamara Takacs (2013) in Henri Dewaele & 
Jan-Jaap Kuipers (Eds.), The emergence of the European Union’s international identity. Views 
from the global arena. Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, pp. 187-209.  
 
General introduction: This first paper offers a general (institutional) overview of the EU’s 
relations with the OECD at large. More specifically, it looks at how the EU organizes itself in 
Paris and brakes down the Union’s identity into four dimensions – note that the concept of 
identity was the general framing of the edited volume. Subsequently, this paper illustrates 
how these four dimensions vary across the Organization’s different committees and bodies, 
arguing that there is not a single dominant way in which the EU organizes itself in the 
OECD. To illustrate this point, particular attention is paid to, respectively, the OECD’s 
Economic Development and Review Committee (EDRC) and the DAC. The main added-value 
of this paper lays in the fact that it is the first study which provides a detailed overview of 
the way in which the EU organizes itself in the OECD at large. As such, it constitutes a 
welcome addition to the first generation of EU-IOs studies (cf. chapter 2). It should be 
pointed out, however, that in parallel with our efforts also Peter Carroll and Aynsley Kellow 
(2012) undertook a similar effort. The main limitation of this study is that it is framed from 
a legal/institutional perspective, corresponding with the overall framework of the edited 
volume. As such, the main focus of this study is on the legal reality of the EU-OECD and EU-
DAC relationship, whereas in a number of cases it would have been more interesting to 
delve deeper into the underlying political reality – as will be done in the remaining 
chapters. This also explains why only limited attention has been given to the distinction 
between the OECD and DAC given that from a legal point of view the latter serves as a 
Committee of the former.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Chapter 5: The DAC is dead, long live the DCF? A comparative 
analysis of the OECD Development Assistance Committee and 
the UN Development Cooperation Forum.  
 
 
Status: Published online (forthcoming on paper) in co-authorship with Prof. Dr. Jan Orbie 
(2015) in European Journal of Development Research.    
 
General introduction: At first sight this second paper might seem a bit misplaced in this 
doctoral dissertation. Indeed, as reflects from its title, the main focus of this study is on the 
DAC and the DCF, and thus not on the EU. Nonetheless, such a perspective is crucial for 
understanding the remainder of this doctoral dissertation. More specifically, as outlined in 
chapters 1 and 2 of this dissertation, the DAC thus far hardly attracted any scholarly 
attention, leaving us wondering about its role in international development cooperation. 
Therefore, this article pays particular attention to this topic, with an explicit focus on how 
the changing aid landscape potentially alters its position in the constellation of 
international development organizations. In doing so, the DAC is put against the UN’s 
Development Cooperation Forum, a forum that has been established in 2007 and explicitly 
presents itself as a more legitimate alternative to the DAC. In this paper, we address this 
claim by braking down the DAC’s and DCF’s legitimacy alongside the lines of input, output 
and throughput legitimacy. The main strength of this article is that by doing so, this study is 
among the very first to offer a comprehensive and nuanced overview of the role of the DAC 
and DCF in international development. The main ‘limitation’ of this study is its comparative 
and generalist approach that did not allow focusing in more depth on a number of specific 
issues38, most notably the EU. This is problematic – to a certain degree – given that the EU 
does have an impact on the DAC’s output and throughput legitimacy (see infra).  
 
 
 
                                                     
38 Furthermore – and certainly not to hide behind the editors and reviewers given that it ultimately was 
my personal choice – also the review process pushed in the direction of this generalist approach, 
advising to stick to the comparative analysis of the DAC and DCF, rather than trying to force to much of 
my findings (i.e. the role of the EU) into this paper.  
  
 
Chapter 6: Once a member, always a member? Assessing the 
importance of time in the relationship between the European 
Union and the Development Assistance Committee.  
 
 
Status: Published (online) in co-authorship with Prof. Dr. Jan Orbie (2015) in Cambridge 
Review of International Affairs.     
 
General introduction: Having acquired a sound understanding of the relationship between 
the EU and the OECD at large (chapter 4) and the role, functioning and legitimacy of the 
DAC (chapter 5), this third paper further brakes down the EU-DAC relationship. More 
specifically, particular attention is paid to the EU’s full membership status in the DAC. The 
article wonders why the EU has been able to join the DAC in the first place in 1960, knowing 
that (i) it lacked legal development competences at that time and that (ii) it holds an 
observer status in the rest of the OECD. In addition, it also wonders why this membership 
status has remained unaltered over time. The major strength of this article is that it offers 
an important theoretical contribution to the study of EU-IOs, outlining the importance of 
time for understanding the EU’s membership status in a particular IO. This illustrates the 
strength of inductive research as it allows (new) theoretical insights to emerge from the 
data. In this context, it is also worth mentioning that the historical institutionalist 
hypothesis that emerged from this study was further tested and confirmed, together with 
several other colleagues (cf. annex one). The main shortcoming of this paper is the problem 
of causality in historical research. More specifically, one of the central events in this study is 
the establishment of the DAC in 1960. In order to reconstruct this event, a wide range of 
historical documents were consulted. For obvious reasons, however, interviews were 
impossible to carry out. As such, this study inevitably missed out on some 
detailed/background information that might be relevant and is not included in, for example, 
minutes of meetings or telegrams – think for example about personal relations between the 
main actors.  A second (minor) shortcoming relates to the presentation of this paper. While 
this research came to exist in an inductive way, the reviewers urged to present it otherwise, 
explaining why it might give the impression that the historical institutionalist framework 
was adopted prior to the study.    
  
 
Chapter 7: Let’s talk about international organizations. EU 
development integration through the lens of the Development 
Assistance Committee  
 
 
Status: under review (awaiting first revision) in Journal of European Integration.  
 
General introduction: Similar to the previous chapters, this paper further brakes down the 
relationship between the EU and the DAC. As reflects from this chapter’s title, the main 
focus of this article lays on understanding the impact of the DAC on European development 
integration. Linking back to figure 1, we study the EU-DAC relationship from a top-down 
perspective, referring to the fact that we only pay attention to the influence of Paris on 
Brussels. The major strength of this article is that it illustrates the importance of the 
multilateral level for understanding EU development cooperation. More specifically, by 
rereading the history of European development integration through the lens of the DAC, 
this article shows how the Committee on a number of occasions helped shaping the EU’s 
development policies in important ways. As such, this article explicitly seeks to integrate 
the multilateral level into the studies of EU development cooperation and European 
integration. This being said, this article also has one important shortcoming, namely the fact 
that it is not easy to draw causality in the historical sections of this paper. Similar to the 
previous chapter, it was impossible to triangulate the empirical findings for the period 
before 1970.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Let’s talk about international organizations: EU development integration through 
the lens of the Development Assistance Committee. 
Abstract 
This article studies the role of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in European development integration. 
While literature thus far focused on the European Union (EU) institutions and Member States as 
main drivers of integration, we argue that also international organizations (IOs) should be 
brought into the picture. By rereading the history of EU development integration through the 
lens of the DAC, we show that the latter has shaped the Union’s development policy in a 
number of important ways. More specifically, through its membership of the DAC, the EU was 
able to become an assertive development actor in the pre-Maastricht era, whereas in more 
recent years the DAC was instrumental in triggering a series of policy reforms at the European 
level, which helped turning the EU into a full-blown development actor.  
KEYWORDS: EU, DAC, OECD, DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION, EUROPEAN INTEGRATION              
Introduction  
The European Union (EU) is a unique actor in international development cooperation, 
combining the characteristics of both a bilateral donor – providing development assistance 
through the EU budget – and a multilateral donor – embodying the collective efforts of all 28 
Member States (Carbone, 2007). Collectively it provides more than half of all Official 
Development Assistance (ODA), while bilaterally the EU ranks as the world’s third largest donor 
(OECD, 2014). The sum of both, arguably, makes the EU one of the world’s key development 
actors (Farrell, 2008; Holland & Doidge, 2012; Orbie, 2012). Remarkably, however, EU 
development policy thus far attracted only limited scholarly attention – especially in comparison 
to other donors (e.g. US, UK, France, Germany) and fields of EU external action (e.g. climate, 
trade, security) (Gänzle, Grimm, & Makhan, 2012; Hoebink, 2010). Indeed, notwithstanding the 
significant efforts of several scholars (e.g. Arts & Dickson, 2004; Carbone, 2007, 2008, 2013b; 
  
 
Hoebink, 2005; Holland & Doidge, 2012; Orbie, 2012), EU development cooperation remains 
greatly understudied.   
Perhaps the biggest shortcoming to the current literature on EU development 
cooperation is its lack of attention for the multilateral level. Indeed, despite a dramatic increase 
of interactions between the EU and international organizations (IOs) (Jørgensen & Costa, 2012; 
Kissack, 2010), as well as the fact that some authors suggest that EU development cooperation 
is the product of a complex interaction between the EU institutions, EU Member States and IOs 
(e.g. Farrell, 2008; Olsen, 2005), EU development literature so far overlooked the EU’s relations 
with international development organizations (e.g. Arts & Dickson, 2004; Carbone, 2007; 
Dearden, 2008; Hoebink, 2005; Holland, 2002; Orbie, 2012). Furthermore, also the burgeoning 
study of EU-IOs relations (e.g. Blavoukos & Bourantonis, 2011; Jørgensen & Costa, 2012; 
Jørgensen & Laatikainen, 2013; Kissack, 2010; Laatikainen & Smith, 2006) and the literature on 
international development organizations (e.g. Birdsall, 2006; Boas & McNeill, 2004b; Nay, 2014; 
Woods, 2008) thus far paid no attention to this topic. Most notable – and to our knowledge only 
– exceptions are Baroncelli (2011), Carbone (2013a) and Farrell (2008, 2012). However, while 
these studies are extremely useful, they ‘only’ offer a bottom-up perspective, focusing on the 
EU’s impact at the multilateral level39, while ignoring the potential role of IOs in EU 
development integration.   
The lack of attention for the multilateral level in the study of EU development 
cooperation is problematic for two reasons. First, and following the suggestions of Farrell (2008) 
and Olsen (2005), it is reasonable to assume that the EU’s development policy is shaped by the 
complex interaction between the EU institutions, the Member States and IOs – not to forget 
other actors such as partner countries and NGOs. After all, also in other fields of EU external 
action (e.g. trade, climate, migration), studies show the importance of IOs for understanding 
certain policies (e.g. Jørgensen & Costa, 2012; Jørgensen & Laatikainen, 2013). Especially, 
                                                     
39 More specifically, Baroncelli focuses on the EU’s performance in the World Bank, focusing on its 
impact during the decision-making process. In a similar vein, Farrell wonders why the EU’s influence in 
the World Bank, IMF and UN has been limited. Finally, Carbone addresses the EU’s actorness at the High-
Level Forums on Aid Effectiveness. 
  
 
neofunctionalist scholars have elaborated on this dynamic, being part of a larger research 
agenda on ‘exogenous spillover’(Niemann, 2006). Second, by ignoring the multilateral level, we 
are potentially trapped in a Eurocentric reading of EU development cooperation. Indeed, when 
explaining EU development integration, scholars thus far have focused on the Member States 
(e.g. Cosgrove-Twitchett, 1978; Grilli, 1993; Hoebink, 2005; Holland & Doidge, 2012), the 
European Commission (e.g. Babarinde, 1998; Holland, 2000; Olsen, 2005) or both (e.g. Carbone, 
2007; Dearden, 2008; Orbie, 2012), seing them as main and only drivers of political change. 
However, by ignoring the potential role of non-European actors, in particular IOs, it is essentially 
impossible to know whether or not we – EU development/integration scholars – are blindsided.  
In sum, there is thus a clear need to bring the multilateral level into the picture of EU 
development cooperation. This article takes a first tentative step in this direction by studying 
the relationship between the EU and the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). While being largely 
unknown – or better understudied –, the DAC is arguably the most important international 
development organization in which the EU takes part (Carroll & Kellow, 2011; Orbie, Saenen, 
Verschaeve, & De Ville, 2015; Verschaeve & Orbie, 2015). Hence, by rereading the story of EU 
development integration through the lens of the DAC, we wonder whether – and if so to what 
extent – the latter has been a shaping factor of EU development policy. For several reasons, we 
expect the DAC to have influenced the course of EU development history. First, the DAC has an 
impressive track record of influencing the aid programs of its members, most notably through 
its peer reviews (Ashoff, 2013; Ben-Artzi, 2013; Masujima, 2004). Second, the EU has a long and 
deep relationship with the DAC, stemming from the fact that it has been a full member of the 
Committee ever since the latter’s inception in 1960 (Verschaeve & Takacs, 2013). Third and 
final, studies have shown that the EU typically is a norm taker when it comes to development 
cooperation, adopting norms that have been set by others – most notably influential donors 
(e.g. US, UK) and IOs (e.g. WTO, IMF, World Bank) (Arts & Dickson, 2004; Farrell, 2008; Holden, 
2009).  
To study whether and to what extent the DAC has shaped the course of EU development 
integration, this study opts for an inductive research approach. We favor such an approach over 
  
 
more traditional (i.e. deductive) ones for two important reasons. First, given the explorative 
nature of our research question, a flexible research approach is required as it is a priori 
impossible to tell what data are relevant to look at. Second, the ultimate goal of this article is to 
bring the multilateral level into the study of EU development cooperation, as such potentially 
providing new theoretical insights on this topic. Again, this particularly fits inductive research as 
it allows insights to emerge from the data without the potential restraints imposed by existing 
theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Maxwell, 2005). Empirically, this study draws on a combination 
of qualitative methods. More specifically, data were collected through (i) archive study and 
document analysis40 (e.g. minutes of meetings, intra-delegation’s correspondence), (ii) semi-
structured interviews with in total 22 DAC and Member States’ officials41 and (iii) participatory 
observation42 in several meetings of the DAC during the period 2012-2013. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. First, we provide a general overview 
on the DAC in which we briefly discuss its role and functioning in international development. We 
also focus on its relationship with the EU. Then, we shift our attention to the central research 
question of this study: has the DAC been a driver of European development integration. In doing 
so, we distinguish between the period before and after the Treaty of Maastricht (1993). It will 
become clear the DAC has always been an important shaping factor of EU development policy, 
though, the way in which it did so changed significantly over time. The article concludes with 
some general reflections on the main findings of this study. 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
40 Data were retrieved from and consulted at the OECD’s archives in Paris. We are grateful to Mr. Jan-
Anno Schuur and Ms. Marie Khalil for their help during our research stays.  
41 As various officials were only willing to share their views on the condition of absolute anonymity, 
interviews are indicated by a general reference only.  
42 We are grateful to the Belgian delegation to the OECD, in particular to Dr. Martinus Desmet and Mr. 
Lieven De La Marche.  
  
 
The (EU-)DAC (relationship) in a nutshell  
For more than fifty years now, the DAC has grouped the world’s main donors43, serving 
as a forum for policy dialogue, coordination and international consensus building (OECD/DAC, 
2011). Its history goes back to 1960. At that time, the world witnessed a process of rapid 
decolonization, forcing Western countries to rethink their relations with their former colonies. 
Against this background, they established the Development Assistance Group (DAG), serving as 
a forum to reflect upon development cooperation. More specifically, its purpose was to increase 
the volume and effectiveness of Western development aid, which would be achieved through 
burden sharing, coordination and mutual learning (Esman & Cheever, 1967; OECD/DAC, 1960; 
Rostow, 1985). Afterwards, in 1961, the DAG became adopted by the newly established OECD – 
explaining its current name – and ever since it has been the main body through which the 
Organization deals with development cooperation44 (Carroll & Kellow, 2011; Griffiths, 1997; 
Masujima, 2004).  
As previously outlined, the DAC seeks to increase the volume and effectiveness of 
development aid (Eyben, 2013; Kim & Lightfoot, 2011). It pursues these goals in three distinctive 
ways. First, the DAC serves as a forum for standard setting and monitoring. In 1969, for 
example, the Committee developed the ODA definition, allowing its Secretariat to monitor the 
aid efforts of its Members. In a similar vein, the DAC also established several other development 
principles, ranging from untied aid to policy coherence for development or donor alignment 
(Manning, 2008; Masujima, 2004; Ruckert, 2008). Second, the DAC serves as a forum for policy 
learning and evaluation. Most notable are its peer reviews, providing its members a means for 
scrutinizing the donor under review, identifying best practices and mutual learning (Ashoff, 
                                                     
43 The DAC is currently composed out of 29 Members: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, European Union, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Korea, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United States and United Kingdom.  
44 Given the DAC’s unique history, it always remained a largely autonomous body of the OECD. For 
example, the DAC has its own – more restricted – membership criteria and it holds is own – partly 
independent – budget. It is also the only OECD committee that is headed by a permanent chair, allowed 
to speak on behalf of the DAC without gaining prior approval of the OECD Council (Carroll & Kellow, 
2011; Verschaeve, 2013).  
  
 
2013; Ben-Artzi, 2013; Paulo & Reisen, 2010). Third and final, the DAC serves as a forum for 
dialogue and consensus building. In recent years, for example, it played a key role in forging 
international development commitments, including the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness 
(2005) and the Millennium Development Goals45 (Eyben, 2013; Kim & Lightfoot, 2011; Manning, 
2008; Masujima, 2004). In sum, the DAC can thus be seen as a central pillar of the international 
aid architecture (Boas & McNeill, 2004a; Heiner, Klingebiel, & Mahn, 2014; Nay, 2014).  
Of particular relevance for this study is the DAC’s relationship with the EU. As became 
clear in the introduction to this article, the EU has strong historical and institutional ties with the 
DAC. This is the case for two reasons. First, the EU – here referring to the European institutions 
– has always been a full member of the DAC, taking part in its work alongside the EU member 
states (Führer, 1996). This makes the DAC one of the few IOs in which the EU is represented as a 
full member (Debaere, De Ville, Orbie, Saenen, & Verschaeve, 2014). Initially, this membership 
entailed the representation of the European Development Fund (EDF) and the European 
Investment Bank (EIB) (see infra), though, over time the EU has also come to represent its own 
development programs as well as those of its members that are not represented in the DAC 
(e.g. Cyprus, Estonia, Malta) (Carroll & Kellow, 2011; Verschaeve & Takacs, 2013). Second, there 
has always been a strong overlap in membership between the EU and the DAC. While at the 
time of the DAC’s inception in 1960, the EU already made up for 6 of the 11 members, it 
currently accounts for 20 of the 29 DAC members. In sum, it can be concluded that the EU and 
DAC are strongly intertwined institutions. Indeed, ever since the DAC’s inception in 1960, 
relations between Brussels and Paris have been strong from an institutional point of view.  
EU development integration through the lens of the DAC 
Having provided a general overview of the DAC’s role in international development and 
its relationship with the EU, the remainder of this article addresses the central research 
question of this study: Has the DAC – and if so to what extent – shaped the course of EU 
development policy? At a first level, we distinguish between two periods, respectively before 
                                                     
45 The MDGs built upon the International Development Goals as put forward by the DAC in 1996 
(OECD/DAC, 1996).   
  
 
and after the Treaty of Maastricht (1993). This is motivated by the fact that this Treaty 
significantly altered the EU’s role in development cooperation by adding this policy to the 
Commission’s portfolio46 (see infra). At a second level, a further selection has been made within 
both time periods in function of our dependent variable, i.e. European development integration. 
More specifically, particular attention is paid  (i) the European Commission’s growing 
development assertiveness from the second-half of the 1960s onwards and (ii) the reforms of 
EU development cooperation in the late 1990s and early 2000s. This is motivated by the fact 
that our analysis clearly illustrates the importance of the DAC in both cases, whereas the 
literature on EU development cooperation thus far largely failed to explain both periods of 
European development integration.  
Finally, and before jumping to our empirics, two important considerations must be made. 
First, this article offers a meta-perspective on the past 55 years of EU-DAC relations. However, 
this analysis builds upon a rigorous and in-depth study of the relationship between both 
institutions. Second, our analysis should be seen as complementary to the existing literature on 
EU development cooperation. Indeed, while this article might give the impression of offering an 
alternative and competing framework for understanding EU development integration, the 
opposite is true.  
From Rome to Maastricht  
The role of the DAC in EU development integration was quite substantial in the period 
before 1993. According to our findings, the DAC helped the European Commission establishing 
itself as a strong and assertive development actor vis-à-vis the EU Member States. The 
underlying story goes back to Treaty of Rome in 1957. While this Treaty foresaw in the 
establishment of a preferential trade relationship with the African, Caribbean and Pacific 
countries and the creation of the intergovernmental EDF, it essentially did not grant the 
European Commission real development competence. Indeed, Member States were reluctant to 
transfer development competences to the European level, with the sole exception of the small 
                                                     
46 Before, the European Commission pursued its development objective through its trade relations with 
the global South and its role in managing the intergovernmental EDF.  
  
 
role the Commission obtained to help managing the EDF and EIB (Carbone, 2007; Holland & 
Doidge, 2012). Consequently, the Commission was initially nothing more than an implementing 
agent of its Member States, helping to implement the development programs they had 
previously agreed upon. Moreover, due to the fact that the Commission lacked institutional 
capacities on development, it was virtually impossible for its officials to assume themselves a 
more assertive role in this policy area. Indeed, compared to their national counterparts, 
European Commission officials faced an ‘aid information gap’, hampering them from proactively 
fostering a European development policy (Arts & Dickson, 2004; Frisch, 2008; Grilli, 1993). 
This gradually changed in the beginning of the 1960s. According to Cosgrove-Twitchett 
(1978), the Commission gave first evidence of more development assertiveness during the 
negotiations of the first Yaoundé convention (1963). However, she – but also other scholars – 
failed to explain this shift given that the political constellation in Brussels had not changed since 
the Treaty of Rome. What did change though, was the establishment of the DAC in 1960. While 
at that time most EU Member States were still reluctant to transfer development competences 
to the European level, they did support the EU’s accession to the DAC as they felt it was in their 
own interests that Commission officials represented the work of the EDF and EIB (see Esman & 
Cheever, 1967; Verschaeve & Orbie, 2015). What they did not anticipate upon, however, was 
the potential impact of such decision. Indeed, as reflects from our empirical findings, the EU’s 
membership of the DAC helped the Commission to assume itself a much stronger role on 
development cooperation. This was the case for two reasons.  
First, the DAC served as an important source of information for the European 
Commission, as such helping the latter’s officials to overcome their ‘aid information gap’. To 
explain this, one needs to take a closer look at the DAC’s initial work. As previously outlined in 
this paper, the DAC was established in a period of rapid decolonization. In the same period, 
most Western countries also set-up their development agencies47 (Führer, 1996; Rostow, 1985). 
Most of these agencies, however, faced severe teething problems. Furthermore, it was unclear 
which country provided what (and how much) aid in what country, as such hampering  more 
                                                     
47 To list a few: DANIDA (1962), French Ministery for Co-operation (1960), KfW (1961), USAID (1961).  
  
 
coherent and coordinated Western aid programmes. Therefore, the DAC’s initial meetings 
(1960-1962) were used to reflect upon improving the management of these newborn aid 
agencies. Furthermore, the DAC also mapped in detail the ongoing aid efforts of its members as 
well as the needs of the developing countries (Cunningham, 1974; OECD/DAC, 1961a, b, 1962b). 
This allowed the Commission to become a well informed and more assertive development 
actor, knowing the nitty-gritty of its Members development programs48.  
Also at a later stage, i.e. when the DAC started to work more thematically from second 
half of the 1960s onwards, the Commission continued to benefit from its involvement in the 
Committee’s work. This clearly reflects from the strong interconnectedness between the 
European Commission’s development initiatives and the work of the DAC in the 1960s, 1970s 
and 1980s. Indeed, if we take a closer look at some of the most important development 
communications of the Commission during this period – i.e. the memorandum on a Community 
development cooperation (1972), the ‘Fresco’ communication (1974) or the Pisani 
memorandum (1982) – one clearly sees a strong overlap with the DAC’s work, both in terms of 
substance and sequence. To give one example, the DAC focused between 1970 and 1973 
extensively on the least-developed countries (LDCs) and the principle of basic human needs in 
its work (Führer, 1996; OECD/DAC, 1970-73). Obviously, the European Commission took part in 
all these meetings, though, its role was quite limited compared to the other DAC members given 
that it was unable to actively contribute to the discussion due to a lack of in-house expertise on 
these topics (OECD/DAC, 1970-73; 1971). Or as stated by a former DAC official: “We had no 
illusions about the European Commission […] With the exception of the trade or EDF related 
discussions, it essentially lacked the capabilities to provide intellectual input to our meetings” 
(interview 1). However, the very same European Commission issued one year later its ‘Fresco’ 
communication in which it paid particular attention to both topics (1974). As such, it can be 
reasonably assumed that there was– at least to some extent – a link between the DAC’s work 
and the initiatives taken in Brussels during this period. Especially with regard to the ‘pure’ 
                                                     
48 Off course, and as is the case with all historical research, it is impossible to pinpoint the exact impact 
of the DAC’s initial work on the EU’s development assertiveness. However, through counterfactual 
reasoning, we believe that it is fair to assume a clear and direct link between both.  
  
 
development initiatives – and thus not trade related initiatives – “ the Commission built upon 
the work that had been done by others, including ours [referring to the DAC]” (interview 1) given 
that it lacked the institutional capacities to carry out similar work itself.  
Second, the DAC indirectly served as a driver of European development integration. 
More specifically, through its recommendations – most notably in the context of its peer 
reviews49 – it fostered the Commission’s development aspirations. Essentially, the DAC did not 
threat the EU different from its other members, that is seeking ways to improve the 
effectiveness of its development programs. However, given that all European aid at that time 
was distributed through the EDF, an intergovernmental fund outside the Community’s budget, it 
was virtually impossible for the DAC to provide recommendations without touching upon the 
division of powers within the EU. Indeed, taking an aid effectiveness perspective, the DAC raised 
several times the idea to strengthen aid coordination at the European level and simplify the 
EDF’s procedures – for example by partly budgetizing50 the fund (OECD/DAC, 1967-69; 1970-73; 
1980-85). It did so in the context of the EU’s peer reviews, though, also on other occasions 
similar ideas were raised (e.g. OECD/DAC, 1980). Again, it is impossible to pinpoint the exact 
impact of this. After all, also a number of EU member states – most notably Germany – 
advocated in favor of, for example, strengthening European aid coordination (Carbone, 2007; 
Delputte, 2013; Grilli, 1993). This being said, however, our data show that one also cannot 
simply neglect the DAC’s influence. More specifically, internal communications between the 
European Commission and the DAC Secretariat, as well as minutes of several meetings indicate 
that the Commission officials attached much importance to ideas and recommendations 
(OECD/DAC, 1967-69; 1980). Furthermore, in several meetings of the DAC, the Commission 
strategically referred to these recommendations while advocating, for example, for highly 
politicized issues such as a (partial) budgetization of the EDF (OECD/DAC, 1967-69; 1980-85; 
interview 1). As such, it can be concluded that the DAC not only fostered the Commission’s 
                                                     
49 Until 1978, DAC peer reviews were conducted on an annual basis. For this reason, they were initially 
called Annual Aid Reviews.    
50 Referring to incorporating the EDF within the EU’s budget.  
  
 
development aspirations, it also served a source of legitimation when advocating further 
European development integration. 
From Maastricht to Lisbon and beyond  
Also after 1993, the year in which the Treaty of Maastricht entered into force, the DAC 
continued to be one of the shaping factors of EU development policy. However, its relationship 
with the EU changed profoundly due to the fact that development cooperation was added to 
the EU’s portfolio. As such, the EU turned itself into a bilateral donor, alongside the other EU 
Member States (Carbone, 2007; Hoebink, 2005; Orbie, 2012). Not surprisingly, this 
fundamentally altered the EU’s relationship with the DAC. Whereas traditionally, this 
relationship had been determined by the EU’s limited development capacities (see supra), 
relations between both institutions gradually became more balanced, in the sense that by 
acquiring proper development capacities, the EU grew more independent from the DAC 
(interviews 2,3,4). As such, the EU thus turned into a more ‘typical’ DAC member, taking part in 
its work to improve the effectiveness of its development programs, coordinate with other 
donors and upload its own preferences (interviews 2,5 ; observations).  
This being said, the DAC did not become irrelevant for understanding EU development 
policy. On the contrary, the Committee has been instrumental in triggering several political 
reforms in Brussels, most notably in the period before 2005. More specifically, and similar to the 
problems most development agencies faced in the early sixties, the EU’s development programs 
initially experienced severe teething problems (Carbone, 2007; Holland & Doidge, 2012). Due to 
a lack of staff and expertise, the EU struggled throughout the nineties to effectively implement 
its large and ambitious development programs. This resulted in a strong delay in the 
disbursement of development funds, as well as a lack of monitoring and evaluation of European 
aid programs afterwards (Orbie, 2012; Van Reisen, 1999). For understandable reasons, this 
sparked much criticism, both in and outside Europe (Holland & Doidge, 2012). Most outspoken 
was the UK’s then Secretary of State for International Development Claire Short who publicly 
accused the Commission in June 2000 for being ‘the worst development agency in the world’, 
providing ‘aid that doesn’t help’ (Short, 2000). Obviously, this situation was unsustainable and 
  
 
the newly appointed Prodi Commission – under the craftsmanship of development 
commissioner Poul Nielson – initiated a series of reforms from the turn of the Millennium 
onwards which gradually turned the EU into a modern and effective donor (Harding, 2000; 
Holland & Doidge, 2012; Orbie & Versluys, 2008).  
Of particular relevance for this study is, however, the role of the DAC in this 
transformation. While being overlooked in the literature, the Committee played a catalytic role 
in the EU’s process of becoming a full-blown development donor. Going back to 1998, the DAC 
was among the first to openly criticize the EU’s development policies. It did so in an extremely51 
critical peer review of the EU (OECD/DAC, 1998). In fact, its criticism about the Union’s 
development programs was not new, but already went back to 1995 (e.g. OECD/DAC, 1995). 
However, while initially the DAC Secretariat assumed/hoped that the EU would outgrow its 
teething problems, it gradually became clear that the situation had only worsened, explaining 
the critical 1998 peer review (interviews 2,6-8). Essentially, the DAC criticized the fact that there 
was “no coherent Commission-wide development strategy or statement on development co-
operation and the policies […] lack consistency and coherence. Because of this divided, splintered 
framework, the Commission must pay a heavy price in organisational efficiency and 
effectiveness” (OECD/DAC, 1998, p. 10). Furthermore, concerns were also raised about the 
significant gap between ODA commitments and disbursements and the lack of decent 
evaluation systems to follow up on European aid (OECD/DAC, 1998).  
The importance of this peer review was twofold. First, at a general level, it set the tone of 
the debate, both at the European (e.g. European Commission, 2000a; European Parliament, 
1999) and Member States level (e.g. International Development Committee, 2000). As such, it 
helped to create a momentum for policy change, something that has been acknowledged by 
several (former) Commission officials (interview 9-11). Second, at a more substantial level, the 
DAC’s peer review has been influential in determining what policy reforms took place within the 
EU. Indeed, while in that period virtually all aspects of the EU development cooperation faced 
criticism, there is a strong link between on the one hand the DAC’s criticisms and 
                                                     
51  While DAC peer reviews are always critical, they often spell out donor’s weaknesses in a diplomatic 
way (Ashoff, 2013). From this point of view, this peer review was surprisingly open and critical.     
  
 
recommendations and on the other hand the policy reforms implemented at the European level 
(interview 2,9,11). Most notable in this regard was the adoption of the 2000 Development 
Policy Statement (DPS) by the European Commission (2000b). By doing so, the EU addressed the 
most fundamental critique of the DAC’s peer review, namely the fact that it lacked an 
overarching strategy on development (OECD/DAC, 1998). Furthermore, also several – more 
technical – reforms to strengthen the coherence, oversight and evaluation of European aid 
programs largely corresponded with the recommendations made by the DAC (Bossuyt, 
Lehtinen, Anne, Laporte, & Gwénäelle, 2000; Lehtinen, 2002; interviews 9,12).  
Of course, it is important to outline that it is impossible to pinpoint to what extent the 
DAC exactly triggered and influenced the above reforms. After all, also other actors (e.g. 
Member States, European Commission, European Parliament) advocated in favor of substantial 
reforms of the EU’s development policy. However, both opinion makers  (Bonaglia, Goldstein, & 
Petito, 2006; Bossuyt et al., 2000; Grimm, de Bergh, & Freres, 2005; Lehtinen, 2002) as well as 
(former) Commission and DAC officials (interviews 2,10,12-13) highlight the importance of the 
DAC in the above reforms – especially with regard to the DPS - or as stated by then 
Development Commissioner Poul Nielson, the main objective of these reforms was ‘going 
mainstream’ (2012, p. 6), bringing the EU’s development practices in line with the principles of 
the DAC and others (Nielson, 2012) 
Also in the first years after the turn of the Millennium, the DAC remained important for 
understanding EU development policy. First, its 2002 peer review of the EU helped maintaining 
the momentum for policy reforms in Brussels (interviews 10,11). More specifically, the review 
praised the substantial reforms that had taken place since 1998, though, also pointed out that 
“several potential challenges [remained] for the reform process and for implementing the 
programme” (OECD/DAC, 2002, p. 16). Especially, with regard to carving out itself a clear role in 
international development, based on the EU’s comparative advantage in a number of policy 
areas, the DAC recommended the Commission to push the envelope. In a similar vein, 
recommendations were also made to strengthen the promotion of PCD and country ownership 
(OECD/DAC, 2002). Second, on a bilateral basis, there were close and regular contacts between 
the DAC Secretariat and Commission’ officials in the first half of the 2000s, which helped the EU 
  
 
to implement a series of more technical reforms (interviews 2,6,13). These meetings came at 
the initiative of both the DAC Secretariat and European Commission52 and addressed, amongst 
other things, the adjustment of the EU’s budget lines to the DAC’s Credit Reporting System and 
the establishment of the EU donor atlas (interviews 6,14). Through these technical 
reforms/initiatives, the EU further improved the monitoring and evaluation of its development 
programs (Bossuyt et al., 2000; Lehtinen, 2002; interview 5,10).  
In more recent years, the DAC’s impact on the EU has become less prominent as once 
was the case (interviews, 15-16). More specifically, while the DAC continues to seek ways to 
improve the volume and effectiveness of European development programs, it is no longer an 
important factor for understanding the evolution of EU development policies in the period from 
2005 onwards (interview 17). This is the case for two reasons. First, by the mid-2000s, the EU 
had successfully completed its development reforms. As such, there was little room left for the 
DAC to make further recommendations on the overall direction or institutional design of EU 
development cooperation (interviews, 15,18). This clearly reflects from the 2007 peer review, 
which draws a rather positive picture of the EU’s development performances and only in the 
margins makes a number of smaller recommendations for further improvement53 (OECD/DAC, 
2007; interview 15). It also explains why in the latest peer reviews much attention is paid to 
strengthening the EU’s so-called federator role, i.e. its multilateral donor role, given that here 
there still is ample room for improvement (e.g. strengthening the institutional mechanisms for 
coordination) (interviews 16,18-21). Second, the EU has also become (much) less responsive for 
the DAC’s influence. This can be explained by the fact the EU has become a more powerful 
development actor with clear international leadership aspirations (Gänzle et al., 2012), as can 
be witnessed by, for example, the European Consensus on Development (Council, 2005) or the 
Agenda for Change (European Commission, 2011). For obvious reasons, this evolution 
decreased the DAC’s ability to influence EU development cooperation. More specifically, while 
                                                     
52 At that time, there was a very strong relationship between on the one hand DAC chair Richard 
Manning and director of the DAC Secretariat Richard Carey and on the other hand EU Development 
Commissioner Poul Nielson and director of DG Development Koos Richelle.  
53 It should be noted, though, that the recommendations on policy coherence on development were 
more critical and substantial.   
  
 
the EU traditionally saw the DAC as a partner (and still does), it has also increasingly come to see 
the Committee as a venue for potential international influence (interviews 8-9,17), and even a 
competitor on a number of topics (Carbone, 2012; interviews, 15,22). To what extent this is a 
permanent swing remains to be seen. However, at present it clearly hampers the DAC’s ability 
to influence the EU’s decision-making on development cooperation.  
Discussion and conclusion 
The EU is arguably one of the most important players in international development 
cooperation. Nonetheless, EU development cooperation thus far only attracted limited scholarly 
attention – relatively speaking – and especially the relationship between the European and 
multilateral level has been massively overlooked. This is remarkable – or even problematic – 
given the dramatic increase of interactions between the EU and IOs in recent years (e.g. 
Jørgensen & Costa, 2012; Kissack, 2010), and the fact that several scholars already hinted at the 
fact that EU development cooperation is shaped by the complex interaction between the EU 
institutions, Member States and IOs (e.g. Farrell, 2008; Olsen, 2005). Therefore, the central aim 
of this article was to bring the multilateral level into the study of EU development policy. We did 
so by studying the relationship between the EU and the DAC, wondering whether – and if so to 
what extent – the latter has been one of the shaping factors of EU development policy.  
As expected, the main finding of this article is that there is an urgent need to focus more 
extensively on the multilateral level in the study of EU development cooperation. This clearly 
reflects from our empirical findings which show that the DAC has always been an important 
shaping factor or the EU’s development policy. Nonetheless, the Committee has thus far been 
largely overlooked in the literature, as such hampering our understanding of a number of key 
moments in European development integration. 
Taking a closer look at our empirical findings, it can be concluded that the DAC 
influenced the course of EU development integration in a number of important ways. More 
specifically, it helped the EU becoming a professional and full-blown develoment actor. 
However, the way in which it did so changed profoundly over time. Essentially, the DAC has 
  
 
acted consistently vis-à-vis the EU during the past half century, that is making recommendations 
to improve the effectiveness of its development programs. However, the impact and relevance 
of its work was different over time. Indeed, intially the DAC served as a source of inspiration and 
legitmation for the EU, helping the latter to become an assertive development actor in the 
absence of clear and strong development competences. Afterwards, when development 
cooperation was added to the EU’s portfolio, the DAC’s relevance changed as it became a 
partner for the Commission to improve the effectiveness of its development programs. In sum, 
one could say that in a first stage the DAC helped the EU acquiring development competences, 
while subsequently it was instrumental in helping the European Commisison taking full 
advantage of its newly gained competences.  
Importantly, our findings suggest that the relations between the EU and DAC might have 
entered a new era in recent years. Indeed, from 2005 onwards, the DAC has become less 
important understanding EU development cooperation given that it no longer prominently 
helped shaping the course of this policy. Whether this is a temporary or permanent situation 
still remains to be seen. However, one could assume this to be the case, stemming from the fact 
that there is a clear structural dimension underlying the decreasing influence of the DAC on the 
EU. Only if the EU institutions and Member States would decide to further integrate (i.e. 
strenghtening the multilateral development role of the EU), one can expect the DAC to play 
some kind of role in this transformation given that this has historically always been the case.     
In sum, this article has shown that it is important to talk about international 
organizations when studying EU development cooperation. While literature thus far saw the EU 
institutions and its Member States as the main – and often only – drivers of policy change and 
only considered IOs to be a venue of potential influence for the EU, our analysis revealed the 
urgent need of moving beyond this Eurocentric view on EU development cooperation. Indeed, 
this single case study took a first tentative step in the right direction, demonstrating the 
importance of the DAC for acquiring an in-depht understanding of several key moments in EU 
development integration. However, additional research should follow, otherwise we will 
continue to be trapped in a too narrow view on EU development cooperation.  
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General introduction: Chapter eight goes further down the road taken by the previous 
chapters, studying the impact of the EU on the DAC’s role in international development 
cooperation. As already became clear in chapters 2 and 5 of this doctoral dissertation, a 
number of scholars have in recent years been puzzled by the DAC’s future, especially seen 
in the light of the proliferation of new development actors and/or the establishment of the 
DCF. This article speaks to this literature, though, taking a fundamentally different 
perspective. More specifically, whereas scholars thus far focused on challenges that are 
external to the DAC, this paper’s focus lays on the EU, wondering whether, how and to what 
extent the Committee is also challenged from within. By doing so, the major strength of this 
article is that it explicitly unites different strands of literature, respectively, on (i) 
international development cooperation, (ii) EU development cooperation and (iii) EU-IOs 
relations. Furthermore, this study is – to my knowledge – the first one that addresses the 
recent reforms of the ODA concept. The main limitation of this study is that it was without 
doubt the most difficult one to account for the personal opinions of the different 
interviewees, stemming from the fact that several responses of interviewees were (partly) 
inspired by conflicts at the personal level (e.g. mismatch of personalities between DCD 
officials and EU officials) at the time of carrying out the research.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Ignoring the elephant in the room?  
Assessing the impact of the European Union on the Development 
Assistance Committee’s role in international development.  
 
Abstract 
This article studies the impact of the European Union (EU) on the Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 
While literature thus far focused on the external challenges for the DAC’s role in international 
development, we argue that the EU should be taken into account as well. By focusing on the 
cases of policy coherence for development and the concessionality of ODA loans, we show that 
the EU poses a structural challenge for the DAC’s role in international development given the 
strong overlap in membership between both institutions and the Union’s changing nature as a 
development actor.  
Keywords: OECD, DAC, EU, development cooperation, policy coherence for development, 
official development assistance.  
1. Introduction 
For more than fifty years now, the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has grouped the world’s 
main donors
54
, serving as a forum for dialogue, coordination and international consensus 
building. Through its role in defining and monitoring global development standards, it has been 
influential in defining what we today see as development cooperation. For example, the concepts 
of official development assistance (ODA), policy coherence for development (PCD) or (un)tied 
aid find their origins in its work (Eyben, 2013; Manning, 2008; Masujima, 2004). Furthermore, 
the DAC also had a strong impact on the way in which the delivering of aid is currently 
                                                     
54 The DAC is composed out of 29 Members: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, European Union, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, United States and United Kingdom.  
  
 
structured, most notable, through its work on aid effectiveness – e.g. the Paris declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness (2005) – and its influential report ‘Shaping the 21st century’ (1996), which paved 
the way for the Millennium Development Goals (Kim & Lightfoot, 2011; Manning, 2008; 
Ruckert, 2008). 
In recent years, however, the DAC’s role in international development cooperation has 
increasingly been challenged. This has everything to do with the changing development 
landscape – i.e. the proliferation of new development actors and ideas – which calls into question 
the legitimacy of the existing aid architecture (Besada & Kindornay, 2013; Kragelund, 2011; 
McEwan & Mawdsley, 2012; Woods, 2008b). This sparked much debate among scholars and 
practitioners on whether or not the DAC will remain a relevant forum for global aid negotiations 
(e.g. Besada & Kindornay, 2013; Bräutigam, 2011; Brown & Morton, 2008; Eyben, 2013; Kim & 
Lightfoot, 2011; Kindornay & Yiagadessen, 2013; Verschaeve & Orbie, 2015). More 
specifically, literature distinguishes between two major challenges for the DAC, respectively, (i) 
its lack of inclusiveness, referring to the fact that only traditional donors take part in its work 
(Besada & Kindornay, 2013; Brown & Morton, 2008; Eyben, 2013) and (ii) the proliferation of 
‘new’ providers of aid (e.g. BRICs, philanthropic foundations, private sector) which challenge its 
pre-eminent status in defining donor norms and principles (Dreher, Fuchs, & Nunnenkamp, 2013; 
Kim & Lightfoot, 2011; Quadir, 2013; Zimmermann & Smith, 2011).  
The central aim of this study is to engage with the ongoing debate on the DAC’s role in 
the changing development landscape. We wonder to what extent the European Union (EU) poses 
a challenge for the DAC. Indeed, while literature thus far focused on the challenges outside the 
DAC’s membership (e.g. Eyben, 2013; Kim & Lightfoot, 2011; Paulo & Reisen, 2010; 
Zimmermann & Smith, 2011), it overlooked the elephant within the room: the EU. For two 
reasons, however, one could expect the EU to have a detrimental impact on the DAC. First, the 
EU has increasingly assumed itself a coordinating role on development from the turn of the 
Millennium onwards. Indeed, while initially the EU was preoccupied with establishing itself as a 
bilateral donor alongside its members (Arts & Dickson, 2004; Holland & Doidge, 2012), it 
gradually also started to play an active role in the coordination of the development policies of its 
members, relying on a set soft-integration mechanisms such as target-setting, monitoring and 
peer pressure (Carbone, 2008a; Orbie, 2012). Second, the overlap in membership between the EU 
  
 
and DAC has significantly increased in recent years. While at the time of the DAC’s inception in 
1960 the EU already made up for 6 of the 11 members, it currently accounts for 20 of the 29 
members
55
. Especially the accession of the Czech Republic, Poland, the Slovak Republic and 
Slovenia in 2013 further expanded the EU’s numerical weight in the DAC.  
Taking both evolutions together, one can thus logically assume the EU’s impact on the 
DAC to be substantial. This observation is not new. Already in 2008 the then outgoing DAC 
chair Richard Manning pointed out that “with 15 EU Member States and the European 
Commission in an membership of 23, the question of what collective action takes place in 
Brussels and what in Paris is a live issue” (2008, p. 14). However, how this exactly plays out in 
practice has thus far been neglected in literature. Notable exceptions are Carbone (2007, 2013) 
and Keijzer (2011) which studied the High Level Forums (HLFs) in Paris, Accra and Busan and 
find that EU coordination in the run up to these meeting left little political room for other DAC 
members and the DAC Secretariat (hereafter Development Co-operation Directorate or DCD). 
However, while these studies are useful for understanding the EU’s actorness and effectiveness at 
the DAC’s HLFs, they do not capture the day-to-day relations between both organizations. 
Indeed, the DAC’s work on aid effectiveness is – or better was56 – very distinctive from the rest 
of its work (Eyben, 2013; Manning, 2008). For one thing, there is virtually no EU coordination in 
Paris as both the EU delegation and its Member States feel such efforts would run counter the 
DAC’s way of functioning57 (Verschaeve & Takacs, 2013). Therefore, it remains unclear how the 
EU’s changing nature as a development actor and the growing overlap in membership with the 
DAC affect the latter.  
The central aim of this study is to address the above gap in literature. By doing so, we 
add to the literature in several ways. Empirically, this study provides the first analysis on this 
topic. Indeed, neither the study of the DAC (Bräutigam, 2011; Eyben, 2013; Kim & Lightfoot, 
2011; Masujima, 2004; Ruckert, 2008), nor the literature on EU development policy (Carbone, 
2007; Gänzle, Grimm, & Makhan, 2012; Holland & Doidge, 2012) or the EU’s role in 
international institutions (Blavoukos & Bourantonis, 2011; Jørgensen & Laatikainen, 2013; 
                                                     
55
 Note that the EU has always been a full member of the DAC, and therefore in this calculation is 
included in the group of EU countries.  
56
 Following the agreement reached in Busan (2011), the DAC turned its work on aid effectiveness over to 
the newly established Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation.  
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 Most EU Member States also do not want to coordinate.  
  
 
Kissack, 2010) thus far paid attention to the EU-DAC relationship. Sole exceptions are two book 
chapters, both providing a first institutional overview of the relationship (Carroll & Kellow, 
2012; Verschaeve & Takacs, 2013). Finally, this study also adds to the literature on international 
development cooperation (Besada & Kindornay, 2013; Boas & McNeill, 2004; Woods, 2008a) as 
it extends our understanding of the DAC’s functioning. Moreover, it provides a detailed account 
of the impact of regional integration processes on the existing international aid regime.  
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. First, we provide a brief 
methodological overview in which we discuss our case selection and data collection. Then, 
section three constitutes the main empirical section of this study. We pay particular attention to 
the cases of PCD and the concessionality of ODA loans and show how the EU structure poses a 
structural challenge for the DAC’s role in international development cooperation. The article 
concludes with some general reflections on the main findings of this study. 
2. Methodology  
As outlined in the introduction to this article, this study provides the first analysis of the 
EU-DAC relationship. More specifically, we wonder whether the EU poses a challenge for the 
DAC’s role in international development given its changing nature as a development actor and 
the growing overlap in membership between both institutions. To answer this research question, 
we address two topical cases, respectively, the promotion of PCD and the concessionality of 
ODA loans. Both cases dominated the DAC’s work in recent years. Moreover, they are very 
distinctive from one another – both in terms of substance and role played by the EU –, as such 
providing a comprehensive overview of the EU-DAC relationship. The data for this study were 
obtained through (i) semi-structured interviews with in total 37 DAC and Member States’ 
officials
58
, (ii) archive study and document analysis (e.g. minutes of meetings, intra-delegations’ 
correspondence) and (iii) participatory observation
59
 in several meetings of the DAC during the 
period 2012-2013. 
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 As various officials were only willing to share their views on the condition of absolute anonymity, 
interviews are indicated by a general reference only.  
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 We are grateful to the Belgian delegation to the OECD, in particular to Dr. Martinus Desmet and Mr. 
Lieven De La Marche.  
  
 
3. Results 
3.1. Policy coherence for development  
Our first case deals with the EU’s role in the prioritization of PCD in the DAC. The 
principle of PCD refers to the general idea that non-aid policies of donor countries have an 
impact on the developing world and therefore should take into account the latter’s needs and 
interests (Ashoff, 2005). The principle was already introduced by the DAC in 1991 
(OECD/DAC, 1991), however, it only became one of its key priorities in recent years. Indeed, 
while during the 1990s and early 2000s, the DAC sought to avoid policy incoherence through its 
peer reviews (Manning, 2008; OECD/DAC, 2006), it has become more ambitious as it now also 
aims to a achieve a better understanding of the potential positive synergies between development 
cooperation and other policy areas (OECD, 2013; OECD/DAC, 2013d). This is most clearly 
reflected in the DAC’s new mandate according to which the promotion of PCD is a key priority 
(OECD/DAC, 2011). In this section, we pay particular attention to the EU’s pivotal role60 in 
prioritizing PCD in the DAC. We argue that while the EU’s efforts to prioritize PCD may seem 
positive for the DAC, they actually had a detrimental impact as they eroded its internal 
legitimacy.  
The underlying story goes back to 2007. At that time, the DAC initiated its ‘strategic 
reflection exercise’. This was a process it undertook to reevaluate its role, structure, functioning 
and composition in the changing aid landscape (OECD/DAC, 2008, 2009). This effort came at 
the initiative of the DCD and served as a response to the mounting criticism the DAC had faced 
in the aftermath of the HLFs in Paris and Accra. The ultimate goal of the reflection exercise was 
to adopt a set of policy recommendations which afterwards could be used as stepping-stones to 
revise the DAC’s mandate for the first time ever (OECD/DAC, 2009; Verschaeve, 2012).  
To facilitate the entire process, the DCD set up a number of task forces, each focusing 
on a particular topic or question. Initially, the plan was to establish two of them, respectively, on 
the role of the DAC in global aid governance and on the Committee’s functioning and 
composition. By doing so, the DCD aimed to tackle questions such as: “What role has the DAC 
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 At a more general level, it should be noted that a number of other dynamics also account for the rise of 
PCD on the western donors’ aid agenda, ranging from the changing development landscape to 
securitization trends or an emerging beyond aid thinking (e.g. Prontera, 2014; Thede, 2013). 
  
 
in the global aid effectiveness regime?”, or “Should the DAC reconsidered its composition?” 
(OECD/DAC, 2009, 2010b). Ultimately, however, the idea was launched to also establish a third 
task, focusing on the promotion of PCD and Global Public Goods (GPGs). This came at the 
suggestion of the EU delegation, the Netherlands and Finland who felt it was necessary to focus 
on these issues in the light of the changing development landscape.  
While being well intended, this idea divided the Committee into two groups: EU and 
non-EU countries. Starting with the latter group, all influential non-EU countries (i.e. Australia, 
Canada, Japan, Norway, US, Switzerland) opposed the proposal. This was also the case for most 
DCD officials. Both rejected the idea for two reasons. First, and in line with the Strategic 
Reflection Exercise’s underlying rationale, it was argued that the DAC needed to focus all its 
attention on its most important – read existential – questions (interviews, 4-5,17-18,23-24,32). 
Second, several of these countries (e.g. Australia, Canada, Japan, US) were reluctant to put too 
much emphasis on the promotion of PCD, while others (e.g. Norway, Switzerland) did supported 
the idea, though, argued that addressing the potential positive synergies between different policy 
areas fell beyond the scope of the DAC’s work and therefore should be left to the OECD. The 
latter was also the line taken by most DCD officials (interviews, 12,17,23-27). 
On the other side of the spectrum, virtually all EU donors supported the idea to establish 
a third task force on PCD and GPGs. What is remarkable, however, is that this outcome cannot 
be explained by prior EU coordination on the issue. Rather, the prioritization of PCD was self-
evident for most EU members of the DAC (e.g. Austria, Belgium, Ireland, France, Germany, 
Spain, Sweden, UK), whereas others (e.g. Greece, Italy, Poland, Portugal) felt politically 
constrained to support the proposal (interviews 1,8,17-19,28-29). This outcome can be explained 
by the engagements on PCD that were previously made at the European level. More specifically, 
from the turn of the Millennium onwards, the European Commission and some of its Member 
States (i.e. Denmark, the Netherlands, and Sweden) had systematically promoted the principle 
(Carbone, 2008b; Hoebink, 2005). Most notable in this regard is the European Consensus on 
Development (2005) which makes explicit reference to the promotion of PCD, granting the 
Commission a key role in monitoring progress on this topic within both its own policies as well 
  
 
as those of its member states
61
 (Carbone, 2008b). As such, most EU countries had already 
become engaged with the promotion of PCD by the time of the DAC’s strategic reflection 
exercise was initiated, explaining why they supported the idea of establishing this third task 
force. Moreover, those EU countries that did not favor the idea (e.g. Greece, Italy, Poland, 
Portugal) found themselves rhetorically entrapped because of the collective commitments they 
had previously made at the EU level. This was clearly pointed out by several interviewees who 
argued that in the absence of the EU structure, these countries would almost certainly have sided 
with the US, Canada or Japan (interviews, 2-4,11,13-14,32).  
Ultimately, following several discussions, an agreement was reached on the issue by 
2008. Essentially, the former group gave up their opposition, resulting in the establishment of the 
third task force on PCD and GPGs. More specifically, they had come to realize that it was a battle 
that could never be won. Not only was it considered to be impossible to convince the large group 
of EU members from their argument – decisions in the DAC are taken by consensus –, there was 
essentially no alternative as continuing arguing over the issue could jeopardize the entire 
strategic reflection exercise (interviews, 12,23,25,28). This also explains why further down the 
process, it was never considered to be an option to only take those policy recommendations that 
originated from the first two task forces into account while writing the new DAC mandate 
(interviews, 24,27).  Therefore, and as outlined in the beginning of this section, the DAC adopted 
in 2011 a new mandate that pays particular attention to the promotion of PCD. More specifically, 
it puts forward the principle as one of its key priorities, one that needs to be achieved in close 
collaboration with the rest of the OECD (OECD/DAC, 2011).  
At first sight, the above outcome may seem beneficial for the DAC, knowing that the 
Committee had undertaken several failed attempts in the past to prioritize PCD (Carbone, 2008b; 
Forster & Stokke, 1999). However, this is only half of the story. While the DAC indeed obtained 
a much stronger mandate on PCD, it came at a high cost. More specifically, the way in which 
PCD made its way up the agenda of the DAC was detrimental for its internal legitimacy
62
. While 
traditionally, the DAC has always derived a great deal of its internal legitimacy from the fact that 
its offers its Members an unique forum to deliberate on what collective actions to taken 
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 This gave ground to a series of biannual follow-up reports on PCD, issued by the European Commission 
from 2007 onwards.  
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 Here defined as the popular support the DAC receives from its Members.  
  
 
(Manning, 2008; Masujima, 2004; Verschaeve & Orbie, 2015), this case illustrates how the EU 
structure is eroding this decision-making culture. More specifically, due to the strong overlap in 
membership, internal EU dynamics constitute a magnifying impact on the DAC. As such, non-
EU members of the DAC are increasingly confronted with a decision-making culture in which 
they no longer have an equal chance to weigh upon the DAC’s work, whereas this used to be the 
case in the past. Especially, when clear and/or strong collective targets have been set in Brussels 
on a particular issue – as was the case with PCD –, it is difficult and perhaps even impossible for 
the non-EU members (but also the DCD) to prevent its rise on the political agenda of the DAC 
(interviews, 3,7,12,23-27).  
This dynamic poses a structural challenge for the DAC’s internal legitimacy in two 
important ways. First, non-EU DAC members risk being confronted with a political agenda that 
no longer reflects their own interests. In this case, for example, countries such as the US, Japan, 
Canada or Australia had – and still have63 – a lukewarm attitude towards the promotion of PCD. 
However, due to the ambitious provisions on PCD in the DAC’s mandate, they are currently 
subjected to several initiatives taken by the OECD and DAC on this topic. Second, some EU 
countries have come to depreciate the DAC because of the above-described dynamic. More 
specifically, due to the often strong overlap in agenda between the EU and the DAC, questions 
increasingly arise within a number of European capitals about the latter’s added value in 
international development (6,16,36). This is most visible in the case of Austria, as the country no 
longer has a permanent representative to the DAC
64
, motivated by the fact that it is cheaper and 
more efficient to shift their development efforts towards Brussels (interview, 10,33). 
3.2. Concessionality of ODA loans  
This second case focuses on the issue of concessional loans, which basically is the 
question of how to count loans as ODA. As outlined in the introduction to this article, one of the 
DAC’s main responsibilities is the monitoring of aid flows. For this purpose, it adopted already in 
1969 the definition of ODA
65
 (Hynes & Scott, 2013). Importantly, while most official aid is 
provided through grants, loans can count as ODA as well. More specifically, the face value of a 
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 This was outlined by several interviewees and also reflects from the fact that they abstain from most 
PCD related events/meetings.  
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 Instead, the Austrian DAC delegate flies in for every meeting of the Committee.  
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 Aid flows count as ODA if they flow from official agencies to official agencies, promote economic 
development and are concessional in character.    
  
 
loan is ODA-eligible if the loan contains a grant element of at least 25%. This is calculated based 
on a reference rate of 10%, a convention that was adopted in 1972
66
 (Manning, 2008). However, 
in today’s world of historic low interest rates, this reference rate is no longer an appropriate proxy 
for measuring donor efforts. As such, loans easily contain a grant element 25% and even profit-
making loans can pass the concessionality test (i.e. donors raise funds on the private capital 
market at a low rate and re-lent it at harder terms, though, below 10%). This created a clear 
tension between the spirit of the ODA definition – i.e. aid flows need to involve a donor effort – 
and the letter of the ODA definition – i.e. loans are concessional if they contain a grant element 
of 25% (Colin, 2014; Roodman, 2014). In this section, we focus on the EU’s role in this debate. 
More specifically, we elaborate on the Union’s practice of reporting profit-making loans as ODA 
and argue that the existence of the EU structure hampered the DAC from tackling this issue in an 
effective way.   
The issue of concessionality emerged in parallel with the financial crisis of 2008. Due to 
the fact that interest rated had fallen sharply and remained at historic lows, a number of DAC 
donors started to report profit-making loans as ODA. Importantly, the EU was one of them, 
reporting loans from the European Investment Bank (EIB). Similar practices were also applied by 
France and Germany (Colin, 2014; Manning, 2013; Roodman, 2014). Initially, this went 
unnoticed. However, when the EU provided in 2009 more detailed information about its ODA 
figures of 2008 as part of its annual reporting, DCD officials found out. Confronted with this act 
of “creative accounting”, they asked to EU to stop the reporting of profit-making loans, as they 
were not in line with the spirit of the ODA concept. Moreover, the DCD openly wondered to 
what extent the EU was actually capable of reporting the EIB’s loans as ODA since “the grant 
element concept is not applied to the market-based lending operations of the multilateral 
development banks” (OECD/DAC, 2013a, p. 2). Read between the lines: the EU cannot add the 
EIB’s loans to its ODA budget due to its particular nature as a development actor (interviews, 
6,9,31,34).  
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 At that time, this served as a proxy for the opportunity cost of public investment required to make funds 
available for lending. A detailed overview on how the concessionality of loans is calculated can be found 
here: (OECD/DAC, 2012c).  
  
 
For understandable reasons, the latter caused hard feelings in Brussels
67
 and a heated 
discussion emerged between the EU and the DCD, both on concessionality and the Union’s 
membership status in the DAC (European Commission, 2010; OECD/DAC, 2010c, 2012a) 
(interviews, 6-7,20,32). In 2010, the issue further escalated when the DCD found out that also 
Germany and France had been reporting similar loans (interview 28). Initially, DCD officials 
tried to solve the issue bilaterally with the EU, France and Germany. However, after several 
failed attempts, the discussion was broadened to all DAC members. Given that none of the other 
DAC members had been reporting similar loans, the DCD hoped to finally solve the issue and 
come up with a new and clearer definition of “concessional in character” (Colin, 2014; 
OECD/DAC, 2013c; interviews 28-29,31-32,34).  
This turned out to be much harder than initially expected. While there was indeed a large 
majority of DAC members – both EU and non-EU donors – that condemned the practice and 
argued in favor of lowering the discount rate of 10% towards the prevailing market rates, the EU, 
France and Germany were not willing to give in on the issue (interviews, 1,7-8,22-26). Their 
argument was twofold, namely, (i) that they had not violated the ODA definition and (ii) 
promoted development through these loans as they were offered at lower rates than the ones these 
countries could possibly obtain at private capital markets. Moreover, the EU also pointed out that 
these loans targeted middle-income countries, and often even projects that were potentially profit-
making in the long run (OECD/DAC, 2010a, 2010c; interviews 6,13,29,31,34). 
Most of the remaining DAC members did not agree with these arguments. On the 
contrary, the reporting of profit-making loans undermined in their views the credibility of the 
ODA concept. Moreover, it was argued that the DAC urgently needed to tackle the 
concessionality issue otherwise other donors could also be tempted to start reporting similar types 
of loans. Especially at a time of austerity and declining ODA budgets, this could create a 
dangerous competition among donors to inflate
68
 their aid figures towards 0,7%, easily undoing 
all previous efforts of debt forgiveness (interviews, 9,23,28,35-36).  
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 The EU has always been extremely sensitive about being threatened equal to all other members of the 
DAC (see e.g. Verschaeve & Orbie, 2015).  
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 To some extent this is a false argument as repayments of loans are counted as negative ODA. 
Traditionally, however, repayments only start after 3 years, creating a situation in which a donor counts 
the face value of a loan to its ODA budget in year one, while deducting the repayments from its aid budget 
  
 
By 2012, still no agreement had been reached on the issue. Therefore, in an attempt to 
break this deadlock, the DAC scheduled the concessionality issue at its annual High-Level 
Meeting (HLM) in December. At this meeting, DAC Members agreed to disagree at the latest 
until 2015
69
. By that time, a larger reform of the ODA definition was scheduled in which 
adopting a clear and quantitative measure of concessionality was one of the priorities. Other 
issues that needed to be tackled were whether or not to maintain student scholarships, in-donor 
refugee costs and debt relief within the scope of the ODA definition. Moreover, the DAC also 
aimed to reconsider the overall relevance of the ODA concept, focusing on questions such as: “Is 
ODA outdated?”, “Should ODA – or a new concept – also focus on climate change, or 
development efforts made by the private sector?” (OECD/DAC, 2013b; interviews, 16-18). In 
sum, the DAC HLM adopted an ambitious ODA agenda and the idea was that a solution to the 
concessionality issue would be a part of a larger package deal (interviews, 31-32).  
Nonetheless, also in the following years, the concessionality issue continued to dominate 
most of the ODA related discussions in the DAC given that the EU, France and Germany were 
still unwilling to change their stance on the issue (OECD/DAC, 2012b, 2012c, 2013c, interviews, 
21,36) It was only in the second-half of 2014 that a compromise was finally reached which 
envisaged a significant lowering of the reference rate of 10% (Barder & Klasen, 2014). This 
agreement was further refined by December 2014 when the DAC presented its larger ODA 
reform. More specifically, the DAC agreed to apply from 2018 onwards the IMF’s variable 
discount rate – at present 5% - and then apply an adjustment factor – varying from 1% to 4% - 
depending on the income group of the borrowing country. In layman’s terms: the need for 
concessionality reduces as countries become richer (OECD/DAC, 2014). The ODA agreement 
also foresees in a number of measures to increase official aid towards the LDCs, and it mandates 
the DAC to create a new measure called Total Official Support for Sustainable Development 
(TOSD). This measure will complement ODA and as reflects from its name it will cover resource 
                                                                                                                                                                            
from year four onwards. The potential danger of this situation – and the argument that was made by the 
DCD and the first group of countries – is that donors thus could continue providing new loans in order to 
artificially level these negative repayments out. In our example, there is no fall in ODA budgets if a donor 
provides in year four a new loan with a face value higher than the repayments it receives that year.  
69
 This deal gave ground to much criticism. Most notable was an opinion piece of former DAC chair 
Richard Manning in the Financial Times in which he openly states that the DAC allows ‘finance 
ministries to get away with murder as they seek to massage reported aid upwards at minimum costs. If the 
OECD cannot do a professional job on this, the UN should take over the reporting for international aid 
flows’ (Manning, 2013).   
  
 
flows to developing countries and multilateral institutions in support of sustainable development 
(OECD/DAC, 2014, interview 37).   
Of particular relevance for this paper is, however, the fact that it took the DAC more 
than five years to reach the above agreement. While to some extent one could rightly argue that 
revisions of the ODA definition have historically always been difficult and lengthy processes 
(e.g. Führer, 1996; Hynes & Scott, 2013), our findings indicate that the EU structure hampered 
the DAC from tackling the concessionality issue in an effective way. This was the case for 
several reasons. First, several EU Members refrained from taking a clear/strong position on the 
issue as they did not wanted to offend the EU delegation. Indeed, while from the very start 
virtually all EU Members were against the reporting of profit-making loans, several of them 
refrained from actively defending this position. For example, the Czech Republic, Poland, the 
Slovak Republic and Slovenia often remained silent during the discussions on this topic for the 
simple reason that the EU had been the main advocate of their (ongoing) accession to the DAC 
(interviews 11,19,22,33,36). Also other EU countries found themselves in a difficult position to 
criticize the EU, for example, because they distribute a large share of their ODA through the 
Unions budget 
70
(e.g. Austria, Greece, Italy) or simply because they did not wanted to undermine 
their relations with Brussels, especially in the light of the ongoing Eurozone crisis
71
 (interviews, 
2,10,13-14). In sum, the EU’s structure – unintentionally (!) – poses a structural problem for the 
DAC’s functioning as it constrains several EU Members to actively take part in the Committee’s 
deliberative decision-making.  
Second, the EU complicated the DCD’s efforts to reach a compromise by trying to 
bypass the DAC and adopt a common European position on concessionality in Brussels. Indeed, 
in 2012, the EU – supported by France and Germany – organized a meeting on concessionality in 
Brussels. This meeting was organized on short notice and the idea was that most delegations 
would be insufficiently prepared to fully capture the importance of a seemingly technical issue. 
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 Note that to a large degree this is determined by their fixed contributions to the EDF and as such not 
necessarily should hamper their behavior. However, given that they provide little aid in general, and 
channel most of their aid through the EU, they are in a political rather dificutl position to strongly criticize 
the European Commission.  
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 Illustrative for this is also the fact that several of these countries went behind the EU’s back to the DCD 
or the chair of the DAC’s working party on statistics, asking the latter not to given in on the 
concessionality issue (interviews 33-34). 
  
 
As such, the EU hoped to adopt a common European position in support of its own view on 
concessionality, which then afterwards would become incontournable for the DAC (interviews 
21,33-35). Ultimately, such an agreement was not reached as most EU countries did not wanted 
to bypass the DAC (interview 31,33). However, and essential to this study, it does illustrate the 
structural threat caused by the EU level. Indeed, the Brussels’ level offers both the European 
Commission and its Member States an alternative venue to discuss issues that are at the core of 
the DAC’s work. Moreover, when such meetings take place, the DAC is essentially forced to stop 
its ongoing work and shift its complete attention towards Brussels, as was the case here. 
Obviously, the DCD is well aware of this imminent threat
72
, explaining why it invests much time 
and efforts in following up on Brussels. Since 2005 – not surprisingly the year in which the 
European Consensus was adopted – it holds, for example, regular six-monthly meetings with the 
Commission. The downside of this, however, is that these efforts are time consuming and further 
add to the image of the DAC being a “European club” (interviews 2-3,7,12,23,36).  
4. Discussion and conclusion 
The central aim of this study was to assess to what extent the EU poses a challenge for 
the DAC’s role in international development. While literature thus far focused on the challenges 
outside its membership (i.e. its lack of inclusiveness and the re-emergence of new providers of 
aid), this study wondered to what extent scholars did not overlooked the elephant within the 
room, namely the EU. Indeed, literature thus far paid no attention to the EU-DAC relationship. 
Nonetheless, there has been a growing overlap in membership between both organizations – 
currently the EU accounts for almost two third of the DAC’s Members. Furthermore, the EU 
evolved in recent years from a purely bilateral donor alongside its Members to an actor that also 
increasingly aspires itself a coordinating role over the development policies of its Member States.  
The main finding of this study is that the EU indeed poses a major challenge for the 
DAC’s role in international development. While the DAC has always been an effective and 
deliberative functioning organization (e.g. Manning, 2008; Verschaeve & Orbie, 2015), our 
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to strengthen the EU coherence and coordination. Again, this illustrates the structural dimension to this 
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findings indicate that the EU increasingly hampers this decision-making culture. More 
specifically, according to our analysis, the problem is not so much the growing overlap in 
membership between the EU and the DAC – off course this does not help the situation (see infra) 
– but rather the EU’s changing nature as a development actor, turning itself from a bilateral donor 
alongside its Members into an actor which also increasingly assumes itself a coordinating role 
over the development policies of its Members. Moreover, our findings also reveal that the EU 
structure by itself – regardless of collective actions at the European level – has an impact on the 
DAC’s functioning.  
The most prominent problem for the DAC is the EU’s changing nature as a development 
actor. This hampers its decision-making in two important ways. First, the collective actions that 
take place at the European level are a constraining factor for its functioning. This is most clearly 
reflected in the PCD case. Indeed, because of the already existing strong and collective European 
targets on policy coherence, EU Member States felt constrained – both in a positive and negative 
way – to support the EU’s idea of prioritizing PCD during the DAC’s strategic reflection 
exercise. This made it virtually impossible for the other DAC Members to prevent the rise of 
PCD on the DAC’s agenda. Second, the EU’s changing nature as a development actor offers both 
the Commission and the EU Member states an alternative venue to discuss issues that are at the 
core of the DAC’s work. This is exactly what happened in the concessionality case as the EU, 
France and Germany tried to bypass the DAC at the European level. At present, there still is 
general unwillingness among most EU donors to do so. However, at the same time one cannot 
ignore the fact that Brussels continuous to put much emphasis on streamlining the Union’s 
external action – think for example at the creation of the EEAS or the dominant discourse on 
coherence –, as such gradually decreasing the costs to bypass the DAC.   
Apart from the EU’s changing nature as a development actor, our findings also reveal 
that the EU structure by itself can be detrimental for the DAC’s functioning. As reflects from the 
concessionality case, the EU structure had a constraining effect on several of its members states, 
as is witnessed by the fact that several of them refrained from condemning the EU’s reporting of 
profit-making loans as ODA. Indeed, Member States refused to openly scrutinize the EU on this 
issue for various reasons, ranging from strategic motives to the fact that they distribute a larger 
share of their ODA through the Union’s budget.  
  
 
Importantly, the impact of the growing overlap in membership between the EU and the 
DAC is less relevant than initially expected. Essentially, it is an important variable for 
understanding the EU’s impact on the DAC, though, only in relation to the above described 
dynamics. This clearly reflects from the PCD case as the collective EU commitments on PCD 
constituted a magnifying impact on the DAC due to the large overlap in membership between 
both organizations.  
Taking the above elements together, it can be concluded that the EU’s impact on the 
DAC is substantial, to say the least. While the DAC has always derived its internal legitimacy 
from its deliberative and effective functioning, one cannot ignore the fact that the EU is eroding 
the Committee’s legitimacy basis. Indeed, the fact that the EU structure functions – often 
unintentionally (!) – as a straightjacket for (some) of its Members inevitable raises questions 
about the Committees added-value in international development, both among EU and non-EU 
Members of the DAC. Moreover, while the DAC has struggled with the image of being a 
“European club” for most of its existence, this perception has only been further enforced by the 
EU’s changing nature as a development actor and the DCD’s reaction to this new political reality.  
In sum, this study sheds a rather pessimistic view on the DAC’s future role in 
international development. While literature thus far already identified two major external 
challenges for the DAC’s role in international development (i.e. its lack of inclusiveness and the 
emergence of new providers of aid), we add a third one to the list. Indeed, our findings clearly 
indicate that the EU is the elephant within the room that nobody is talking about. Moreover, 
unlike in the case of the first two challenges, there is no easy/clear fix to the challenge posed by 
the EU – assuming there is a fix at all. While the DAC could try to diversify its membership as an 
attempt to level out the magnifying effect constituted by the large overlap in membership 
between both institutions, its future essentially lies to a large degree in the hands of the EU and 
its Member States.  
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General introduction: The sixth and final paper of this doctoral dissertation addresses the 
rise of policy coherence for development on the Western donors’ aid agendas. As such, and 
unlike the previous chapters, this article is not framed from the perspective of either the EU 
or the DAC. Instead, the perspective that is taken is that from the special issue in which this 
article will feature, namely, seeing PCD as a tool for transformative development. Hence, the 
overall purpose of this article is, as already outlined, understanding why PCD thrives well, 
allowing to reflect on its potential as a transformative tool for development. Off course, this 
article fits in perfectly with the rest of the doctoral dissertation. This is the case for two 
reasons. First, in terms of focus, this article addresses the rise of PCD within the OECD and 
DAC. In doing so, particular attention is being paid to all relevant actors – including the role 
played by the EU and its Member States on this issue. Second, while for the sake of clarity 
the previous papers addressed one particular aspect of this dissertation’s research topic (cf. 
figure 1, chapter 1), this article illustrates how the different actors (e.g. EU, Member States 
DAC, OECD) and dynamics (e.g. changing international system) interact with one another. 
This multi-causal approach constitutes the major strength of this article. Indeed, while 
various scholars have explicitly advocated such an approach, very few studies have actually 
implemented a complexity sensitive perspective.  The main limitation of this study is the 
limited attention for the potential subtle nuances in interpretation given to the concept of 
PCD by the different actors. While such an approach was not necessary to address our 
research question – explaining why we did not engage with such type of analysis – it does 
has the potential to provide additional insights on the rise of PCD.   
 
 
 
  
 
The rise of policy coherence for development: a multi-causal 
approach 
 
Abstract 
In recent years policy coherence for development (PCD) has become a key principle in 
international development debates, and it is likely to become even more relevant in the 
discussions on the post-2015 sustainable development goals. This article addresses the rise of 
PCD on the Western donors’ aid agenda. While the concept already appeared in the work of 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in the early 1990s, it took 
until 2007 before PCD became one of the Organisation’s key priorities. We adopt a complexity-
sensitive perspective, involving (i) a process-tracing analysis and (ii) a multi-causal explanatory 
framework. We argue that the rise of PCD is not as contingent as it looks. While actors such as 
the EU, the DAC and OECD Secretariat were the ‘active causes’ of the rise of PCD, it is equally 
important to look at the underlying ‘constitutive causes’ which enabled policy coherence to 
thrive well.   
KEYWORDS: policy coherence for development, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, Development Assistance Committee, multi-causality, Aristotle 
Introduction  
With only a couple of months left on the clock, discussions on the successor framework 
to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are heating up. While at present there is a 
general consensus that the post-2015 framework needs to be a “truly international framework 
of policies to achieve sustainable development” (UN, 2013: 2), discussions are ongoing on how 
to translate this objective into a set of specific targets and strategies. So far, a recurring theme 
in these discussions has been that of policy coherence for development (PCD), referring to the 
general idea that non-aid policies of donor countries have an impact on developing countries 
  
 
and therefore should take into account the latter’s needs and interests (Forster & Stokke, 
1999a). However, and as already outlined in the introduction to this special issue, it remains 
unclear what the concept of PCD exactly entails and how it could concretely feature as a tool for 
transformative development in the post-2015 framework.  
The central aim of this study is to extend our understanding of the concept of PCD. More 
specifically, we seek to explain the rise of the concept on the Western donor’s aid agenda. 
While donor countries traditionally had a lukewarm attitude towards the promotion of PCD 
(Forster & Stokke, 1999b; Ashoff, 2005; Carbone 2009), since the mid-2000s the concept has 
become ‘one of the most hotly debated issues among donors’ (Hoebink 2010b: 9) and has 
increasingly been seen within policy circles as a tool for transformative development (DIIS, 
2013; ECDPM, 2014; ODI, DIE, & ECDPM, 2013; OECD, 2013b). This shift is most clearly reflected 
in the work of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and its 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC). While the DAC already introduced the concept of 
PCD in 1991, only limited progress was made throughout the 1990s and early 2000s to further 
develop and promote it. Moreover, the concept was mainly framed negatively, in terms of 
avoiding policy incoherence (Carbone, 2009; Forster & Stokke, 1999b; Picciotto, 2005). As we 
will show in this article, it took until 2007 before PCD became a central issue on the OECD’s 
political agenda and was further elaborated as a tool for transformative development. It 
continues to figure prominently in the work of the OECD until today, as reflects from the OECD 
Strategy on Development (2012a) or the new DAC mandate (2011), which both put forward the 
PCD concept as a key development principle. Moreover, several efforts have been undertaken 
to further advance the concept and place it at the heart of the post-2015 discussions (ECDPM, 
2014; OECD, 2013b, 2014a, 2014b; Stroß, 2014).  
Importantly, literature has not addressed the rise of PCD on the Western donors’ aid 
agenda. Indeed, while there is an emerging literature on how OECD donors promote PCD at the 
institutional level, both in general (e.g. Ashoff, 1999; Ashoff, 2005; Carbone, 2009; Forster & 
Stokke, 1999b; Hoebink, 1999; Stroß, 2014) and within a particular policy field (e.g. Makhan, 
2012; Morrissey, 1999; Youngs, 2007), scholars have thus far paid little attention to why donors 
increasingly attach importance to the principle of PCD. Most notable exceptions are the studies 
  
 
of David Chandler (2007) and Nancy Thede (2013), though, both studies focus on the security-
development nexus. The central aim of this article is to address the ‘why’ behind the rise of PCD 
in all its aspects.  
Some tentative explanations for the rise of PCD on the Western donor’s aid agenda have 
been suggested. The European Union (EU), for example, has been undertaking a series of efforts 
from 2005 onwards to promote PCD vis-à-vis its Member States and the development 
community at large (Carbone, 2008; Hoebink, 2010; Stroß, 2014) and the EU has been called 
“one of the leading proponents of PCD in the OECD/DAC” (ODI et al., 2013: 22). It could also be 
that the concept of PCD thrives well in today’s globalized world in which the boundaries 
between different policy areas and levels have become blurred, forcing donors to think ‘beyond 
aid’ (Barder, Clark, Lépissier, Reynolds, & Roodman, 2013; Janus, Klingebiel, & Paulo, 2014). It is 
also possible that donor countries have finally taken the criticism on their incoherent policies to 
the heart and aim to increase the impact of their aid (OECD/DAC, 2005, 2008f), or perhaps the 
promotion of PCD is not good at all but simply serves the interests of Western donors (Chandler, 
2007). It may also reflect a commitment to neoliberalism (Thede, 2013). Another option is that 
the rise of PCD can be attributed to the efforts of the OECD and DAC Secretariat, or more 
specifically to OECD Secretary-General Angel Gurría who has taken a particular interest in the 
topic (Manning, 2008). In sum, various (f)actors may have contributed to the surge of PCD on 
the Western donors’ aid agendas. However, given the absence of systematic and 
comprehensive studies on this topic1, it is impossible to tell if and how these relate to one 
another, let alone whether they have explanatory power at all or need to be complemented 
with other/alternative explanations. Therefore, the central aim of this study is to unravel the 
underlying puzzle of ‘why’ PCD thrives well in recent years.  
We do so by adopting a complexity-sensitive perspective, which has ontological, 
epistemological and methodological implications (see Figure 1). Ontologically, and in line with 
critical realist assumptions, we recognize that social reality consists of multiple strata in which 
different causal mechanisms interact in a complex manner (Bailey, 2008). This allows us to 
provide a more ‘stratified and integrated, and therefore more adequate, account’ (Bailey 2008: 
232) of the (f)actors that enabled the rise of PCD on the Western aid agenda. Epistemologically, 
  
 
this requires a multi-causal approach to social reality (Eun, 2012; McKelvey, 2004). Hence, by 
embracing a deeper and broader meaning of ‘cause’ we accept that factors not inevitably ‘push 
and pull’ in a ‘when A, then B manner’ but rather ‘constrain and enable’ in complex 
combinations (Kurki 2006: 202; Eun 2012: 167). Applied to our case, it leads us to think beyond 
seemingly obvious causes such as the impact of the EU, the DAC secretariat, or specific 
individuals, by putting these into perspective and relating them to other sorts of causes.  
One way to engage in a multi-causal analysis is to use an Aristotle framework on 
causality. Aristotle identified four types of causes – material, efficient, final and formal causes – 
each offering a different perspective on why a certain phenomenon took place. While 
traditional accounts usually take a narrow view in terms of efficient causes, this framework 
provides us a deeper understanding of the ‘why’ as it also elaborates on various types of causes 
and how they relate to one another. Some studies have advocated such an approach in IR 
(Kurki, 2008; McKelvey, 2004; Wendt, 2003), and an Aristotle framework on causality has 
proven its merits in others social sciences such as psychology, health or business (e.g. McKelvey, 
2004; Pérez Álvarez, 2009; Sunday, Eyles, & Upshur, 2001). However, notwithstanding some 
partial exceptions (e.g. Bailey, 2008; Jutila, 2009) applications in the field of IR and development 
studies are missing.  
Methodologically, we apply process-tracing to reconstruct how the concept of PCD made 
its way up the political agenda of the OECD and DAC (cfr. Bennett & George, 2005). The data for 
this study were obtained through (i) semi-structured interviews with in total 28 OECD, DAC and 
Member States’ officials2, (ii) archive study and document analysis (e.g. minutes of meetings, 
working reports, intra-delegations’ correspondence) and (iii) participatory observation3.   
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. In the next section, we provide a 
process-tracing analysis of how the concept of PCD made its way up the political agenda of the 
OECD and the DAC. Subsequently, in section three, we discuss the different causes underlying 
the rise of PCD within the OECD system from 2007 onwards. The paper concludes with some 
general reflections on the main findings of this study, linking them to the broader question of 
this special issue “What role for PCD in the post-2015 framework”.  
  
 
The rise of PCD within the OECD  
The principle of PCD came to the fore in the OECD in December 1991, when it was first 
discussed at the DAC’s annual High-Level Meeting. In the light of the ending of the Cold War, 
which profoundly altered the North-South relations, the DAC called for greater coherence in the 
policies of its Members vis-à-vis the developing world in order to make aid more effective 
(Carbone, 2008; Forster & Stokke, 1999a). More specifically, the DAC Secretariat (hereafter 
Development Co-operation Directorate or DCD) put forward an agenda which revolved around 
four key priorities, namely (i) establishing a clear-cut definition of PCD, (ii) developing a 
methodology to assess the cost of policy incoherence, (iii) identify best practices in the 
promotion of PCD and (iv) promoting horizontal work within the OECD on PCD related issues. 
Moreover, the DAC called for PCD at various levels, respectively, within the framework of a 
country’s development policies, within the framework of domestic and foreign policies (e.g. 
agriculture, trade, migration) and within the framework of donors’ policies vis-à-vis the 
developing world (OECD/DAC, 1991, 1991b, 1991c, 1992). 
However, while the DAC successfully drew international attention to the need of greater 
policy coherence, few further efforts were undertaken to implement the above agenda 
(Carbone, 2008; Forster & Stokke, 1999b; Führer, 1996). On the contrary, in the subsequent 
years the focused of its work predominantly lay on good governance, aid effectiveness and 
participatory development. Furthermore, the DAC reviewed in 1993 its list of ODA-eligible 
countries and in 1995 it initiated a so-called ‘exercice de réflection’ to reevaluate the role of 
development cooperation in the 21st century (Führer, 1996; OECD/DAC, 1994a; 1994b; 
interviews 14,15). This being said, the issue of PCD did not fall completely off the radar during 
the 1990s. At a rhetorical level, the principle was reaffirmed on a number of occasions, most 
notably in the DAC’s report ‘Shaping the 21st century’. However, while this report put forward a 
series of well-defined international development goals, its provisions on PCD were short and 
ambiguous (OECD/DAC, 1996b; interview 22). In a similar vein, the principle of policy coherence 
was also reaffirmed on a small number of other occasions, though, typically in the margins of 
discussions on other – more important – discussions such as the establishment of the MDGs or 
  
 
financing for development (Forster & Stokke, 1999b; Führer, 1996; OECD/DAC, 1994a,1995, 
1996a).    
Also at the beginning of the new Millennium, the promotion of PCD was not considered 
to be a priority by the OECD. In 2000, for example, the DCD and a coalition of countries (i.e. 
Belgium, Canada, Netherlands and UK) were keen on placing the issue of PCD more central in 
the work of the OECD, though, failed in doing so (OECD/DAC, 2000a; 2000b; interviews 8,14). In 
2002, the same actors did successfully push the OECD’s Ministerial Council to adopt the ‘OECD 
action for a shared development agenda’, which called upon the Organisation to ‘enhance the 
understanding of the development dimension of member country policies and their impact on 
developing countries’ (OECD, 2002). However, and similar to the early 1990s, few efforts were 
undertaken to implement this agenda. In fact, the only important achievement was the 
inclusion of a PCD chapter in the DAC’s peer reviews from 2002 onwards (Ashoff, 2013; 
OECD/DAC, 2002). As a result, DAC donors were forced – at least to some extent – to pay 
attention to policy coherence in their policies vis-à-vis the developing world. Moreover, it 
allowed the DCD to identify best practices on how to promote PCD at the institutional level 
(Ashoff, 2013; Manning, 2008; Picciotto, 2005; interview 14). Nonetheless, the inclusion of PCD 
in the DAC peer reviews was in many aspects also a missed opportunity. More specifically, the 
DAC did not put forward a clear definition, nor measurement of the concept, making it 
impossible to systematically track progress on the issue (Carbone, 2009; Picciotto, 2005;  
interviews 2,4,10,21). Moreover, by focusing exclusively on how to achieve PCD at the 
institutional level (i.e. how to avoid policy incoherence), the DAC did not address the larger 
question of what potential positive synergies exist between development cooperation and 
other policy fields such as agriculture, health, trade or migration (interviews 5,14,21,22).  
From 2007 onwards, the concept of PCD rapidly made its way up the political agenda of 
the OECD. More specifically, while the DAC had traditionally been the main (and often only) 
advocate of PCD –focusing on the institutional dimension of policy coherence, the OECD 
Secretariat-General increasingly took an interest in enhancing the understanding of PCD. More 
specifically, the OECD established in 2007 a PCD unit within the office of the Secretariat-
General, responsible to stimulate horizontal work on policy coherence across the Organisation 
  
 
and to address the potential synergies between different policy areas. In the same year, the 
OECD also set-up an informal network of focal points for PCD to strengthen the dialogue on this 
topic between the Organisation and its Members (Manning, 2008; OECD, 2007a; OECD/DAC, 
2007a; interviews, 5,8,14,16,21) and in June 2008 the OECD Ministerial Council explicitly 
reaffirmed the principle of PCD, stressing the need for greater policy coherence and a better 
understanding of the concept (OECD, 2008). Furthermore, the DAC issued in 2007 and 2008 a 
number of reports on how to promote PCD at the institutional level, building upon insights it 
had drawn from its peer reviews (OECD/DAC, 2007b, 2008a, 2008f).  
However, it was the DAC’s strategic reflection exercise that heralded the breakthrough 
of PCD within the OECD. This strategic reflection exercise took place between 2007 and 2009 
and was a process to review the DAC’s mandate, i.e. its role, structure, functioning and 
composition in the light of the changing development landscape (Manning, 2008; OECD/DAC, 
2008b, 2009a). This effort was undertaken in response to the mounting criticism on the DAC, 
which revolved around the fact that both developing countries and (re)emerging donors were 
not represented or unwilling to take part in the Committee’s work (Eyben, 2013; Kim & 
Lightfoot, 2011). To facilitate the process, the DAC set-up three task-forces, each dealing with a 
particular topic. Importantly, one of these task forces focused exclusively on the issues of PCD 
and Global Public Goods (GPGs), following the suggestion of the European Commission, the 
Netherlands and Finland (OECD/DAC, 2009a, 2010b). Consequently, the DAC’s new mandate – 
which built upon the recommendations of the reflection exercise – puts much emphasis on PCD. 
More specifically, it puts forward the promotion of policy coherence as one the DAC’s key 
priorities, and stipulates that this needs to be achieved in close collaboration with the rest of 
the OECD (OECD/DAC, 2011).  
The OECD warmly welcomed the DAC’s invitation and in May 2011 its Ministerial Council 
decided that the Organisation needed to engage in drawing its first-ever overarching strategy on 
development in which particular attention needed to be paid to the promotion of PCD (OECD, 
2011). This process led to the adoption of the ‘OECD Strategy on Development’ in May 2012 
according to which ‘enhancing policy coherence for development is one of the [OECD’s] primary 
objectives’ (2012a: 5). In pursue of this objective, the OECD put forward a clear set of priorities, 
  
 
namely (i) develop systematic and evidence-based analyses of the costs and benefits of 
(in)coherent policies, (ii) establish robust indicators to monitor progress on PCD, (iii) focus on 
key issues such as food security, illicit financial flows and green growth and (iv) foster dialogue 
on PCD within the organisation as well as across different development stakeholders (OECD, 
2012a). Ever since, the Organisation has been in the process of implementing these objectives 
(OECD, 2012b, 2013c). While the DAC continues to identify good practices on how to promote 
PCD at the institutional level through its peer reviews, the OECD’s PCD unit is engaged in a 
process of drawing a clear-cut definition and measurement of PCD (OECD, 2013c). Moreover, 
several OECD committees have collectively been undertaking studies to address the potential 
positive synergies between development cooperation and other policy areas, for example, on 
food security (OECD, 2013a), sustainable development (OECD, 2014b) or illicit financial flows 
(OECD, 2014a). Finally, in the context of the post-2015 discussions, the OECD Secretariat-
General has been undertaken a series of efforts to place the principle of PCD at the heart of the 
international agenda (e.g. OECD, 2013a; OECD, 2013b; interviews 3,5,21,23,24).  
Four causes 
The previous section clearly shows that PCD became a priority for the OECD from 2007 
onwards, even if the principle had been around for at least 15 years. This section unravels this 
puzzle. Taking a complexity-sensitive approach whereby different types of causes are identified 
at different levels of explanation, we structure our analysis around the four causes identified by 
Aristotle: material (i.e. the matter out of which things come to be), efficient (i.e. the initiator of 
change), final (i.e. the ultimate purpose or aim) and formal (i.e. that what shapes or defines 
matter) causes (Caksu, 2007; Kurki, 2008).  (Figure 1). We use the Aristotelian categories purely 
for heuristic purposes, acknowledging that they interact in complex ways.  
Material cause 
Explanations according to the Aristotle framework usually start with the material causes 
or ‘the matter out of which things come to be’. This ‘matter’, or ‘stuff’ (Gorham, 2009: 6), has a 
‘passive potentiality’ (Kurki, 2006: 206) in that it does not directly nor intentionally determine 
  
 
the phenomenon, but it constitutes an essential element without which the phenomenon would 
not exist. As such material causes are necessary ingredients to any explanation, but they are 
never sufficient. They tend to be an inherent part of the phenomenon that needs to be 
explained, which implies that they are not necessarily independent of it and that they do not 
necessarily precede it temporally. Just like formal causes, material causes constitute the social 
world in the sense of enabling and constraining it (Kurki 2006:208).  
Whereas they are easy to identify in exact sciences such as biology (e.g. the genetic code 
of an organism), it proves harder to pinpoint material causes in a social context. Perhaps 
counter-intuitively, material causes are also intangible and have an ideational component 
alongside interests. The material cause ‘out of which’ a social event has come to be is inevitably 
also a social construction. For example, the material cause of a war between two countries may 
involve the specific fights that have taken place, which are part of and constitute the war.  
Applied to our case, the very notion of ‘PCD’ forms the material cause for the rise of the 
idea on the agenda. There was nothing new about the notion of policy coherence, which had 
long been considered an important prerequisite for effective public management. Also in the 
context of development policy, it had been long established that the potentially detrimental 
effects of trade and agricultural policies need to be considered (Forster & Stokke, 1999a). As 
mentioned in the previous section, PCD already appeared in the OECD in the early 1990s. 
However, it was for a long time a ‘vaguely defined’ and ‘flexible’ term (Forster & Stokke, 1999a; 
OECD/DAC, 1996b, 2001; Stroß, 2014; Thede, 2013). It took until the mid-2000s before experts, 
officials and policy-makers started to develop more precise and elaborate interpretations 
(Führer, 1996; Manning, 2008; OECD, 2006; OECD/DAC, 2007d, 2008f; Thede, 2013). Whereas 
previously PCD was mostly framed negatively, in terms of avoiding incoherence between 
development policy and other policy domains, it became increasingly seen as a positive notion, 
i.e. a tool for transformative development. In other words, it evolved from a criticism against 
existing practices towards a new organizing narrative for development debates.  
In short, the success of the PCD concept comes out of its technical and intellectual 
potential for being a steering concept in international development policy. The elaboration of 
  
 
the notion around the mid-2000s proved to be a necessary material condition for its rise on the 
agenda. However, it cannot be seen as a sufficient condition, which begs the question to 
underlying explanations. For example, which (f)actors account for policy-makers’ increased 
interest in elaborating the notion of PCD in the mid-2000s? Why is it that quite suddenly the 
notion of PCD was fully embraced and elaborated? 
Efficient and final cause  
Material causes are necessary but not sufficient as an explanation: there also needs to 
be an account of why and by whom the ‘matter’ (i.e. the elaborated PCD notion) was ‘triggered’ 
or ‘activated’ (i.e. prioritized on the agenda). This leads us to consider the efficient and final 
causes, which both concern the ‘agency’ side of the Aristotelian framework. Efficient causes 
closely relate to mainstream explanations of causality in the sense of ‘source of change’ or 
‘pushing and pulling’ (who or what provoked the change?), whereas final causes address the 
intentionality behind change (what was the intended impact of the change?).  
Searching for the main drivers of the rapid rise of PCD up the political agenda in Paris 
from 2007 onwards, we can identify (i) the European Commission (EC), (ii) a small group of EU 
Member States (the Netherlands, Finland and Sweden), (iii) the OECD Secretariat-General, and 
(iv) the DAC Secretariat. These actors’ ambitions to prioritize PCD in international development 
debates constitute the efficient cause. They are inspired by final causes such as lifting countries 
out of poverty, but also bureaucratic politics – i.e. strengthening the position of the OECD 
Secretariat-General – and institutional survival strategies – i.e. securing the role of the DAC in 
the changing aid landscape.  
The first and perhaps most important actor that accounts for the rise of PCD in the OECD 
is the European Commission. Through its efforts in Paris (i.e. putting the item on the agenda) 
and Brussels (i.e. promoting policy coherence vis-à-vis its Member States), the EC played a 
catalytic role in making the principle of PCD incontournable. The EC’s efforts to promote PCD go 
back to mid-2000s. While the issue of policy coherence was already introduced with the Treaty 
of Maastricht (1993), the Commission only became a strong advocate of PCD from 2005 
onwards, both in its own policies as well as vis-à-vis its Member States (Carbone, 2008; Hoebink, 
  
 
2005). This shift was rooted in a growing belief that aid in itself is an insufficient tool to lift 
countries out of poverty (European Commission, 2005). In parallel to the proceedings in 
Brussels, the Commission also increasingly emphasized the importance of PCD in the OECD from 
the mid-2000s onwards, something which has been openly acknowledged by the DAC 
(OECD/DAC, 2007c, 2012b). Or as put by a senior-level official from the OECD’s PCD unit: “The 
European Commission has been one of the strongest and most persistent advocates of PCD 
within the OECD” (interview, 21). This was particularly true from 2007 onwards. For example, 
the Commission accounts to a large extent for the establishment of the task force on PCD and 
GPGs in 2007, which operated in the context of the DAC’s strategic reflection exercise 
(interviews 1,7,13,16). More specifically, while the DCD was afraid this task force would divert 
too much attention away from the DAC’s key priorities (i.e. the traditional ‘ODA’ dimension of 
aid) and other countries (i.e. Canada, Japan, US) had a lukewarm attitude towards the 
promotion of PCD, a majority of DAC Members supported the EC’s proposal, i.e. mainly EU 
countries which were either convinced of the idea (e.g. Austria, Belgium, Germany, France, 
Spain, UK) or unwilling to go against the Commission (e.g. Italy, Greece, Portugal, Poland) 
(interviews 3,9,11,14-15,18-20). Furthermore, in 2008, the EC was one of the main advocates of 
PCD at the DAC’s High-Level Meeting (OECD/DAC, 2008d) and the OECD’s Ministerial Council 
(interviews 5,9,12), illustrating its commitment to put policy coherence high on the political 
agenda. Also in more recent years, the EC has been one of the strongest advocates of PCD, for 
example, during the writing of the new DAC mandate and the OECD Strategy on Development 
(interviews 6,21,22,26-28). Importantly, the EC also played an important role in advancing the 
understanding of the concept (cf. the material cause), for example, by undertaking various 
studies on the topic which it presented in meetings of the DAC and the OECD informal network 
on PCD (e.g. OECD, 2007a; OECD/DAC, 2008e, 2012a). Moreover, the Commission helped the 
OECD with the establishment of the informal network on PCD focal point in 2007, building upon 
its own experiences in setting-up such a network in 2003 (OECD, 2007a), and it maintained close 
relations with the PCD unit with whom it regularly exchanged views (interviews 21,24) and 
organized events on policy coherence (e.g. European Commission, 2013; OECD/DAC, 2009b). 
Finally, also in terms of financial support, the EC has been one of the larger voluntary 
  
 
contributors to the OECD’s and DAC’s work on PCD (OECD/DAC, 2008c; interviews, 21-24,26-
27). 
A second group of actors that account for the rise of PCD are the Netherlands, Finland 
and to a lesser extent also Sweden. Similar to the EC, these countries have systematically put 
the issue of PCD on the agenda of the DAC and OECD, motivated by a shared conviction that 
policy coherence fosters development (interviews 2,21,26). During the DAC’s strategic reflection 
exercise, for example, they advocated in favor of including PCD in the mandate of the 
Committee – the task force on PCD and GPGs was also chaired by a Dutch official – (OECD/DAC, 
2010a), a plea which was repeated at the OECD Ministerial Council of 2008 (interviews 5,9,12). 
Furthermore, the Netherlands, Finland and Sweden have devoted an important part of their 
voluntary contributions to the DAC’s budget to advancing its work on PCD from 2006 onwards 
(OECD/DAC, 2006; 2008c; interviews 2,9,14,26). They have also been engaged in organizing 
events4 on the topic and/or conducted pilot-studies on PCD in collaboration with the OECD’s 
PCD unit (Department of Foreign Affairs Finland, 2013; Manning, 2008; OECD, 2007b).  
Third, also the OECD Secretariat-General has been an important driver of the PCD 
agenda. More specifically, the OECD took a particular interest in the promotion of the principle 
from 2007 onwards, whereas before the DAC had typically been the main – and often only – 
advocate of policy coherence. This shift can first of all be explained by the election of Angel 
Gurría as new Secretary-General of the OECD in 2006. Unlike his predecessors, he took a 
personal interest in the promotion of PCD, convinced of the intrinsic value of the concept, and 
therefore was in 2007 one of the main architects of the PCD unit which operates from within his 
own office (Manning, 2008; interviews 14,22,23). However, the OECD’s interest towards 
promoting PCD should also be seen in the light of the Organisation’s efforts to become a more 
modern and legitimate organisation. While in the 1990s and early 2000s the OECD successfully 
expanded its membership and modernized its decision-making procedures, from the mid-2000s 
onwards its focus shifted to finding new flagships that could give direction to the work of 
Organisation (Carroll & Kellow, 2011; Woodward, 2009). The promotion of PCD – especially the 
transformative notion of the concept – was considered to be such an issue given its potential to 
cover and link different areas of OECD expertise. Moreover, the promotion of PCD was also seen 
  
 
as a way to strengthen the position of the Secretariat-General as a central actor in the OECD’s 
decision-making process. Finally, it also allowed the OECD to engage in the debates on achieving 
the MDGs as well as the emerging discussion on how the post-2015 development agenda should 
look like (Atwood, 2012; interviews 14,16-17,21,28).  
Finally, also the DAC played an important role in the rise of PCD. As reflects from our 
empirical analysis, the DAC had always been the main driver of the PCD agenda within the OECD 
(Manning, 2008). However, in the period before 2007 it mainly framed PCD in a negative way, 
i.e. avoiding incoherence between development policy and other policy domains, while ignoring 
the notion of PCD being a transformative notion (see supra). This can be explained by the fact 
that the DAC did not want to divert too much attention away from its key priorities, i.e. its work 
on ODA and aid effectiveness. However, the DAC changed its stance on the issue from 2007 
onwards. At that time the DAC faced an existential crisis due to the changing international aid 
landscape, the emerging ‘beyond-aid’ discourse and the mounting criticism on the legitimacy of 
its work on aid effectiveness5, explaining why the Committee undertook its strategic reflection 
exercise (Manning, 2008; OECD/DAC, 2008b; 2009a; interviews 1,14).  In this context, the 
promotion of PCD – more specifically its transformative notion – was seen as a strategy for 
institutional survival (Carbone, 2011; interviews, 1,11,14,20,26). This also clearly reflects from 
various speeches of the then DAC Chair Eckhard Deutscher according to whom “the 
development community will become increasingly marginalised […] without a strong and serious 
engagement with PCD” (2009), which “is also why the DAC has decided to put a much stronger 
emphasis on PCD in the future” (2010). Moreover, it also allowed the DAC to strengthen its ties 
with the OECD. While traditionally the DAC had always been a quasi-independent body 
operating within the OECD’s institutional framework6 – and was keen on maintaining this 
autonomy (Masujima, 2004; Verschaeve & Takacs, 2013), it felt that it could better face the 
challenges ahead by joining efforts with the OECD. Moreover, integrating more strongly within 
the OECD also offered a number of opportunities. The latter, for example, was increasingly 
acting as the de facto Secretariat of the G8/G20, potentially providing the DAC a role in 
implementing/monitoring the decisions taken within these forums, as well as a venue for its 
own work on development (Manning, 2008; Woodward, 2009; interviews 1,3,9,14,21). 
  
 
Formal cause 
Although we have identified now the various actors that played a significant role in the 
prioritisation of PCD (efficient cause), and showed why they decided to embrace this policy 
standard more actively from 2007 onwards (final cause), the analysis of active causes is silent on 
the underlying, structural factors that enabled the rise of PCD. In general scholars tend to 
concentrate on the role of the aforementioned ‘active’ pushing and pulling causes, neglecting 
the institutional and ideational forces that constrain and enable them (Kurki, 2006: 207). Hence, 
in order to understand the prioritisation of PCD since 2007 one has to look more carefully at the 
constitutive ‘formal causes’ that have enabled such a rise. While Aristotle referred to ‘formal 
causes’ as ‘that which shapes or defines matter’ (Kurki, 2006: 207), in social sciences these can 
be understood best as the ‘ideas, rules, norms and discourses’ that define and structure social 
practice. In contrast to the ‘active’ efficient and final causes that we discussed above, formal 
causes should be seen as intrinsic, constitutive and structure-related causes. Consequently, we 
argue that both the institutional and ideational structure in which the aforementioned actors 
operate are key to fully understand the rise of PCD on Western donors’ development agendas.  
First, in relation to the institutional structure, we can point to the EU’s dominance in 
Paris. Indeed, in order to understand why the EU has been able to place PCD on top of the 
agenda, we cannot ignore its significant weight within both the OECD and DAC. More 
specifically, in the case of the OECD, EU Member States constitute for 21 of the 34 Members, 
while in the DAC they account for 20 of the 29 Members7.  Moreover, the EU – referring to the 
institution – is represented in the work of the OECD and DAC as well, respectively, as a full 
participant and a full member (Verschaeve & Orbie, 2015). Importantly, this allows the EU – and 
the EC in particular – to heavily influence the decision-making of the OECD and DAC, even 
though decisions in both institutions are taken by consensus and the EU typically does not 
present itself as a single-voiced bloc  (Carroll & Kellow, 2012; Verschaeve & Takacs, 2013). 
Another institutional factor that has enabled the rise of PCD on the OECD agenda relates 
to the mere existence of the EU as a structure within which reluctant Member States have come 
to accept policy standards such as PCD. Through their membership of the EU, even laggards 
  
 
such as Greece, France and Italy have committed to PCD as a principle. The EC and several 
Member States (in particular the Nordic-plus) have systematically promoted the principle of 
PCD since the early 2000s. In doing so, they have also engaged some of the less PCD minded 
Member States in (at least rhetorical) support of PCD (Carbone 2008; Hoebink 2005). It could be 
argued that because of these commitments within the EU framework, these countries found it 
difficult not to embrace PCD at the level of the OECD and DAC. Stated otherwise, in the absence 
of the EU structure, some Members may have sided with countries such as the US, Canada and 
Japan; however their endorsement of the PCD principle within the Brussels context made it 
nearly impossible to resist in Paris (OECD/DAC, 2008d; interviews 3,9,11,14-15,18-20). As such 
internal EU commitments constitute a magnifying impact on the international level.  
More broadly, globalization has entailed an increasingly blurred distinction between 
different policy levels (e.g. national, European, global) as well as different policy areas (e.g. 
development, trade, environment), thereby providing an enabling environment for the PCD 
concept. 
Second, the ideational structure in the second half of the 2000s has had a conditioning 
impact on the acceptance of PCD as a new priority of Western donors, in the sense of providing 
an enabling intersubjective structure within which PCD became a feasible and legitimate 
project. This period shows the emergence of a strong anti-aid discourse. It is striking that the 
rise of PCD coincides with the re-emergence of a fierce debate on the nature of international 
development cooperation, spurred by the publication of a number of influential works such as 
Jeffrey Sachs’ ‘The end of poverty’ (2006), William Easterly’s ‘The White Man's Burden’ (2006) 
or Dambisa Moyo’s ‘Dead Aid’ (2009)8. The ideational context is one in which Western donors’ 
aid practices are severely questioned.  At a more fundamental level, the prioritisation of PCD 
can thus be seen as an answer from Western donors who come to realize that their foreign aid 
model is increasingly under pressure (Deutscher, 2010; OECD, 2009; interviews 5,9,13). 
Arguably, this growing awareness that enabled the embracement of the PCD norm, was further 
strengthened by the changing landscape, characterized amongst others by the rise of the BRICS. 
At the same time, the rise of Western donors’ aid budgets had come to an end between 2005-
2007. In line with pledges made at the 2002 UN Monterrey Conference which focused on 
  
 
Financing for Development, average ODA budgets had gradually increased since the early 2000s, 
but even before the global economic crisis started to hit most Western economies it had 
become clear that most donors were cutting their aid budgets. The PCD agenda provides the 
perfect legitimation for this, since PCD is essentially about development in the absence of 
growing ODA budgets (OECD/DAC 2008d; Deutscher, 2009;  interviews 12,21,25,27). 
Finally, the PCD agenda also fits within a broader trend of securitisation (Thede, 2013), 
whereby development is increasingly considered as part and parcel of a broader foreign policy 
agenda. While the international development consensus until the early 2000s focused on the 
objective of poverty reduction, since 9/11 we have witnessed a growing consensus that more 
attention should be paid to the security-development nexus. The mutual linkages between 
development and security are obvious and the need for coherence between development and 
foreign policy can hardly be denied. However, there has been an acute fear by critics that the 
former would become subordinated to the latter, whereby national security considerations 
would take priority over development concerns. There is also an institutional dimension to the 
discourse on the security-development nexus, since in many countries the ministry of foreign 
affairs’ clout over development policy has been growing – examples are Australia, Canada, 
Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway (Ashoff, 2005; OECD, 2013). Also at 
the EU level, the creation of the European External Action Service and its partial incorporation 
of former DG Development staff and expertise can be seen in the light of the securitisation of 
EU foreign policy (Furness, 2010). Both the EU and the DAC have also become less technocratic 
and development-oriented and more politically oriented institutions. A specific illustration of 
this within the DAC is that there has been a shift in the profile of Member State delegates since 
the mid-2000s, from senior officials of the development administrations to less senior diplomats 
from the ministries of foreign affairs (interviews 1,3,8,15). Thus, the broader context is one in 
which the development sub-systems of several countries has been weakening. As such the PCD 
agenda can be seen as both an attempt to reconquer the loss of power of the development 
administrations and an indication of the growing impact of non-development spheres.  
 
  
 
Conclusion 
This paper focused on the rise of PCD on the Western donors’ aid agenda. While the 
concept already appeared in the work of OECD in the early 1990s, it took until 2007 before it 
became one of the Organisation’s key priorities. Furthermore PCD evolved during this period 
from being a negative concept, in terms of avoiding policy incoherence, to a positive concept, 
i.e. the notion of PCD being a tool for transformative development. Taking a complexity-
sensitive approach whereby we used the Aristotelian framework of material, efficient, final and 
formal causes, this paper shows that the rise of policy coherence is not as contingent as it looks 
like.  
Indeed, this study shows that while existing research provides us some answers why PCD 
thrives well, it fails to grasp the full complexity of the issue as it only takes stock of the active 
causes and ignores the constitutive causes (cf. figure 1). More specifically, and in parallel with 
what has been suggested in literature by some observers, our findings confirm that the 
elaborated notion of PCD (i.e. the ‘matter’) was activated by a number of actors, i.e. (i) the EC, 
(ii) the Netherlands, Finland and Sweden, (iii) the OECD Secretariat-General and (iv) the DCF. 
They successfully put PCD on the international agenda, inspired by a shared belief in its 
transformative power. Moreover, actors such as the OECD Secretariat-General and the DAC 
displayed bureaucratic interest in advancing the PCD agenda.  
The added-value of this paper, however, lays in the fact that it moves beyond such 
‘efficient’ and ‘final causes’ by also addressing the constitutive causes underlying the rise of 
PCD. More specifically, our analysis shows first of all that the success of the PCD concept comes 
out of its intellectual potential for being a steering concept in international development 
cooperation. While it had been established long before 2007 that donors need to consider the 
potentially detrimental effects of other policy areas, the technical elaboration of PCD as a 
concept around the mid-2000s proved to be a necessary precondition for its rise on the agenda.  
Second, our findings illustrate that the structure in which the aforementioned actors 
operate enabled the rise of PCD (i.e. formal causes). The institutional structure in which the 
  
 
aforementioned actors operate is characterized by an overrepresentation of the EU, a 
magnifying impact of internal EU commitments on laggards within the EU, and blurred 
boundaries because of globalization processes. The ideational structure in the second half of the 
2000s also had a conditioning impact, in the sense that the growing anti-aid thinking, the 
changing aid landscape, and stalling ODA budgets provided an enabling climate within which 
policy coherence became a feasible and legitimate project. The rise of PCD also fits within a 
broader trend of securitisation, whereby development is increasingly considered as part and 
parcel of a broader foreign policy agenda.  
In sum, this study shows that the rise of PCD is not as contingent as it looks. The 
implications of this finding are twofold. First, our study shows that PCD is there to stay in the 
work of the OECD. Even if the aforementioned actors would become less engaged with the PCD 
agenda, which at present is not the case, the underlying constitutive causes will continue to 
create a structure in which the concept thrives well. Second, this study raises the broader 
question to what extent the concept can really become a central element of the post-2015 
agenda. While the aforementioned actors are keen on placing PCD at the heart of the 
discussions, one cannot ignore the fact that a number of constitutive causes will provide less of 
an enabling factor in the development community at large.  While in the context of the OECD, 
the EU proves to be an important formal cause – both in terms of structure and 
overrepresentation – this obviously is not the case (or to a lesser extent) in the context of the 
ongoing UN negotiations. Moreover, other stakeholders such as developing countries or 
emerging donors may be more reluctant towards PCD given that they operate in a different 
ideational structure.  
Notes 
1) Also the study of the OECD and the DAC have thus far paid no attention to the rise of PCD 
(Carroll & Kellow, 2011; Eyben, 2013; Ruckert, 2008; Woodward, 2009). 
2) As various officials were only willing to share their views on the condition of absolute 
anonymity, interviews are indicated by a general reference only. A complete list of interviews 
can be found at the end of this article.  
  
 
3) One of the authors took part as an observer in the work of a number of DAC meetings in the 
period 2012-2013. 
4) In May 2007, for example, the Netherlands hosted in Noordwijk a High-Level Meeting to 
promote more research for diseases of importance to developing countries (Manning, 2008). 
5) This ultimately even resulted in the establishment of a rivalry institution – the UN 
Development Cooperation Forum – in 2007 (Molina, 2008). 
6)  Stemming from the fact that the DAC was established before the OECD, and was only 
adopted by the latter afterwards (Verschaeve & Orbie, 2015). 
7) Note that the DAC has a more resistricted membership than the OECD, stemming from the 
Committee’s unique establishment history (see supra).  
 8) Illustrative for this point is the fact that Dambisa Moyo presented the main findings of her 
book during the meeting of the OECD’s informal network of PCD focal points on 8 June 2009 
(OECD, 2009). 
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Aristotelian Framework of Causality (partly based on Kurki 2008: 220 & 229; Bailey 2008: 237) 
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Part three 
 
 
 Part three provides a summary of the main issues covered in this doctoral 
dissertation. More specifically, chapter 10 first reconstructs the research process, followed 
by a section that provides a detailed outline of the main theoretical conclusions of this 
study. A third and final section of chapter 10 engages in a number of critical reflections 
about this doctoral dissertation, as well as outlines an agenda for future research.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Chapter 10: Discussion and conclusions 
 
10.1. Reconstructing the research process 
 The central aim of this doctoral dissertation was to acquire an in-depth understanding of 
the relationship between the European Union and the Development Assistance Committee. This 
is relevant for two important reasons. First, both institutions are important – and intertwined – 
pillars of the international aid architecture. Yet, it is unclear how both institutions interact, let 
alone how their relationship influences the global fight against poverty. Therefore, this doctoral 
dissertation first of all contributes to gaining a better understanding of the politics that underlie 
international development cooperation. Second, by doing so, this dissertation addresses an 
important gap in the academic literature given that the relationship between the EU and the 
DAC thus far did not attract any scholarly attention. Indeed, both the burgeoning literature on 
EU-IOs relations and the study of EU development cooperation overlooked this particular 
relationship, which is quite remarkable given that, for example, the EU has been a full member 
of the DAC since 1960 or increasingly aspires itself a leading role in international development 
cooperation. Furthermore, also the literature on development studies and IR overlooked the 
EU-DAC relationship.  
 In order to unravel the EU-DAC relationship, this study opted for an inductive research 
approach, inspired by grounded theory. This choice was motivated by epistemological 
considerations, i.e. the pragmatist idea that social enquiry is the best way of acquiring in-depth 
knowledge on a particular topic. GT distinguishes itself from more conventional approaches by 
its unique stance towards existing literature and the processes of data collection and analysis. 
While research typically starts with an (extensive) literature review, followed by the steps of 
data collection and analysis, this study started almost immediately with the simultaneous 
collection and analysis of data. This should be seen as an iterative process whereby the 
processes of data collection and analysis continuously feed into each other, allowing research 
questions to emerge from the empirics and gradually become more targeted and theoretically 
inspired (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). By doing so, the risk of being preconceived was reduced to a 
minimum, allowing theoretical insights to emerge from the data. Stemming from this inductive 
  
 
approach, this doctoral dissertation did not started with a set of specific research questions. 
Indeed, there was basically no research question, but rather the objective to acquire an in-
depth understanding of the EU-DAC relations. The research itself proceeded in four phases, 
corresponding with the different stages of coding (cf. chapter 3), respectively, open coding (i.e. 
problematizing stage), axial coding (i.e. integrating stage) and selective coding (i.e. refining and 
summarizing stage). This process can be visualized as follows:  
Figure 7: 
 
 As illustrated above, the collection and analysis of data was in a first stage guided by a 
wide range of questions73, all of them corresponding with a particular aspect of the relationship 
                                                     
73 Note that figure 7 was designed for heuristic purposes only, and as such does not include an 
exhaustive list of research questions that inspired the collection and analysis of data.  
  
 
between the EU and DAC which seemed potentially relevant and thus worth exploring. In a 
second and third phase, the collection and analysis of data gradually became more targeted. 
More specifically, while the second phase focused on integrating the different questions into 
larger and more substantial research questions, the third phase of this study was characterized 
by a move towards broader theoretically inspired research questions. Note that these research 
questions also served as the starting point of most of the papers that have been presented in 
the second part of this doctoral dissertation. A fourth and final stage involved the creation of an 
integrated theoretical account of the EU-DAC relationship. In line with my ontological and 
epistemological positions, the ambition was not to develop a single authoritative framework in 
the positivist sense of the word. Indeed, in my view this is neither possible, nor desirable given 
that social sciences are fundamentally different from natural sciences. Rather, the theoretical 
contribution of this doctoral dissertation lays in unraveling the EU-DAC relationship, offering a 
thick description (cf. Geertz, 1973) of the relations between both institutions in which particular 
attention is being paid to explanations at the different layers of social reality.  
10.2. Main findings 
 Having provided a recapitulation of the objectives and methodological underpinnings of 
this doctoral dissertation, this section elaborates on the main empirical findings of this study. 
Combining the insights of the previous chapters, two general – and interlinked – findings can be 
drawn: 
 First, the EU and DAC have been interdependent institutions for most of their existence, 
in the sense that the way in which both organizations influenced one another was 
mutually beneficial, giving ground to a stable relationship74.    
 
                                                     
74 Note that interdependence is here interpreted as something positive given that it leads to 
stability. This ressembles the longstanding liberal claim that economic interdependence leads to 
stability and peace as it reduces the change of conflict. One of the first advocates of this claim 
was Montesqieu in the 17th century, though, up until now it has been repeated and/or further 
refined by various thinkers and scholars (e.g. Barbieri, 1996; Mansfield & Pollins, 2001; 
Rosecrance, 1986)  
  
 
 Second, from the mid-2000s onwards, the level of interdependence between the EU and 
DAC has gradually decreased, to the extent that the relationship between institutions is 
evolving into a dependent relationship75 whereby the DAC is the weaker partner. This 
undermines the stability of the interactions between Brussels and Paris.  
 In what follows, both findings will be taken together and discussed in more detail. In 
doing so, I distinguish between three periods in the EU-DAC relationship, respectively, (i) the 
period between 1960 and 1991, (ii) the period between 1991 and 2005 and (iii) the period from 
2005 onwards. This distinction is based upon the level of interdependence between both 
institutions and the underlying dynamics of influence between the EU and DAC. Graphically, this 
can be visualized as follows: 
Figure 8: 
 
                                                     
75 Note the the concept of dependence has some clear resemblances with the concept of 
assymetrical interdependence as developed by Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane (2001) in the 
sense that it increases the power of one actor, which in turn might lead to instability (e.g. Nye, 
2007).  
  
 
 The above figure 8 plots the evolution of EU-DAC relationship over time (x-axis) in 
function of the degree of interdependence/dependence (y-axis). Basically, it summarizes the 
different chapters of this doctoral dissertation, and thus also the above outlined main findings, 
in a heuristic way. Indeed, what is important is not the specific height of the curve, but its 
general shape. This shape is determined by the degree to which both partners influenced one 
another – i.e. the thickness of the block arrows in the boxes below the curve – during each 
period. In the remainder of this section, each of the above periods will be discussed in greater 
detail, paying particular attention to the degree to which the EU and DAC influenced one 
another and whether this was beneficial.  
10.2.1. Growing interdependence 
 
 The first phase in EU-DAC relations started with the inception of the Committee in 1960 
and lasted until 1993. It is characterized, first of all, by a strong influence of the DAC on the EU 
(cf. chapters four, six and seven). Indeed, in the absence of strong and de jure development 
competences, the EU relied extensively on the DAC during this period, for example, for acquiring 
development expertise. Furthermore, the DAC also served as a source of inspiration and 
legitimation for the EU, helping to turn the European Commission into a more mature and 
assertive development actor. Also the other way around, the EU actively contributed to the 
work of the DAC. While initially rather hesitant and only in relation to the representation of the 
EDF and EIB, it gradually became actively involved in all aspects of the DAC’s work (cf. chapter 
six). In doing so, the EU particularly active on a number of issues that were closely related to its 
own preferences/competences such as (i) regional integration in the developing world (e.g. 
OECD/DAC, 1966; 1971; 1973), (ii) trade related development assistance (e.g. OECD/DAC, 1966; 
1971) or (iii) donor coordination (e.g. OECD/DAC, 1965; 1971; 1980).  
 In sum, it can be concluded that during this first phase of EU-DAC relations, both 
partners increasingly benefited from their interactions, thus became more interdependent. 
While this was clearly the case for the EU – i.e. its interactions with the DAC played an 
important role in its development as a development actor – also the DAC benefited from its 
partnership with Brussels – i.e. by influencing the EU, it was able to play its role as advocate of 
  
 
more and better development aid. Furthermore, the EU strengthened the DAC’s role in 
international development cooperation because (i) it adopted a lot of DAC norms and principles 
(one could even say became socialized) and (ii) became increasingly involved in the Committee’s 
work.  
10.2.2. A flourishing relationship 
 The second phase in EU-DAC relations began in 1993 with the signing of the Maastricht 
Treaty, granting the EU shared competences in the field of development cooperation. It lasted – 
roughly speaking – until 2005. The main characteristic of this second period is that the EU-DAC 
relationship flourished as never before, stemming from the fact that both institutions were 
strongly interdependent during this period and as such influenced each other in important and 
mutually beneficial ways. Starting with the DAC, its peer reviews of 1998 and 2002 helped 
creating a momentum for turning the European Commission into a full-blown donor – think, for 
example, about the adoption of the EU Development Policy Statement (2000). Furthermore, the 
DAC also helped implementing a number of more technical reforms, most notably bringing the 
reporting of European development aid in line with its Statistical Directives (cf. chapter seven). 
Also the other way around, the impact of the EU on the DAC was significant. Building upon its 
new status as one of the world’s largest providers of ODA, the EU not only became one of the 
central actors in the DAC, it also actively used its leverage to contribute to the Committee’s 
objectives – especially from the 1999 onwards76. The EU, for example, became one of the 
driving forces of several task forces, sub groups or working parties, often as a (co-)chair and/or 
contributor of studies and financial resources (e.g. OECD/DAC, 1996a; 1997a; 1997b; 1998b). 
Furthermore, the EU used its political leverage vis-à-vis its own Members to actively 
promote/safeguard the DAC norms and principles – think, for example, about the Commission’s 
role in safeguarding the adoption of the DAC’s recommendation on aid untying in 2001 (cf. 
Carbone, 2007) and subsequently the EU commitment in 2002 to fully untie all bilateral 
European aid and the ambition of its Member States to follow this example (EU, 2002). At a 
higher level of abstraction, it can thus be concluded that the EU-DAC relationship reached a high 
                                                     
76 Stemming from the fact that before the reforms of 1999, the EU spent a lot of energy in solving 
internal problems related to development cooperation (cf. chapter seven).  
  
 
level of interdependence during this second period, given that both partners reinforced each 
other’s role in development cooperation.  
10.2.3. An eroding relationship 
 The third and final phase in EU-DAC relations started in 2005. Unlike the previous 
periods, it is characterized by a declining interdependence between Brussels and Paris. In recent 
years, the EU-DAC relationship is even evolving into the direction of a dependent relationship. 
At the empirical level, this is witnessed, by a declining impact of the DAC on the EU (cf. chapter 
seven), whereas the influence of the EU on the DAC has continued to increase in comparison 
with the previous period. Indeed, in recent years, the EU has become, arguably, the pivotal 
actor in the DAC’s decision-making process. This reflects from the fact that it increasingly 
dominates the latter’s work – not necessarily in an intentional way – which has given ground to 
much more unstable relations between Brussels and Paris. Clear examples are the discussions 
on the EU’s status in the DAC’s statistics (cf. chapter six) or its stance towards concessional loans 
(cf. chapter eight).  
 Finally, two important considerations must be made. First, the above shift did not 
happen overnight, but should be seen as a slow, yet gradual process. Second, the fact that the 
EU-DAC relationship is evolving into a dependent relationship does not imply that the 
interactions between Brussels and Paris are by definition not mutually beneficial – think, for 
example, about the EU’s role at the HLF in Accra (Carbone, 2013a) or the joint efforts of the EU 
and DAC towards promoting aid for trade (e.g. OECD/DAC, 2013c). Therefore, combining the 
above insights, this third phase in EU-DAC relations can be best descripted by the concept of 
erosion, stemming from the fact that it is gradual process, which is not always visible at the 
surface, though, at a structural level undermines the stability of the relationship.  
10.3. Explanations  
 Having provided a general overview of the main empirical findings of this doctoral 
dissertation, the central question that remains unaddressed is how to explain the eroding 
relationship between the EU and the DAC (i.e. the evolution from an interdependent to 
dependent relationship). Adopting a complexity-sensitive perspective, the remainder of this 
  
 
section applies the four causes as identified by Aristotle (cf. chapter nine), allowing me to 
identify different explanations at different levels of social reality. These are, respectively, (i) 
material (i.e. the matter out of which things come to be), (ii) efficient (i.e. the initiator of 
change), (iii) final (i.e. the ultimate purpose or aim) and formal causes (i.e. that what shapes or 
defines matter) (Caksu, 2007; Delputte, 2013;  Kurki, 2008).  
 The rationale behind adopting the above approach is that it inductively became clear 
that only a multi-causal approach is able to capture the full complexity of the EU-DAC 
relationship. Indeed, while existing theoretical frameworks come some way in understanding 
certain aspects of the eroding EU-DAC relationship, they can never explain the complete 
picture. For example, while historical institutionalism allows us to understand why certain 
tensions arise on the EU’s status in the DAC’s statistical directives (cf. chapter six), it does not 
explain why it took the DAC several years to deal with the issue of concessionality. This stems 
from the fact that most – if not all – theoretical frameworks typically focus on one particular 
type of cause, whereas the key to acquiring in-depth knowledge of a certain social phenomenon 
lays in mixing different perspectives – i.e. the foundation of analytic eclecticism (see e.g. Cornut, 
2014; Sil & Katzenstein, 2010). Importantly, the Aristotelian framework on causality is one 
possible way of doing so as it provides four distinctive perspectives (or causes) to look at social 
phenomena, motivated by the fact that mixing these allows for understanding the full 
complexity of change. Consequently, the four causes of Aristotle should not be mistaken with a 
theory in the sense that they do not possess explanatory power on their own. Rather they serve 
as a kind of heuristic tool, enabling more abstract and complex reasoning on causality (Caksu, 
2007; Delputte, 2013;Falcon, 2015; Kurki, 2008). Finally, it is important to outline that I did not 
choose the Aristotelian framework because I consider it to be superior to other ‘eclectic’ 
frameworks – think, for example, about the 3 I’s, referring to interests, institutions and ideas 
(e.g. Hall, 1997). Indeed, ultimately it was a personal choice, motivated by the fact that I felt it 
captures the complexity of my empirical findings most clearly.   
  
 
10.3.1. Material causes 
 Explanations according to the Aristotle framework typically start with the material 
causes, referring to the matter out of which things come to be. This ‘matter’ or ‘stuff’ has a 
passive potentiality in the sense that it does not directly nor intentionally determine the 
phenomenon, but it constitutes an essential element without which the phenomenon would 
not exist (Gorham, 2009; Kurki, 2006). Consequently, material causes are necessary ingredients 
to any explanation, but they are never sufficient (Falcon, 2015). Furthermore, they tend to be – 
but not necessarily are – an inherent part of the phenomenon that needs to be explained, 
meaning that they are not necessarily independent of it (Falcon, 2015; Kurki, 2006). This is best 
illustrated with an example77, let us say understanding the rationale behind the establishment 
of the new EEAS building, commonly referred to as the Triangle. The material causes of the 
Triangle are, for example, Article 27(3) of the EU treaty which established the EEAS or the size 
and geographical location of the different EU external services prior to the Lisbon treaty. 
However, this obviously is only one part of the explanation, as it does not capture why or by 
whom the building was created.   
 Applying the above insights to this doctoral dissertation, one could thus say that the 
material cause of the eroding relationship between the EU and the DAC is the fact that at one 
point in history relations have been established between Brussels and Paris. Similar to any other 
social relationship – be it between humans or IOs –, the EU-DAC relationship had always the 
passive potentiality to erode. This is particularly true for this relationship, stemming from the 
fact that both partners are IOs, adding additional complexity to their interactions. Indeed, from 
the moment the EU became a full member of the DAG in 1960 (cf. chapter six), its relationship 
with the DAG/C had a passive potentiality to be challenged by policy dynamics such as European 
development integration – knowing that the EU is a more supranational and economic oriented 
IO – or the growing overlap in membership between both organizations (cf. figure 9).  
 
                                                     
77 It should be noted that this is a fictious example, in the sense that I did not carried out research on this 
topic and thus make assumptions why it has been established.  
  
 
Figure 9: 
 
 
(based upon own calculations, data obtained from Führer (1996) and www.oecd.org) 
 Consequently, one could say that the matter of the EU-DAC relationship (to apply the 
Aristotelian terminology) is essentially very complex in the sense that both institutions are 
interlinked in a rather complicated way – i.e. the different EU delegation and EU Member States 
represent their own bilateral aid policies in the DAC but also jointly constitute the European 
Union. Though, not all EU Members are represented in the DAC. Schematically, this complexity 
looks as follows: 
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Figure 10: 
 
  In sum, one could thus concluded that the EU-DAC relationship was to some extent 
flawed by design in the sense that there has always been a passive – yet realistic – potentiality 
of worsening relations between both organizations, stemming from the complex nature of their 
relationship.  
10.3.2. Efficient and final causes  
 As outlined in the previous section, material causes are necessary but insufficient 
explanations of social phenomena given that they do not account why certain events take place 
or who triggered these. Indeed, while the complex nature of the EU-DAC relationship helps 
explaining its current erosion, it does not explain why this is happening today – and, for 
example, not in the early nineties. This is why the Aristotle framework on causality also pays 
particular attention to the source(s) of change – i.e. efficient causes – and the intentionality 
behind change – i.e. final causes (Falcon, 2015). Linking back to our example of the EEAS’ 
building, one could identify the EU institutions and Member States as efficient causes, 
respectively, supporting the establishment of the Triangle for final causes such as increasing the 
visibility of the EU institutions or strengthening the coherence of the Union’s external action by 
  
 
physically grouping the different actors being involved. Finally, and as reflects from the above 
example, it is worth pointing out that both the efficient and final causes constitute the agency 
side of the Aristotelian framework, explaining why both are taken together in this section.  
 Applying the above insights on understanding the eroding EU-DAC relationship, one can 
first of all distinguish between three efficient causes, respectively (i) the EU delegation – i.e. the 
European Commission78, (ii) the EU Members of the DAC and (iii) the DAC Secretariat or DCD. 
What these actors have in common is that they all contribute(d) – not always intentionally (!) – 
to the eroding relationship between the EU and the DAC. In doing so, they are driven by final 
causes such as promoting development, achieving institutional survival or minimizing the impact 
of the DAC on their own development programs. In what follows, each of the above efficient 
causes will be discussed in more detail, elaborating on the final causes that underlie their 
actions.  
 Starting with the first efficient cause, the EU delegation, chapters eight and nine clearly 
demonstrated that its role on prioritizing PCD during the DAC’s strategic reflection exercise 
(2007) or it stance towards concessional ODA loans (2009-2014) were a source of instability. 
Nonetheless, in both cases, EU officials were first of all convinced that their actions helped 
lifting countries out of poverty. Indeed, the EU genuinely believes that PCD is the way forward in 
today’s interconnected and multipolar world, and is convinced that concessional loans – even 
profit making ones – can be used as development tools in specific cases (e.g. vis-à-vis the BRICs). 
This explains why they pushed hard for uploading their approaches on both topics to the level of 
DAC, regardless of the appropriateness of the context (e.g. the strategic reflection exercise) or 
the position of the other Members of the Committee and the DCD. Furthermore, the EU’s 
actions in the DAC are also inspired by other final causes, most notably winning the ongoing 
cold war with the DCD – to the extent this conflict can be won. More specifically, as outlined in 
chapters six and eight, recent years have witnessed the emergence of a series of – largely 
                                                     
78 As outlined in chapter 4, the EEAS officially took over the representation of the EU in the DAC, whereas 
previously this had always been the job of the European Commission. However, in reality, the EU 
delegation to the DAC is composed by former Commission officials, and in a number of cases – e.g. on 
technical issues – the European Commission continues to take part in the DAC’s work.   
  
 
symbolic – conflicts on the EU’s status in the DAC statistics. While the DCD was not the only 
actor involved – think, for example, about the role played by other DAC Members in this 
discussion – it gave ground to a cold war between the EU and the DAC secretariat. This 
influenced the behavior of the EU delegation in various ways. It explains, for example, why the 
EU suspended its voluntary contributions to the DAC’s budget, but also why it tried to bypass 
the DAC – i.e. the DCD’s efforts – on the issue of concessional loans (cf. chapters six and eight).   
 The EU Member States of the DAC constitute the second efficient cause. Similar to the 
EU delegation, their actions on, for example, the topics of PCD, concessional ODA loans have 
proven to be harmful for the relations between Brussels and Paris. Again, the main motivation 
behind their actions was the final cause of achieving development. For example, the 
prioritization of PCD during the DAC’s strategic reflection exercise was considered to be vital for 
achieving development by most EU Member States (cf. chapters eight and nine). At the same 
time, also more pragmatic/interest driven final causes steer the behavior of the EU Members of 
the DAC. Examples are the support of France and Germany for the EU’s attempt to bypass the 
DAC on the issue of concessional loans79 (cf. chapter eight) or the unwillingness of a number of 
EU countries (e.g. Poland, Greece, Italy, Portugal) to (openly) challenge the EU position on PCD 
or concessionality in the DAC in order to maintain good relations with Brussels or because they 
felt rhetorically entrapped (cf. chapters six, eight and nine). Finally, to single-out one country in 
particular, the declining presence of Austria in the DAC and growing reliance on the EU 
delegation also erodes the EU-DAC relations. It does so to downscale its overall diplomatic corps 
in times of economic crisis, potentially setting a dangerous precedent for other EU Member 
States (cf. chapter six).  
   The third and final efficient cause is the DCD. Similar to the above actors, its actions also 
contributed to the eroding EU-DAC relationship. Indeed, as outlined most clearly in chapters six 
and eight, the DCD often found itself diametrically opposed to the EU – think, for example, 
about its initial reluctance to prioritize PCD during the DAC’s strategic reflection exercise (2007), 
                                                     
79 Note that most officials from both countries also intrinsically saw no flaws in the reporting of these 
loans (cf. first final cause).  
  
 
its stance towards concessional ODA loans or its position on the EU’s status in the DAC’s 
statistical directives. These positions were first of all inspired by the final cause of promoting 
development. For example, DCD officials were convinced of the need to strengthen the lower 
the reference rate for concessional loans in order to discourage the (excessive) use of loans (cf. 
chapter eight). A second final cause that inspired the DCD’s behavior has been that of securing 
the DAC’s role in the changing international development landscape (cf. chapter five). Taking 
the example of concessionality again, the DCD was basically forced to solve the issue to secure 
its credibility as monitor of international aid flows – think, for example, at the highly critical 
opinion piece of former DAC chair Richard Manning in the Financial Times (2013) on this issue 
(cf. chapter eight). Also indirectly, this second final causes contributes to the eroding EU-DAC 
relationship given that it, for example, explains why the DCD has come to follow up much more 
closely what goes in Brussels (cf. chapter eight), which in turn cultivates the image of the DAC 
being an EU dominated IO. In a similar vein, the DCD has in recent years actively sought to 
expand the DAC’s membership as a way to increase to Committee’s inclusiveness (cf. chapter 
five). However, by doing so, it also further strengthened the EU’s overrepresentation in the DAC 
(see supra) A third and final cause that drives the DCD’s behavior is the cold war between 
Brussels and Paris (see supra). Indeed, similar to the EU delegation, the DCD basically does not 
want to lose this fight, explaining why it not always acts in the most diplomatic way vis-à-vis the 
EU. Again taking the example of concessionality, the DCD has been particularly hard for the 
European Commission, even though France and Germany played a similar role on this issue – 
both in terms of reporting these loans and actively seeking to bypass the DAC (cf. chapter eight).   
10.3.3. Formal causes  
 
Having identified the material, efficient and final causes of the eroding EU-DAC 
relationship, this third and final section elaborates on the formal causes that underlie this 
evolution. Formal causes are what shapes and defines matter (Falcon, 2015; Kurki, 2006). In 
social sciences these are ideas, rules, norms or discourses given that these structure and define 
reality. As such, formal causes should be seen as intrinsic, constitutive and structure-related 
explanations of a social phenomenon. Using the example again of the EEAS building, some of 
the formal causes that underlie the establishment of the Triangle are European integration in 
  
 
the field of foreign policy or the dominant thinking that in today’s multipolar world European 
countries need to work together when it comes to external policies. As reflects from the above 
example, formal causes can thus be parts of the institutional but also the ideational structure. 
They are an important part of any explanation as they provide a deeper understanding of 
agent’s behavior (i.e. efficient and final causes).  
Applying the above insights to the EU-DAC relationship, one can distinguish between a 
number of – interlinked – formal causes. These are, respectively, (i) a shifting balance of power 
between the EU and DAC, (ii) a growing impact of the EU structure on the DAC’s functioning and 
(iii) an increasing ideological divergence between the EU and DAC. A fourth formal cause is the 
changing development landscape. It should be noted, however, that this cause intersects with 
each of the previous ones. Hence, I have chosen not to address it separately, but rather to 
discuss it in relation to each of the aforementioned formal causes.  
 The first formal cause that underlies the eroding relationship between the EU and DAC is 
the shifting balance of power between the Brussels and Paris, an evolution that took place 
between 2002 and 2007. As reflects from chapters five, six and seven, the DAC has historically 
always been more powerful than the EU in the sense that it played a leading role in 
international development, whereas the role of the EU was much more modest. Importantly, 
there are two sides to this story. On the one hand, before 2005 the DAC was almost 
incontournable in international development, stemming from the fact that it represented all 
important donors. This the allowed the Committee to strongly shape the international 
development agenda – think, for example, about its 1996 report ‘Shaping the 21st century’, 
which paved the way for the MDGs (cf. chapter five). On the other hand, the EU could hardly be 
considered a prominent international development actor before the turn of the millennium. 
Indeed, before 1991, it lacked de jure development competences, but also once it obtained 
these it initially struggled quite a lot with its new role as bilateral development actor(cf. chapter 
seven).  
 However, the power balance between both actors gradually changed from the turn of 
the millennium onwards, with 2005 as symbolic tipping point. Starting with the DAC, its role in 
  
 
international development has been declining in recent years. Due to the (re)emergence of new 
development actors, it no longer represents all major providers of development assistance 
(think about the BRICs). Furthermore, the Committee’s prominent role in setting the global 
development agenda has been increasingly challenged, forcing the DAC to reevaluate its 
position in international development. Most notable in this context was the Paris Declaration on 
Aid Effectiveness – adopted in 2005 (!) – given that it spurred much debate on the DAC’s 
legitimacy, stemming from the limited involvement of non-donor stakeholders in the drawing of 
the declaration, ultimately even inspiring the UN General Assembly in the same year to 
mandate the ECOSOC to establish the DCF (cf. chapter five). In sharp contrast, the EU 
increasingly came to play a much more prominent role in international development 
cooperation from 2000 onwards. Building upon a series of internal reforms, the EU developed 
itself as a full-blown development donor (cf. chapter seven). Furthermore, it also started to 
develop itself as a multilateral development actor, with the collective European ODA pledges in 
Monterrey (2002) being the first visible exponent of this process. However, the tipping point – 
be it to a large extent symbolic – can again be found in 2005 as this was the year in which the 
European institutions and Member States adopted the European Consensus on Development, 
outlining for the first time ever a common European view on development. Finally, and perhaps 
ironically to some, it worth pointing out that the DAC contributed – at least to some extent – to 
the EU’s growing prominence in international development. Indeed, the DAC helped pushing for 
substantial reforms in Brussels around the turn of the millennium (cf. chapter seven) and its 
more recent peer reviews of the EU urged the latter to take on a more pro-active role in 
international development – e.g. in 2002 the EU was referred to as a ‘timid giant’ (OECD/DAC, 
2002b) – and further develop its ‘federator role’ vis-à-vis its Member States (OECD/DAC, 2012c; 
2007c).   
 The second formal cause that underlies the eroding EU-DAC relations is closely related to 
the previous one, namely, the impact of the EU structure on the Committee’s work. More 
specifically, as outlined in chapters six, eight and nine, the emergence of the EU’s role as a 
multilateral development actor has come to shape and constrain the behavior of several EU 
Members of the DAC, be it as straightjacket (i.e. limiting their policy choices, as illustrated by 
  
 
the concessionality case) or an amplifier (i.e. enabling an easy uploading of priorities that have 
been set in Brussels, as illustrated by the PCD case). As such, the context in which the EU and 
DAC interact with one another is one whereby it has become increasingly important what 
collective actions take place in Brussels. This is particularly true from 2005 onwards, stemming 
from the magnitude of collective European efforts in Brussels (e.g. the European Consensus on 
Development, the joint commitments on PCD, Aid Effectiveness) as well as the enlargement of 
the EU, given that the so-called new EU Member States – which became active as an observer in 
the DAC from 2006-7 onwards and joined the Committee in 2013 – have proven to be 
particularly vulnerable for the constraining impact of the European construction.  
 Importantly, the above dynamic runs counter the DAC’s traditional strengths in the 
sense that it challenges its output and throughput legitimacy (cf. chapter five). Indeed, as 
became clear throughout the previous chapters, the EU structure (potentially) hampers the DAC 
from tackling certain issues in an effective way – think about the struggles the DAC faced to 
address the concessionality issue or merge its statistical directives (cf. chapters six and eight) – 
or function deliberatively – think about how PCD became a key priority of the DAC without the 
support of all its Members or the DCD (cf. chapters eight and nine). At a more general level, the 
above dynamic even stimulates forum shopping among the EU delegation and the EU Members 
States in the sense that they might use the Brussels’ institutions to bypass the DAC’s decision-
making (cf. chapter eight). For obvious reasons, this challenges the DAC’s role in international 
development cooperation80, explaining why the DCD, for example, has come to follow up much 
more closely on Brussels or why recent years have proven to be a fertile ground for tensions 
between the EU delegation and the DCD (see supra).  
 The third and final formal cause that explains the eroding EU-DAC relationship situates 
itself at the ideational level. More specifically, recent years have witnessed a growing 
ideological divergence between the EU and the DCD, an evolution that for obvious reasons 
hampers relations between Brussels and Paris. As became clear throughout the previous 
                                                     
80 It should be pointed out, however, that this is not – or to a much lesser extent – the case for the DAC’s 
more technical work that is carried out predominantly by the DCD (e.g. studies, peer reviews).   
  
 
chapters, the DAC intrinsically did not change its ideological stance towards promoting 
development over the past fifty years. This reflects most clearly from the DAC’s strategic 
reflection exercise, which offered the DCD a window to fundamentally rethink the Committee’s 
mandate, though, ultimately ended up re-endorsing its original objectives and principles (cf. 
chapter five). Indeed, notwithstanding the ideational challenges posed by the changing 
international development landscape (cf. chapter one), the DAC continues to promote its 
traditional norms and principles, be it in a slightly updated fashion – think, for example, about 
its recent efforts to modernize the ODA definition (cf. chapters five, eight and nine). The 
opposite can be said of the EU – here referring to European Commission. While during most of 
its existence, the EU was ideologically on the same page as the DAC – think, for example, at the 
fact that the Commission used the Committee as a source of inspiration during the 1960s, 1970s 
and 1980s or the explicit ambition of the Prodi-commission to turn the Union into a mainstream 
DAC member (cf. chapter seven) – it more recently has come to adopt a new ideological stance 
towards development. Largely in response to the changing development landscape (but also the 
global economic crisis), the EU has become a more strategic development actor (cf. chapter 
one), increasingly emphasizing the need to move beyond aid from 2007 onwards (cf. chapters 
eight & nine). Furthermore, while theoretically speaking the beyond aid paradigm not 
necessarily conflicts with the traditional DAC principles and norms, it increasingly does in the 
case of the EU. This can be best illustrated by the following quote of an EU official, openly 
stating that “ ODA is an old-fashioned and neocolonial concept”, when asked why the Union has 
come to put so much emphasis on the prioritization of PCD in the DAC (Paris, 8/11/2013).  
10.3.4. Summary 
 The central research question that inductively emerged during this doctoral dissertation 
was “How to explain the eroding EU-DAC relationship?”. As reflects from the previous sections, 
there is no straightforward answer to this question. Indeed, in order to fully understand this 
process, one needs to look at different types of explanations – or causes – at different levels of 
social reality, as such moving beyond the traditional accounts of the active causes (i.e. efficient 
and final causes) that prevail in political science. Schematically this looks as follows: 
  
  
 
 
Figure 11: 
 
 
 Indeed, and as I tried to visualize in figure 11, this complexity not only stems from the 
interactions between the different types of causes, but also from the interactions within each 
cause. For example, there was a clear agency side to the conflict on the EU’s status in the DAC 
statistics (e.g. aspirations of the EU delegation, the concern of the DCD to maintain the integrity 
of its statistics…), though, at the same time this is an insufficient explanations given that the 
larger structure also ‘enabled’ this conflict (e.g. the complex situation of a DAC member being 
also a recipient of ODA, the EU’s new status as a leading development actor…). However, the 
particular way and direction in which these different causes interact with one another varies 
from case to case, making it impossible to try to force the above schedule into a more law-like 
one – in the natural science fashion of the word.   
 This being said, the previous sections do show that there is a clear and strong structural 
dimension underlying the eroding EU-DAC relationship. Furthermore, most of these structure 
related causes are difficult to change in the sense that it cannot be done overnight. 
Consequently, the transformation of the EU-DAC relationship from an interdependent to a 
dependent relation (cf. figure 8) will continue to shape the interactions between Brussels and 
Paris in the next years, and perhaps even decades. However, this does not imply that this 
  
 
dynamic cannot be slowed down, stopper or even reversed. Indeed, as reflects from this study, 
there is a continuous interaction between structure and agency, meaning the above discussed 
actors should not be looked upon as passive players given that they can (try to) influence the 
material and formal causes in order to remedy the eroding EU-DAC relationship.    
10.4. Concluding reflections  
 
 Having outlined the main findings of this doctoral dissertation, this final section will 
establish a number of concluding reflections on the main contributions and implications of this 
study. 
10.4.1. Towards a multicausal study of EU-IOs and EU development policies?  
 
 A first contribution of this doctoral dissertation is that it illustrates the importance of a 
multicausal perspective to understand social reality. This awareness has grown inductively, in 
the sense that at the outset of this study I was not concerned about whether to adopt a 
monocausal or multicausal perspective. However, it quickly became clear that the only possible 
way to achieve an in-depth understanding of the EU-DAC relationship was by adopting a multi-
causal perspective, i.e. analyzing why and how agents (i.e. efficient and final causes) are able to 
act and interact in the larger structure context (i.e. material and formal causes). To be honest, 
this argument can be hardly called original given that it echoes what a growing number of 
scholars have come to advocate in recent years (e.g. Delputte, 2013; Eun, 2012; Kurki, 2006 & 
2008). However, and as is often the case in science, few scholars thus far actually adopted such 
a multicausal perspective in their research (exceptions are Delputte, 2013; Jutila, 2009 & 
Wendt, 2003). As such, at a general level, the contribution of this doctoral dissertation lays in 
the fact that it shows one possible way of doing so, both in terms of research approach (i.e. 
grounded theory) and way of structuring the empirical findings (i.e. Aristotelian framework on 
causality81).  
                                                     
81 Note that this would have never been possible without the help of Jan Orbie and Sarah Delputte. 
Indeed, it was only after writing our joint paper on PCD (cf. chapter 9) – and more specifically because of 
the numerous discussions during the writing process – that I became fully engaged with the Aristotelian 
framework on causality.  
  
 
 At a more specific level, the contribution of this doctoral dissertation is in the fact that 
the example provided by this study, arguably, might be the way forward to achieve more 
theoretical depth in the study of EU-IOs relations and EU development cooperation. Both fields 
have in common that they lack well-established theoretical frameworks to work with. Indeed, 
not only are most studies descriptive82, the scholars that do go down the road of theory 
typically single out one (or a limited number of) causal factors which they then study in detail 
and try to link. One such example are the recent efforts in the study of EU-IOs to incorporate 
the ‘external context’ and link this variable to the concepts of coherence and effectiveness  (e.g. 
Drieskens, 2014; Groen & Niemann, 2013; Oberthür & Rabitz, 2014). However, as reflects from 
this doctoral dissertation such attempts are essentially flawed by design given that they a priori 
privilege a certain factor (or causal relationship), whereas this study shows that the EU-DAC 
relationship is defined by multiple causes which interact in complex and unpredictable ways. 
Therefore, it would make more sense to study EU development cooperation or EU-IOs relations 
from a multicausal perspective as this allows for a more in-depth understanding of social reality. 
However, also inveterate positivists would benefit from such an approach (see also Eun, 2010). 
More specifically, as reflects from the current state of the literature, the tasks of identifying 
explanatory variables is still unfinished, making multicausal – or at the very least an open-ended 
inductive approach – a much more efficient way of unraveling the different components of what 
could become – in their views – a general theory.   
10.4.2. Do EU-IOs relations have an expiry date?  
 A second contribution of this doctoral dissertation lays in the fact that it gives ground to 
new theoretical insights and lines of enquiry – i.e. the hypothesis that some EU-IOs might have 
an expiry date. However, before elaborating on this hypothesis, it is important to provide a brief 
background on how it came to exist, at very least to not be mistaken for a poorly disguised 
positivist. More specifically, as outlined repeatedly in this dissertation, the aim of this study was 
never to develop a general (law-like) theory given that this is not possible, nor desirable. At the 
                                                     
82 This is particularly true for the field of EU development studies. However, it should be emphasized that 
I do not consider ‘descriptive’ as some kind of low-quality label. On the contrary, most of these studies 
are extremely useful and relevant. Furthermore, they typically pave the way for more theory driven 
research.  
  
 
same time, however, the purpose of this dissertation – and multicausal studies more general – 
is not to point out that everything matters. Similar to others scholars, I also strive for a higher 
level of generalization of certain findings, off course only if possible and supported by additional 
empirical data83.   
 Driven by such motivations, I therefore started to wonder to what extent the pattern of 
the EU-DAC relationship (cf. figure 8) also could be found in other EU-IO relations while 
wrapping up this dissertation. And if so, to what extent similar or completely different causes 
underlie this process. Thus far, only a first tentative attempt has been undertaken to address 
these questions and while there are no conclusive answers yet – but rather new lines of enquiry 
– it seems that similar patterns can be found in a number of EU-IOs relations. More specifically, 
institutions that clearly stand out are the Council of Europe (CoE), the Organization for Security 
and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the NATO in the sense that their relationship with the 
EU shows similar dynamics as the ones observed in this study. More specifically, as put most 
succinctly by the CoE itself in one of its recent publications: “In Vienna and Strassbourg, the 
syndrome of the EU shadow started to show its symptoms” (2014, p. 8). This also applies to 
some degree to the case for the NATO, whose relationship with the EU has become increasingly 
unstable, swinging between co-operation and competition in recent years (e.g. European 
Parliament, 2006; Koops, 2010; Groeger & Haugevik, 2013). Finally, also the EU-ILO relationship 
– be it to a lesser extent84 – shows some parallels with the EU-DAC relationship given that the 
(ideological) objectives of both not necessarily coincide, as well as the fact that the ILO is the 
weaker partner (e.g. Novitz, 2003, 2009).  
 Quite strikingly, all of the above IOs – with the exception of the ILO – have in common 
that they are regional (European/Western) organizations in which the EU’s power is 
                                                     
83 Think, for example, about the finding that times needs to be taken more seriously in understanding the 
EU’s membership status in IOs (cf. chapter six). This finding was pushed to a higher level of 
generalization by testing it in a number of other additional IOs (cf. annex one), though, never with the 
intention of putting it forward as a kind of universal law.  
84 In the sense that this point is only made explicitly by Tonia Novitz (2003; 2009), whereas most other 
studies on EU-ILO relations do not pay much attention to this dynamic, raising the assumption to what 
extent it indeed is really prominent.  
  
 
considerable in terms of representation and/or competences, which might hint at similar 
material and formal causes. However, at this stage it is still too early to tell whether this is 
actually the case. Indeed, virtually-all studies that addressed the relationship between the EU 
and one (or more) of the above IOs paid specific attention to one particular aspect of this 
relationship, as such adopting a monocausal perspective85, whereas ideally each of the above 
relations is studied in much greater depth from a multicausal and open-ended perspective.  
 In a similar vein, I went searching in other fields of study for answers, but again they did 
not provide satisfactory answers. Nonetheless, two strands of literature are worth pointing out 
given that they also seem to support some of the findings of this study. A first strand of 
literature is that on regime complexity (e.g. Alter & Meunier, 2009; Lesage & Van der Graaf, 
2013; Nye, 2007; Oberthür & Stokke, 2011). More specifically, it has been pointed out by several 
of its authors that conflict and troubled relations are more likely to occur between institutions 
that are overlapping and nested at the same time86 (e.g. Alter & Meunier, 2009; Hafner, 2008) – 
applied to this study: the EU-DAC relationship has been nested from the start, but only became 
overlapping from turn of the Millennium onwards. Furthermore, there is a well-established link 
between asymmetrical interdependence and conflict/instability (e.g. .Nye, 2007). A second 
strand of literature is that on inter-organizational relations87 (e.g. Cropper, 2008; Lowndes & 
Skelcher, 1998; Van de Ven & Poole, 1995). More specifically, various scholars in this field have 
been developing so-called ‘life-cycle models88, and while being extremely positivist, they 
virtually-all put forward patterns that are similar to the one witnessed in this study – i.e. an 
almost inevitable decline in relations between organizations from a certain point onwards (e.g. 
Lowndes & Skelcher, 1998; Phelps, Adams & Bessant, 2007; Van de Ven & Poole, 1995). 
Unfortunately, both fields have in common that they do not offer in-depth explanations of a 
                                                     
85 An important exception is the study of Joachim Koops (2010) given that he – without explicitly 
referring to it as being a multicausal study – pays particular attention to both agency and structure 
related explanations at different levels.  
86 Albeit, it has been pointed out by Brian Uzzi (1997a, 1997b) that overlapping and nested regimes may 
also provide advantages (e.g. more problem-solving and risk taking). However, this requires a strong 
degree of trust between both partners.  
87 Referring to the strand of literature that predominantly focuses on the relationship between firms.  
88 Similar to evolutionary thinking, the idea is that relations between organizations progress through a 
number of subsequent and irreversible stages (Cropper, 2008) 
  
 
changing relationship between IOs. Indeed, while they typically refer to explanations related to 
power or a growing distrust between both partners, it remains unclear how exactly such 
processes unfold over time.  
 Linking the above insights, it can thus be concluded that some of the findings of this 
dissertation can be generalized to a higher level. Indeed, also other EU-IOs relations (and more 
generally regimes and relations between firms) seem to have reached their expiry date at a 
certain point, and recurring (monocausal) explanations thus far have in common that they point 
more or less in the same direction of some of the material and formal causes identified in this 
study (e.g. complexity, shift of power). However, much more in-depth research is required on 
this topic, ideally starting with the IOs that have been put forward in this section.  
10.4.3. Practical implications  
 
 While the previous sections elaborated upon the scholarly contributions and 
implications of this doctoral dissertation, it is equally relevant to think about its practical 
implications. Indeed, the objective of this study was never to acquire an in-depth understanding 
of the EU-DAC relationship for the sake of academia only. Indeed, one of the underlying 
motivations for this study was the need to gain a better understanding of the politics of 
international development cooperation in order to make a tiny, yet valuable contribution to the 
eradication of poverty. It does so in two important ways. First, this study brings some important 
nuances to the debate on the DAC’s role and legitimacy in international development 
cooperation. This was necessary given that too often opinions about the DAC have proven to be 
unbalanced or incomplete89, stemming from the fact that the Committee has hardly ever been 
the subject of scholarly attention. As such, this dissertation – and in particular chapter five – 
serves as a first step in the direction of more balanced and informed debate (and decision-
making) on issues that are directly or indirectly related to the DAC.  
                                                     
89 To give one example, in 2010 the Spanish presidency of the EU convened a conference on the topic of 
development cooperation in times of crises. At this conference, Owen Barder, Mikaele Gavas and Simon 
Maxwell presented a paper in which they portrayed the DAC as being an institution which fails to 
respond to the changing aid landscape, as such completely ignoring, for example, the DAC’s strategic 
reflection exercise, its (future) enlargements (Barder et al, 2010).  
  
 
 Second, this doctoral dissertation has come to highlight the potential negative impact of 
regional development integration – in this particular case the EU – on the existing international 
aid architecture. This raises the bigger question whether or not European development 
integration – and more specifically the development of the Union’s role as a multilateral 
development actor – is something good or bad. Essentially, there is no straightforward answer 
to this question. Indeed, as became clear throughout this dissertation much depends on the 
particular context (i.e. the way in which the EU structure interacts with other causes). This 
makes that European development integration is not by definition something negative. 
Nonetheless, considering the case of the DAC, I tend to take the position that one must be 
extremely careful when it comes to strengthening the EU’s role as a multilateral development 
actor. Taking a functionalist perspective, the EU and its Member States should at the very least 
consider case by case whether or not the European level is the most appropriate level for 
collective action. After all, in many cases the collective actions that are agreed upon at the 
European level offer no clear advantage to the collective actions at the level of IOs such as the 
DAC, World Bank or UN in the sense that both are legally non-binding. However, as reflects from 
this particular study, the EU’s efforts (potentially) come at much higher costs given that they 
might undermine the role of existing IOs which are often more inclusive and potentially also 
more effective and/or deliberative. Therefore the contribution of this dissertation lays in the 
fact that it raises awareness for the potential detrimental impact of EU development 
integration, urging EU institutions and Member States to be extremely careful and reflexive 
about their collective development actions.  
10.4.4. Limitations and an agenda for further research  
 
 Finally, it is important to elaborate on the main limitations of this doctoral dissertation. 
As is the case with all research, there is always room for improvement and this study is no 
exception to this rule.  
 First, this study has analyzed the past 55 years of EU-DAC relations in about three and a 
half year. This choice was inspired by the lack of literature on this topic, making it necessary to 
first develop a certain standard against which the current EU-DAC relations could be assessed. 
  
 
However, by covering such a large time period, choices inevitably had to be made in terms of 
focus. More specifically, particular attention has been given to the establishment of the DAC as 
well as the more recent evolutions from the Maastricht Treaty onwards, whereas the period in 
between received less attention. As such, further research could explore in greater depth the 
EU’s role in the DAC during the 1970s and 1980s. In doing so, topics that are worth further 
exploring are (i) regional integration in the developing world, (ii) trade related development 
assistance and (iii) donor coordination given that a first superficial analysis revealed that much 
emphasis was put into promoting these topics by the EU delegation.  
 Second, and similar to the first limitation, I also had to make certain choices in terms of 
focus for the most recent period in EU-DAC relations. More specifically, while I chose to focus on 
those cases that were most relevant for this study – in terms of the emerging theoretical 
insights – there are also interesting cases that I have not been able to study in greater depth. 
One such case is that of Aid for Trade, stemming from the fact that the EU and the DAC have 
always worked very closely together on this issue. Furthermore, the fact that this topic is jointly 
addressed by the DAC, the OECD and the WTO also makes it interesting from a theoretical point 
of view in the sense that this structural context may interact with the efficient and final causes 
in a different way. In a similar vein, also the interaction between the EU and the DAC in some of 
its subsidiary bodies might be worth further explorations. Unlike the cases in this dissertation, 
the work of these bodies is often more technical and less politicized, making it relevant to 
explore to what extent for example the substance of the work or the level of politization 
influences the EU-DAC relationship.  
 Third, this study has predominantly focused on what goes on in Paris, be it at the level of 
the DCD, the EU delegation or the different Member States of the DAC. This, however, implies 
that I did not pay equal attention to the headquarter level. Indeed, while most of the interview 
with DAC delegates briefly touched upon this issue, it is something that needs closer attention, 
stemming from the fact that not all DAC Members – including the EU – have organized their 
representation in Paris in a similar way. For example, while some DAC delegates have a large 
  
 
degree of autonomy, the opposite is true for others. Obviously, this might also influence their 
positions in the DAC, explaining why further research on this dimension is necessary. 
 Fourth, albeit this doctoral dissertation started from an open-ended and multicausal 
perspective, the primary units of analysis have always been states and IOs, whereas the level of 
the individual has been touched upon in a less systematic way. This is somewhat of a missed 
opportunity given that a growing number of studies more recently have come to acknowledge 
the importance of the individual in explaining policy change (or lack of change). Therefore, 
future research could look in greater detail to what extent the level of the individual indeed 
constitute an important causes that should be taken more seriously. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Annex 
 
 
 This fourth and final part of this doctoral dissertation is constituted by one paper that is 
more indirectly related to the topic of this study. More specifically, it is a book chapter which I 
have written together with Dr. Peter Debaere, Prof dr. Dr. Ferdi De Ville, Prof. Dr. Jan Orbie, Dr. 
Bregt Saenen and has been publiced in 2014 under the title “Membership: the evolution of EU 
membership in major international organisations” in the edited volume of Amandine Orsini (The 
European Union with(in) international organisations: commitment, consistency and effects 
across time). Its link with this doctoral dissertation is that it further investigates to what extent 
also in other IOs then the DAC the initial decision on the EU’s membership status installs path 
dependence.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
The Evolution of EU Membership in Major International 
Organisations 
Peter Debaere, Ferdi De Ville, Jan Orbie, Bregt Saenen and Joren Verschaeve 
Summary 
The EU’s membership status, i.e. how it can and does act in international organisations, varies 
significantly. There is no single determinant that is able to explain this diversity. Neither the IOs’ 
membership rules, nor the position of third states vis-à-vis the EU’s status, the EU’s legal 
competences, or internal preference distribution offer a satisfactory explanation. This chapter 
analyses the EU’s membership status in eight key IOs in the socio-economic sphere (GATT, 
WTO, OECD, DAC, G8, G20, ILO and FAO).
90
 It shows that the EU’s status in IOs is varied, 
but has remained remarkably constant over time in each IO. To a large extent, the EU’s current 
status in IOs is determined by the ‘initial decision’ made on the basis of the legal and political, 
internal and external contexts at the time. Changes to these contexts have not altered the EU’s 
membership status in the cases of the GATT/WTO, OECD/DAC, G8 and ILO. However, in the 
cases of the FAO and G20, two critical junctures – short periods of rapid contextual change – 
have enabled a significant upgrade of the EU’s status. 
Key Words 
Critical juncture; DAC; FAO; G8; G20; GATT; historical institutionalism; ILO; membership; 
observer; OECD; path dependency; WTO. 
                                                     
90 We adopt here a broader definition of IOs than the one proposed in the introduction to this volume. Indeed, the G8 and G20 do 
not fit all the criteria for being IOs, mostly because they are informal clubs and do not have headquarters, budgets or staff. Yet 
they play a key political role on the international scene and are inter-governmental and multilateral. It is in this respect that we 
consider them as IOs.  
  
 
Introduction 
In this chapter, the volume’s focus on the membership of the European Union in international 
organisations is narrowed down to the EU’s ‘membership status’ in IOs, defined here as its 
politico-legal status. Our analysis is inspired by two puzzles. First, the membership status of the 
EU varies extensively across different IOs. Second, its status in any given IO seems to change 
only rarely over time. Traditional explanations for the variation in EU status focus on internal 
and/or external, legal and/or political factors (e.g. Jørgensen and Wessel 2011, Hoffmeister 2007, 
Wouters et al. 2008, Gehring et al. 2013). Some stress the importance of the division of 
competences within the EU (internal, legal) for the Union’s status in IOs. Others emphasise the 
IOs’ rules for participation as decisive (external, legal). A third independent variable in the 
literature is the degree of substantial homo/heterogeneity of preferences among member states in 
the domain where an IO is active (internal, political). A final explanation is the international 
context or support for EU involvement in an IO (external, political). 
The existing literature concentrates mainly on explaining the EU’s membership status at a 
specific moment in time rather than understanding its evolution over time. It does not adequately 
address the question whether and why the EU’s status remains constant or changes when the 
above-mentioned factors change. Inspired by the aforesaid puzzles and hiatus in the literature, 
this chapter examines: (i) whether the EU’s status is characterised by change or continuity; and 
(ii) why change occurs or continuity persists. By addressing these two questions, it also sheds 
light on why the EU’s status varies significantly across a number of IOs. 
We discuss the evolution of the EU’s status in the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), the 
  
 
International Labour Organization (ILO), the Group of Eight (G8), the Group of Twenty (G20), 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the World Trade Organization (WTO) and 
the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). These organisations share sufficient background 
characteristics as they all represent different IOs in the socio-economic sphere, while a maximum 
of diversity within the sample is pursued in terms of membership status and in possible 
explanations for change or continuity (Rihoux and Ragin 2009: 20–21). With the notable 
exception of the GATT/WTO, the EU’s role in these socio-economic IOs has been under-studied 
(Orbie et al. forthcoming). 
With ‘EU membership status’ we refer to the politico-legal status of the European Union 
in IOs. Status focuses on the various forms of EU membership in IOs, thus not only on the 
division of competences between the EU and its member states within IOs, or the EU’s 
performance or effectiveness in an IO. Since practices of EU membership in IOs may diverge 
significantly from what formal rules would lead us to expect (Jørgensen et al. 2011: 601), we do 
not limit ourselves to a legal argument and leave room for political elements too. 
We discern five categories of membership status: ‘member’, ‘participant’, ‘observer’, 
‘attendant’ and ‘absent’ (see Table 2.1). These categories do not necessarily correspond with the 
terminology used by the IO itself or with classifications of other authors (e.g. Wouters et al. 
2008: 22). While categories are typically constructed based on the array of rights a member 
enjoys in an IO, we identify parameters or ‘thresholds’ that have to be met in order to obtain a 
certain membership status. In doing so, we concentrate on the question of what conditions need to 
be fulfilled to observe a change in status. 
  
 
The threshold between ‘absent’ and ‘attendant’ depends on the presence of the EU at 
several meetings of an IO. An occasional invitation does not qualify for attendant status. In order 
to become an observer, the EU must be allowed to table proposals or amendments during 
negotiations. As an observer, the EU is, however, not allowed to vote. The right to vote 
represents the threshold to the status of participant. In this case, the EU possesses de facto 
membership. In settings where voting rarely occurs, the EU is considered as a participant when it 
has an equal say compared to the members of the IO. The fourth threshold for qualifying as a 
member is reached when the EU is recognised by the IO and its member states as a member. 
Often, full membership of the EU is then anchored in the IO’s statutes or in a similar legal 
document. 
Table 2.1 EU membership statuses within a selection of IOs 
Status Threshold IOs Period 
Member Formal member WTO 
DAC 
FAO 
G20 
1995–
2014 
1961–
2014 
1991–
2014 
2008–
2014 
Participant Allowed to vote but not legally recognised as 
formal member 
GATT 
G8 
OECD 
1960–
1994 
1977–
2014 
1961–
2014 
Observer Allowed to table proposals or amendments 
but not allowed to vote 
FAO 1972–
1991 
Attendant Attending several IO meetings but not 
allowed to table proposals or amendments 
ILO 1953–
2014 
Absent Not attending several IO meetings  G20 1999–
2008 
 
  
 
To analyse the evolution of the EU’s membership status, we use an inductive approach. 
The first step is to scan through the history of the EU’s membership in the identified IOs as well 
as the characteristics of such membership. A second section then looks at the mechanisms that 
explain such membership, i.e. path dependency and critical junctures. Finally, a third section 
examines the effects of the EU’s membership status on the EU as well as on the IO. 
Embracing Long-term Participation: The EU’s Commitment to the GATT, WTO, OECD, 
DAC, G8, G20, ILO and FAO 
The EU has been an ‘original member’ of the WTO since its establishment in 1995. In that way, 
the status since the 1960s whereby the EU had been recognised as a de facto contracting party of 
the GATT has been formalised (the GATT did not have ‘members’ but ‘contracting parties’). The 
Agreement Establishing the WTO, Article XI.1, states that ‘The contracting parties to GATT 
1947 as of the date of entry into force of this Agreement, and the European Communities, … 
shall become original members of the WTO’ (WTO 1994: 16). The signing of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947 preceded the establishment of the EU. 
Although the Community became exclusively competent for trade policy through Article 113 of 
the Rome Treaty in 1957, it did not formally accede to the GATT, nor did the GATT contracting 
parties regulate the legal status of the Community. 
Subsequently, the Community’s status was set through its consistent practice, since the 
Dillon Round of 1960–1961, of acting as if it were a contracting party (Hirsch 1995: 39–43, 
Petersmann 1986). The European institutions have ever since been participating in negotiations 
and representing the member states – except in the Budget Committee as the contributions were 
paid out of national budgets by each member state individually (Petersmann 1986: 36). While the 
  
 
member states remained present around the table and retained their right to vote, the Community 
over the years thus became a de facto contracting party. All GATT agreements and protocols 
provided that their acceptance is open to ‘contracting parties to the GATT and by the European 
Economic Community’ (Petersmann 1986: 37). With the exception of the Tokyo Round codes, 
the GATT agreements have been concluded by the EU as ‘Community Agreements’ without 
direct acceptance on the part of individual member states. The EU’s de facto assumption of 
GATT contracting party and recognition by the rest of the membership has also been visible in 
the GATT dispute settlement mechanism. From 1974 on, complaints by third parties were 
directed against the EU instead of individual member states. 
This de facto recognition of the membership of the EU was unproblematic and 
uncontested as long as the GATT Rounds focused on tariffs. The Tokyo Round dealt for the first 
time with non-tariff barriers, however, with limited success. With the following Uruguay Round 
(1986–1994), the international trade agenda took a qualitative leap by focusing on several ‘new’ 
trade issues such as services and intellectual property rights. While during the Uruguay Round 
the EU maintained a pragmatic negotiating practice whereby the Commission represented the 
member states on all issues without prejudicing the formal division of competence, the 
conclusion of the Round led to a confrontation between the Commission and the Council (and 
most of the member states; Billiet 2006, Hilf 1995). The conflict revolved around who should 
sign what, and the consequent question of whether the EU and/or the member states should 
become members of the new WTO. The Commission put the issue before the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) in 1994. It was subsequently ruled (Opinion 1/94) that while the EU has exclusive 
competence for trade in goods (and cross-border services), this was not the case for other modes 
of trade in services and trade-related intellectual property rights. Thus, the WTO charter was 
  
 
signed as a ‘mixed agreement’ and both the EU and the member states became members of the 
new organisation. 
While this could be interpreted as a step back in the light of the GATT practice whereby 
agreements were concluded as ‘Community Agreements’ (see supra), we argue for a different 
reading. Notwithstanding the difficult atmosphere in the years leading up to conclusion of the 
Uruguay Round (1994) and the establishment of the WTO (1995), both with regard to trade 
competences and with regard to European integration in general (the difficult ratification process 
of the Maastricht Treaty; see also Hilf 1995: 245), the EU became a full member of the WTO. 
And the continued membership of the member states did not alter the practice of the Commission 
acting as the single and exclusive voice for the EU on all issues, notwithstanding the internal 
formal division of competence. This happened also in spite of attempts by third countries to play 
EU member states off against each other, both before and after the end of the Uruguay Round. 
Moreover, this practice of exclusive supranational representation for all issues discussed at the 
WTO was also internally formalised with the Lisbon Treaty that entered into force on 1 
December 2009. The EU is now also legally exclusively competent for all trade issues, including 
services, intellectual property rights and investment. 
While the OECD is often considered to be a monolithic IO, it is better to consider it as a 
family composed of the OECD, the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and the 
International Energy Agency (Lesage and Van de Graaf 2013, Woodward 2009). In this chapter, 
we limit our attention to the OECD and the DAC. The EU’s current status in the OECD can be 
qualified as full participant. This stems from the first supplementary protocol in the OECD 
Convention, which stipulates that the ‘Commissions of the European Economic Community … 
shall take part in the work of the Organization’ (OECD 1960). This provision has been 
  
 
interpreted very broadly as the EU takes part – alongside its member states – in all aspects of the 
OECD’s work and is even allowed to chair meetings of OECD committees. As a result, the EU is 
generally considered to be one of the most important and central actors in the OECD (Carroll and 
Kellow 2011, Comelli and Matarazzo 2011). Nonetheless, throughout the past 50 years the EU 
was unable to take the leap towards full membership. When the OECD was established in 1961, a 
compromise provided that the EU is not a member of the OECD, though a participant (in casu a 
de facto member; Esman and Cheever 1967, Verschaeve and Takacs 2013). Despite EU attempts 
to upgrade its membership in the following decades, and some minor successes such as its 
accession to the OECD’s Working Party 3, its membership status remained unchanged (Carroll 
2009, Woodward 2009). 
The EU’s membership status in the DAC poses a similar empirical puzzle. The DAC is a 
leading international development institution that offers its members a forum to reflect upon the 
volume and effectiveness of aid. While it operates within the OECD (de jure as a Committee), it 
is generally considered to be an IO in its own right given its quasi-autonomous standing within 
the OECD (Masujima 2004). The EU has been a full member of the DAC – alongside its member 
states – ever since the latter’s establishment in 1961 (Verschaeve and Takacs 2013). This full 
membership status (and its continuity) is remarkable both from a legal as well as a political 
perspective. Legally speaking, the EU should have been unable to join the DAC in 1961 as at that 
time the EU lacked development competences, and politically the role of the EU in development 
cooperation has been contested many times over the past decades (Holland and Doidge 2012). 
Nonetheless, the EU’s full membership in the DAC has remained unaltered ever since 1961. 
In the G8, we consider the EU today as a participant. In 1977, the European Council 
decided that the President of the Commission and the rotating President of the Council would be 
  
 
invited to take part in those sessions that deal with items that fall under EU competence, such as 
trade (Hainsworth 1990). The agreement to allow the EU in the G7 (which became the G8 in 
1998, following Russia’s accession) as a participant instead of a member has remained unaltered 
until now. But soon, the participation of the Commission was extended to cover all agenda items. 
Already in 1978, its presence at the summits had become uncontested. The Commission 
participated fully in all economic sessions and their preparation at the 1978 Bonn summit. In 
1981, the Commission was allowed to take part in the political discussions and joined the 
preparations one year later (Putnam and Bayne 1984: 152). In 1987, the Commission drew up for 
the first time a detailed working paper dealing with the problem of sub-Saharan African debt, 
which served as the basis for summit discussions (Hainsworth 1990). A few years later, the G7/8 
tasked the Commission to coordinate Western aid to the former Eastern Bloc Countries after the 
collapse of communism. The resulting PHARE programme illustrates the recognition of the 
Commission’s role in the G7/8. But still, the EU has never acquired official G8 membership and 
remains a full participant of the G8. 
For the G20, while the membership status of the EU remains officially unaltered, the 
sudden entrance of the European Commission at all G20 levels in 2008 is such a drastic change in 
the EU’s representation that its membership status can hardly be described as continuous. 
Established by the G7 in September 1999, the G20 gathers the finance ministers and central bank 
governors of 20 systemically important economies. Contrary to the G8, the EU was granted 
official G20 membership from the start. The rotating Council Presidency and the President of the 
European Central Bank represented the EU, while the Commission only participated at a 
technical level. However, when the G20 was upgraded to the level of Heads of State and 
Government in 2008, the Commission was fully accepted as an integral part of the EU delegation 
  
 
at all levels in the G20. Today, the Commission can thus be considered as a full member of the 
G20. 
Formal relations between the ILO and the EU’s predecessors were established in the 
1950s. The European Coal and Steel Community in 1953 (ILO Office 1953: 290–91) and the 
European Economic Community in 1958 (ILO Office 1958: 65–6) were initially granted a status 
that can be placed in our attendant category. Since then, formal relations have been regularly 
renewed, notably with exchanges of letters in 1961 (ILO Office 1961: 532–3), 1989 (ILO Office 
1990: 180–81) and 2001 (ILO Office 2001: 79–81). These exchanges reflected the internal 
expansion of the Union’s social dimension. For example, the 1989 exchange of letters stated that 
the EU should play a greater role in the ILO due to this internal expansion (ILO Office 1990: 
180). Moreover, these exchanges of letters have formed to backbone of the intensification of the 
inter-organizational cooperation between the Commission and the ILO Office (Orbie and Tortell 
2009), while the EU institutions play an increasingly prominent role in the coordination and 
representation of the Union in ILO standard-setting (Delarue 2006, Kissack 2011).  However, the 
increased importance of the EU has not led it to reach the threshold for becoming an observer, 
participant, or member in the ILO. 
The FAO’s constitution of 1945 only provided for the membership of states. 
Consequently, the EU could not become a member at the time of its establishment in 1957. 
Through an exchange of letters in 1962, a closer cooperation between the European Commission 
and the FAO was envisaged. The most important element was to grant observer status to the EU. 
Henceforth the EU could be invited to all meetings dealing with issues that are of common 
interest or where collaboration is deemed to be desirable. The letters also suggested that 
eventually membership could be considered (Hallstein and Sen 1962). This ‘non-permanent 
  
 
observer’ status implied that the EU had the right to speak but not to vote. Legally speaking it 
could only intervene after the members of the FAO had spoken and upon approval of the 
chairperson. In practice, however, the EU became a ‘privileged observer’, stretching the limits of 
its observer status to a maximum (Frid 1993: 241, Frid 1995: 230, Tavares De Pinho 1993: 657, 
Van de Voorde 1992: 57–58). In 1971, following a Commission proposal for full membership of 
the FAO (European Commission 1971), the Council agreed that the observer status should be 
‘enhanced in a pragmatic way’. In community matters, the Commission should fully participate 
and act as the spokesperson of the member states (European Council 1972). Nevertheless, the EU 
remained a non-permanent observer, and it still depended on the chairperson to decide whether 
the EU had to wait until all members had spoken before it could intervene in the meetings (Frid 
1995: 230). 
In 1991 the FAO constitution was amended so as to allow for the accession of ‘regional 
economic integration organizations’ which meet a number of criteria such as the authority to 
make binding decisions over their member states on a range of matters within the purview of the 
FAO. In the same year the EU became a full member of the FAO, and, given the rigid 
membership criteria, it is unlikely that any other regional organisations would be allowed to 
follow the EU’s example. Consequently, it also has the right to vote. The ‘no plural voting’ 
clause in the new constitution provides that if the EU votes on an issue then the member states 
will refrain from doing so, and vice versa, so that the EU’s total voting weight within the FAO 
does not increase as a consequence of the EU’s membership. Despite its legal and political 
recognition as a full member, there are still certain areas where the EU does not have the same 
prerogatives as other members. Specifically, it is excluded from budgetary and institutional 
discussions (Frid 1995: 266–7, Pedersen 2007: 64–5). Some argue that it is better to speak of a 
  
 
‘parallel full membership’ with the member states since the EU’s voting power depends on 
whether the issue at stake is an exclusive or a shared competence (Emerson et al. 2011: 44). This 
still constitutes a qualitative leap compared with its previous observer status. 
Making Long-term Participation Work: Initial Decision, Path Dependency and Critical 
Junctures 
Initial Decision 
The cases included in this chapter predominantly point to a marked and long-term continuity of 
the EU’s membership status in IOs (see Figure 2.1 for an illustration). Before looking for 
explanations, we turn to the starting point of this continuity, i.e. the ‘initial decision’ concerning 
the Union’s status. In doing so, we turn to the internal/external and legal/political factors that 
were mentioned in the introduction to this chapter. Which factors are behind the initial decisions 
on the EU’s membership status? External legal factors play a decisive role in the opportunity for 
the EU to participate in the identified international institutions. In the event that the IO is created 
after the establishment of the EU in 1957, the initial decision is situated around the decision to 
create the new institution. For example, at the time of the creation of the OECD, the DAC and the 
G8/G20, the question of EU membership came to the surface. Conversely, if the IO is older than 
the EU, as in the cases of the ILO and the FAO, it is very likely that its constitution only provides 
for observer status of non-state actors and not for full membership. The GATT is one exception: 
its constitution was less constraining since the GATT was not an international organisation but 
rather a multilateral treaty. Consequentially, it was easier for the EU to become a full participant 
of the GATT, even though the latter was already established in 1947. There was also broad 
political support for full membership inside the EU and from other GATT signatories. 
  
 
However, although the external legal context might be important, it is not sufficient as an 
explanation. On the one hand, there is considerable variation in the EU’s membership status in 
institutions that were created after 1957. External political factors often play a decisive role in 
these decisions. For example, the 1961 decision to grant the Community full membership in the 
DAC was driven by a favourable geopolitical context, which took precedence over the legal and 
political objections that existed at the time (Carroll and Kellow 2011). Also, the 1999 decision 
not to grant the Commission any status in the G20 was driven by the veto of the United States of 
America (US) against including the Commission in these institutions. 
Moreover, there exists interplay between internal political factors (i.e. preference 
homo/heterogeneity among EU member states) and the external political context that is important 
during the initial decision. For example, this interplay comes to the fore when looking at the 1961 
decision to make the Community a full participant in the OECD. While the geopolitical context 
was favourable, notably with the US in favour of full membership, the Community ultimately had 
to settle for full participation as the result of a compromise between its own member states. 
Countries such as Belgium, the Netherlands or Italy joined the US in favour of full membership, 
but this fell on deaf ears with France and the UK, who felt that this was a prerogative of 
sovereign states (Verschaeve and Takacs 2013). Similarly, once more against the background of a 
favourable geopolitical context, the 1977 decision to make the Community a full participant in 
the G8 was the result of a compromise between its member states. Another example comes from 
the Community’s full participation in the GATT, where, without explicit possibilities foreseen in 
the Agreement, political practice to have the Community at the table as a full participant was 
accepted internally and externally. 
  
 
On the other hand, the EU’s observer status within older IOs also differs from attendant 
(ILO) to observer (FAO). In order to explain the variation between these two cases, it should be 
noted that internal legal factors also play a role, since the EU’s competences in matters covered 
by the FAO were more substantial than competences in ILO-related issues at the time of the 
establishment of the EU. However, the distribution of competences does not always explain the 
EU’s membership status. While it is true that the Union’s competences are often used as an 
argument in favour of or against a specific membership status, they are a rather unreliable 
predictor for the initial decisions. For example, at the time of the 1961 decision to grant the 
Community full membership in the DAC, this was not supported by substantial competences in 
the field of development. Nevertheless, geopolitical factors brushed aside this objection, resulting 
in the Community taking a place at the table as a full member (Verschaeve and Takacs 2013). 
Path Dependency and Critical Junctures 
The general picture that emerges from our analysis hitherto is that, once the EU has embraced 
participation in an international institution, its initial membership status is unlikely to change 
over the following decades. The cases show that the effects of long-term participation of the EU 
in an IO tend to correspond to what historical institutionalism has defined as ‘path dependency’. 
According to this theory, member states delegate power to the EU level at a certain point in time, 
prompted by their short-term interests. In the long run, however, their initial decisions can 
become increasingly irrational due to changing preferences or unforeseen consequences. 
Nonetheless, member states are generally unable to fix this discrepancy between their initial and 
newfound interest, since this is often too expensive (e.g. because of the costs already incurred) or 
even impossible (e.g. because of the veto power of one institutional actor; Meunier and 
McNamara 2007, Pierson 1996). As a result, member states are locked in a path, and adapt to the 
  
 
new – sometimes suboptimal – situation. Only in moments of rapid change in internal and 
external conditions – critical junctures – is (radical) change possible. ‘As such, … critical 
junctures constitute a situation that is qualitatively different from the “normal” historical 
development of the institutional setting of interests’ (Cappoccia and Kelemen 2007: 348). 
The historical institutionalist dynamics described above clearly apply to our cases. 
Despite significant internal and external changes over time, the EU’s membership status has 
remained fairly constant (see Figure 2.1). For example, the upgrading of internal competences for 
the EU in certain areas such as social affairs and employment has not enhanced its attendant 
status in the ILO. One important factor here is the continuing reluctance of the EU member states 
to similarly delegate the external representation of these issues to the supranational level 
(Johnson 2005: 161). Despite the development of an extensive agricultural and fisheries policy at 
the EU level since the 1960s, and several calls by the Commission for full membership in the 
FAO, it took more than three decades before the EU became a member of this international 
institution. Similarly, while the economic integration of the EU had been significantly expanded 
since the end of the 1970s and even extended to monetary integration in the Euro zone, for a very 
long time (until the late 2000s) the European Commission was not represented in the G20 
because of opposition from the US. Another example of the limited value of internal competences 
to explain continuity in the EU’s membership status concerns the EU’s membership in the 
OECD. Even though the EU obtained legal personality with the entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty, which overcomes the legal hurdle for obtaining full membership of the OECD, the EU’s 
membership status has not changed as this has been opposed by non-EU members of the OECD. 
[Insert Figure 2.1 here] 
  
 
Figure 2.1 EU membership evolution in a selection of IOs 
Also, changing internal political factors have not always entailed a change in the EU’s 
membership status. For example, despite EU member states’ contestation of EU competences in 
development aid since the 1960s, the EU’s membership status in the DAC has remained 
untouched over time. Also in the field of trade, the political context does not provide a 
satisfactory explanation for the EU’s membership status. The EU became a member of the newly 
established WTO despite the changing political atmosphere in the early 1990s around the role of 
the EU in ‘new’ and ‘deep’ trade issues. Notwithstanding the contestation surrounding the EU’s 
role in the new trade agenda, the de facto practice that had been established in the GATT was 
extended by providing mixed EU/member states formal membership of the WTO, whereas in 
political terms it is the supranational level that has full membership. Conversely, while the 
Commission’s role in dealing with new trade issues was accepted by the member states and even 
legalised in the new Lisbon Treaty, this has not led to the withdrawal of EU member states’ 
formal membership of the WTO. Again, continuity is remarkably strong. 
However, our research also shows two important examples of change in membership 
status: the full membership of the FAO since 1991, and the participation of the European 
Commission in the G20 since 2008. These exceptions to the rule can be explained by looking at 
the broader political context, which was changing drastically at the time of the decision to 
upgrade the EU’s membership status. While the Commission and some member states had been 
advocating full membership of the FAO for decades (e.g. European Commission 1971), and 
while nothing prevented the EU from negotiating membership of the FAO from the 1960s 
onwards when the agricultural provisions of the Rome Treaty had been fully implemented (Frid 
1993: 239), it took until the end of the 1980s before a change of the FAO’s constitution became 
  
 
politically feasible inside and outside the EU. In spite of changing circumstances, the status quo 
created at the time of the FAO’s establishment in 1945 was maintained for a long time. The 
Commission was not allowed to start negotiations with the FAO and its members, even though 
only France directly opposed this initiative. A large majority of member states, including 
Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, were even in favour of membership talks 
(COREPER 1972). The prospect of difficult and lengthy negotiations within the FAO lent further 
support to those favouring the status quo. Then again, how can we explain that the EU’s 
membership status eventually changed? 
Three specific characteristics of the end of the 1980s (e.g. Sandholz and Zysman 1989) 
provided the context within which the EU’s membership status of the FAO could be readdressed. 
First, this was a period of ‘europtimism’ initiated by the ‘Europe 1992’ project under the auspices 
of the Delors Commission. During this ‘brief, shining moment’ (Dinan 2004: 206) the European 
project also received broad support from policy-makers and the public at large, who widely 
agreed that one lesson of the 1970s was that many issues cannot be adequately addressed at the 
national level. Within this context, the Commission skilfully advanced integrationist proposals 
that went even beyond purely internal market issues. Second, the context appeared favourable for 
concessions on the part of member states in the area of agriculture. Again, the Commission 
played an important role. EU external policies at the time were dominated by the GATT Uruguay 
Round, with agricultural concessions at the forefront. At the same time, the EU was preparing a 
far-reaching Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) reform under Agricultural Commissioner 
MacSharry. Against this background, national sovereignty in agricultural issues had become, 
more than ever, unthinkable. Moreover, compared to the agricultural policy reforms being 
introduced at the EU and global levels, the loss of sovereignty involved in the EU’s membership 
  
 
of the FAO seemed only negligible. Third, since the end of the Cold War, the former Eastern bloc 
countries, who were the most consistent opponents of EU membership, had become less reluctant 
than in the past (Frid 1993, Van de Voorde 1992: 54). This last factor cannot explain why the 
Council agreed to start talks on accession with the FAO in April 1989, but it facilitated their 
successful conclusion in November 1991. 
Within this facilitating context, an immediate cause for the reconsideration of the EU’s 
membership was the negotiations on the ‘Indian Ocean Tuna Commission’ in the FAO (Frid 
1995: 270). This new IO would deal with an issue that belongs to the exclusive competences of 
the EU (i.e. fisheries). However, the EU could not become a member because it was not a 
member of the FAO.
91
 The alternative solution to this problem was that a new institution would 
be established, outside the context of the FAO and the UN, to which the EU could easily become 
a member (Agence Europe 1989). Thus, because of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission case and 
another related case (i.e. a similar agreement on fishing in the Mediterranean), the FAO had a 
distinct institutional interest in EU membership, which would allow its bureaucratic expansion 
towards more specific organisations. This tilting of interests on the side of the FAO is interesting 
because the FAO was generally reluctant concerning the accession of regional organisations.
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Yet, it realised that fully involving the actors who are responsible for the issues at stake (i.e. the 
                                                     
91 In 1978 the European Commission had already requested full membership in the FAO’s Fisheries committee, arguing that its 
observer status did not allow it to work adequately in the committee. The FAO Council argued, though, that this would involve 
extremely complicated changes to the FAO constitution and that the EU could fully use its observer status (Tavares De Pinho 
1993: 657–8). 
92 Even when accepting the accession of the EU, the FAO, together with industrialised countries, aimed at a stringent definition of 
‘regional economic integration organizations’ to which only the EU qualifies, in order to avoid ‘an unhappy precedent’ for other 
regional organisations (Van de Voorde 1992: 59). 
  
 
EU in the area of fisheries) would also increase the leverage and legitimacy of the FAO’s 
workings (Frid 1995: 238 and 270). It is probably no coincidence that the Council decided to start 
talks on membership in April 1989, two years after the Commission’s proposal, but in the same 
month as the organisation of a conference on the establishment of the Indian Ocean Tuna 
Commission (Tavares de Pinho 1993: 658). When such a Commission was established in 1993, it 
explicitly provided for the membership of regional organisations to which states have transferred 
relevant competences, so that the EU could easily accede. 
Also, the upgrade of the Commission’s status in the G20 took place in a rapidly changing 
international context, namely the global financial crisis. When the G20 was upgraded to the level 
of Heads of State and Government in 2008, the Commission was suddenly fully accepted as an 
integral part of the EU delegation at all levels in the G20. This unexpected entrance of the 
Commission at the G20 is remarkable given the traditional reluctance of G7 members to involve 
the European Commission in the G7 and the G20. The global financial crisis expanded the range 
of choice possibilities for key G20 actors on possible Commission involvement. In other words, it 
made the inclusion of the European Commission in the G20 more likely because of at least two 
reasons. First, the EU member states acknowledged the potentially important role of the 
Commission in a European response to the crisis, as witnessed by its role as initiator and 
coordinator of the European Economic Recovery Plan. An illustrative response at the 
international level is the discussion in early 2008 on possible membership of the European 
Commission in the Financial Stability Forum, the executive arm of the G20 (US Embassy 
London cable 04/02/2008). Second, one of the main issues to be tackled by the G20 in 2008 and 
2009 was the regulation of financial markets and services. The Commission is responsible for 
proposing and monitoring the legal framework in financial services and is conceived as an 
  
 
influential actor in this matter (Quaglia 2010: 134). Involving the Commission in the G20 was 
thus not only necessary because of the distribution of competences within the EU, it would also 
add a considerable amount of expertise to the G20’s work. Moreover, given its agenda-setting 
powers and the right to initiate and draft legislation, having the Commission at the table would 
increase the chances of swift implementation of G20 measures by the EU. 
Additionally, the decision to convene an international summit at leaders level in 2008 was 
taken at a meeting of the French President Sarkozy and the Commission President Barroso with 
US President Bush at Camp David. Sarkozy and Barroso envisaged an enlarged G8 summit. In 
this format, Commission participation would have been secured, given its involvement in the G8. 
A few days after this meeting, the US announced that it would invite the G20 leaders to the crisis 
meeting. Even though the Commission was not involved in the G20, it would have been difficult 
for President Bush not to invite Barroso after their joint decision for a summit at Camp David. 
The Effects of Long-term Participation 
While the previous sections provide evidence of a strong consistency in the EU’s membership 
status over time, this section takes a closer look at the long-term effects that stem from it. In 
doing so, we pay particular attention to the effects of the EU on an IO (uploading) as well as the 
effects the other way around (downloading). Starting with the latter, it seems that in a number of 
cases a strong membership status may eventually result in an expansion of the intra-EU 
competences in that particular policy area. For example, contrary to the preferences of several 
member states, the DAC helped the EU in establishing its role as a strong development actor. 
Before the EU took part in the work of the DAC, the Commission was unable to play an assertive 
development role vis-à-vis its member states as the EU lacked both legal competences and 
  
 
analytical capacities in the field of development cooperation (Frisch 2008, Grilli 1994). DAC 
membership, however, reversed this situation because the EU became a member of an important 
network of aid agencies and development donors. As a result, the Commission rapidly became a 
fully informed development player increasingly assuming for itself a strong aid role (Carroll and 
Kellow 2011, Cosgrove-Twitchett 1978). This, among other factors, eventually resulted in the 
delegation of shared development competences to the EU level in 1992 with the Maastricht 
Treaty (Arts and Dickson 2004, Verschaeve and Takacs 2013). Nonetheless, at that time, and 
even up to the time of writing, development cooperation remains a highly sensitive and contested 
EU policy. Also in the trade domain, the EU’s competences were extended, to cover sensitive 
issues such as intellectual property rights, services and investment in order to bring the internal, 
formal rules in line with the established practice within the WTO. 
The effects of long-term participation also go the other way round, referring to the effects 
of the EU on IOs. This can be illustrated with the case of the GATT/WTO. More specifically, at 
the time of the WTO’s establishment in 1995, the decision on the EU’s membership status was de 
facto a non-decision for both EU and non-EU members as the Union quasi-automatically 
obtained the full membership status. This stems from the fact that the EU had always taken part 
in the work of the GATT as if it was a contracting party (Hilf 1995, Billiet 2006). In other words, 
over time the EU had developed a reputation – or perhaps even identity – as a de facto member of 
the GATT, which was impossible to reverse at the time of the WTO’s establishment talks. As a 
result, alternative options were not explored, even though they could have been – theoretically 
speaking – equally or perhaps more suitable. 
The case of the FAO also shows that a critical juncture leading to a change in membership 
status, can, in the long-term, also involve a change in related organisations that were established 
  
 
before the change of membership status. Such a membership spill-over has been witnessed by the 
EU’s accession to the Codex Alimentarius Commission (the ‘Codex’), created by the FAO and 
the World Health Organization in 1963. Expectations that EU membership to the FAO would 
quickly spill over into accession to the Codex did not materialise because of disagreements 
within the FAO and within the EU (Frid 1995: 275, Van Schaik 2013). Once again, it proved 
difficult to change the membership rules of an ‘old’ IO in the face of opposition from a number 
of member states, even if there seemed to be sound legal and political reasons to do so. However, 
proponents of EU accession to the Codex continued to use the example of the FAO in arguing for 
membership of the Codex. At the end of the 1990s the bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) 
crisis and the hormones case provided a window of opportunity that further legitimised a 
common EU approach to food issues. In July 2003 the EU eventually became a Codex member. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the evolution of the EU’s membership status, in politico-legal terms, 
in eight IOs within the socio-economic sphere: the GATT/WTO, the OECD family (OECD and 
DAC), the Gx family (G8 and G20), the ILO and the FAO. We have found that, between the 
different IOs, the EU’s status varied significantly, ranging from absent to a full member. For 
example, in 2014, the EU is a member of the WTO, but only an attendant in the ILO. Our second 
main finding is that the EU’s membership status neither changes regularly, nor drastically. The 
EU’s membership status has remained constant for decades in the ILO, OECD, DAC, G8 and 
GATT/WTO. 
Both main findings confront the existing literature on the EU’s role in IOs with problems. 
Common explanations, based on differences in internal/external and legal/political explanations 
  
 
such as IO rules (external, legal), EU competences (internal, legal), external context (external, 
political) and internal preferences (internal, political), cannot fully explain our findings. To 
reiterate, while the EU has shared competence for social policy, agriculture and fisheries, 
economic cohesion and consumer protection – Art. 4.2 Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU) – and mixed competence in development cooperation (Art. 4.4 TFEU), 
its membership status in the concordant IOs currently varies from full member (DAC, FAO), 
through full participant (OECD) to attendant (ILO). Also, changes over time in the EU’s internal 
competences and the other three variables are not similarly reflected in the evolution of the EU’s 
membership status in these IOs. 
Our research leads to three main conclusions. The first is that the EU’s membership status 
is ‘sticky’: it does not tend to change – neither often, nor radically. This thus gives great weight 
to the ‘initial decision’ on the EU’s membership status within an IO. This initial decision, we 
have shown, is dependent on its timing (when an IO precedes the establishment of the EU, its 
founding text generally does not foresee the full membership of non-states), and influenced by an 
interplay of internal and external political factors, where the big players internationally (the US) 
and internally (France, Germany and the UK) play a decisive role. Our second main finding is 
that the EU’s status is not completely rigid. It can change (in our cases: be upgraded), but only in 
a short time frame when the external and internal context is changing rapidly. We have identified 
two such critical junctures: the ‘europtimism’ and end of the Cold War era at the end of the 1980s 
and early 1990s (enabling full membership of the FAO) and the international financial crisis at 
the end of the 2000s (enabling Commission membership of the G20). Our third conclusion is that 
this path dependency of the EU’s status in IOs has important and often unintended consequences 
  
 
beyond the EU’s role in the IO. It has an impact on both the IO’s workings and the EU’s internal 
division of competences and policies. 
These three conclusions offer interesting hypotheses to be tested on the EU’s status in 
other socio-economic international organisations – such as the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), the World Bank and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) – as well as in other IOs (for example in the security, environmental or human rights 
spheres). Our analysis indicates that historical institutionalism might be a good theoretical 
candidate to explain the variety in the EU’s membership status in IOs. Whether this theory 
actually applies to the entire study of EU–IO relations is hard to tell. However, based on our 
inductive case studies and the – at first sight – strong explanatory value of historical 
institutionalism, we believe that additional deductive research on this topic is worthwhile 
exploring. 
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